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ABSTRACT 
 
This study explores the challenges of urban planning for poverty reduction 
that are faced by public institutions in urban Kenya. The existing studies in 
urban planning show that very little is known about these challenges. 
However, it is well acknowledged that globally urban poverty has increased at 
rates much higher than rural poverty. Indeed, poverty presents a dilemma for 
policy makers and citizens in Sub-Saharan African cities such as Nairobi and 
raises questions as to why poverty continues to grow despite the 
implementation of urban plans, policies and poverty reduction programmes. 
 
As a largely uncharted research area, it was necessary to explore the problem 
in significant depth; thus a qualitative research methodology was adopted to 
explore the case study of the Local Authorities Service Delivery Action Plans 
(LASDAP) in Nairobi’s Viwandani ward. Data were gathered and triangulated 
by means of focus groups and in-depth and semi-structured interviews. These 
were supplemented by key informant data, document reviews and an 
extensive review of urban planning and political science literature. A total of 
ninety-nine people including sixty-six men and thirty-three women participated 
in this study. The respondents were drawn from communities in Viwandani, 
city planners and other staff from the City of Nairobi, central government, and 
politicians. To analyse these data, a range of analytical techniques, namely a 
hybrid of categorisations, data displays, pattern matching and in some cases 
theoretical propositions were applied. These generated a set of themes for 
discussing the challenges of urban planning from the case study. The results 
were cross-checked with interview respondents and key informants and then 
validated in key feedback consultations in the study communities. 
 
This study shows that a long tradition of “power over the constitution”, 
embodied by the notion of an imperial presidency not only imposes one’s will 
over the people, but also can virtually destroy institutions. This study also 
finds that the legal framework for urban planning in Kenya is anchored in 
stakeholders’ involvement that only pays lip service to citizen’s participation 
 iv 
and to accountability. Since the old Constitution was not supportive of 
participation and accountability, the planning predictably restricted space for 
citizen participation and did not provide for significant accountability by public 
officers. Therefore, the participation in the LASDAP in Viwandani was simply a 
sophisticated form of manipulation of citizens that is conceptualised as 
facipulation in the study. Facipulation here refers to the facilitation of a project 
to give the impression that citizens have the power to influence decisions of 
the state while at the same time being manipulated to ensure that the covert 
interests of powerful actors in the state are not undermined. 
 
The study reveals that challenges which public institutions face in urban 
planning for poverty reduction are both multi-layered and complex. The results 
show that the institutional framework for implementing the LASDAP in Kenya 
was by design defective in planning for poverty reduction. The study further 
reflects that the processes of constitutional development affect the form and 
types of political institutions established for urban planning. To achieve an 
urban planning framework for poverty reduction, therefore, institutional reform 
processes should be cognisant of and address the insidious power 
represented by the reluctance to shift the current institutional framework away 
from the status quo. The framework should also be aligned to the aspirations 
as expressed in the recently promulgated Constitution. In this Constitution 
citizens of Kenya are vested with all sovereign power and power is to be 
exercised only in accordance with the Constitution.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE POVERTY QUESTION IN URBAN KENYA 
 
 
1.1 Urban Planning and Poverty Reduction 
The major urban challenges of the twenty-first century include the rapid 
growth of many cities and the decline of others, the expansion of the informal 
sector, and the role of cities in causing or mitigating climate change. Evidence 
from around the world suggests that contemporary urban planning has largely 
failed to address these challenges. 
Ban Ki Moon, 2009 
 
Globally, many organisations have expressed concern about the growing level 
of poverty (World Bank, 2001; 2005; UNDP, 2005; Sachs, 2005; Collier, 2007; 
Green, 2008). In 2001, close to half of the world’s population was classified as 
poor (Collier and Dollar, 2001: 1787). Out of these, an estimated 30 per cent 
of the world’s poverty stricken people were in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This 
translated into forty of the fifty-one countries in Africa having more than 50 per 
cent of their population living in slums and, unsurprisingly, 62 per cent of the 
urban population in these countries was living in slums in 2010 (UN Habitat, 
2011: 32). Conservative estimates show that at least 320 million people live in 
abject poverty in SSA’s cities (United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (UNDESA), 2010). 
 
From the ‘one-or-two-dollars a day’ perspective, the absolute number of the 
poor, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly on the increase. Recent data 
using international poverty lines of 1.25 dollars shows that the poor increased 
from 214 million in 1984 to 390 million people in 2005 in SSA (Ravallion and 
Chen, 2008:35). The optimistic reports notwithstanding, the relentless focus 
on poverty reduction from the 1990s by both the international development 
community and national governments, strongly indicates that the war against 
poverty remains indeterminate and its eradication in the future will be a 
Pyrrhic victory, particularly in Africa (Chandy and Gertz, 2011; Mitlin and 
Satterthwaite, 2011). 
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Efforts by governments and donors to address urban poverty have generally 
been ineffective. Moser’s (1995) analysis of various social and economic 
policies for urban poverty shows that globally these policies ignored various 
dimensions of poverty and were also constrained in addressing urban poverty. 
She notes: 
 
Despite increased resource allocations to urban development, there is 
no guarantee that individual sectoral interventions will have significant 
impact on urban poverty reduction. .... Lack of a cross-sectoral 
planning methodology tends to result in “Christmas tree” approach with 
arbitrary interventions in different unconnected sectors (Moser, 
1995:161). 
 
Ravallion et al. (2007: 690-691) show that unlike on the other continents, 
poverty, particularly in urban areas, has been on the increase in Africa. While 
the urban poverty situation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is not dissimilar to 
the Latin American or Asian condition, in Sub-Saharan Africa’s cities poverty 
remains one of the most enduring challenges for city and national 
governments. In articulating the myriad of challenges that face these cities, 
there is much consensus on the following: a fast growing population, and a 
growing inability by cities and their governments to provide for these 
populations’ shelter, transportation, employment and health (Devas, 1999; 
Devas and Rakodi, 1993; Swilling 1997; Douglass and Friedmann, 1998; 
Garland, Massoumi and Ruble, 2007; UN Habitat, 2009). These changes 
notwithstanding, poverty in SSA’s cities presents a difficult dilemma and 
questions abound as to why it continues to grow even when urban plans, 
policy reform and anti-poverty programmes are implemented. 
 
Indeed, poverty is clearly one of the most glaring challenges in Kenya. The 
poverty rate has been on the increase since independence as confirmed by 
government itself (Republic of Kenya, 1965; 1969; 1978; 1983; 1988; 1993; 
1996; 1999; 2001; 2004, 2008). In its forty-seventh year of independence, 
Kenya faces an increasingly acute challenge related to burgeoning poverty. 
Computed mainly by using the poverty line, poverty has worsened from 30 per 
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cent of the population in the 1970s (Manda et al., 2001:16) to an estimated 60 
per cent in 2004 (Government of Kenya, 2004:7) and improved to an 
estimated 48 percent in 2010 (UNDP, 2011). 
 
According to the 1994 Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS), the incidence of 
poverty was 47 per cent in rural Kenya and 29 per cent in the urban areas.1 
Previous studies on poverty (for example Crawford and Thorbecke, 1978; 
Collier and Lal 1980; Bigsten, 1987; World Bank, 1995; Narayan and 
Nyamwaya, 1996; and Mwabu et al, 2000) drew on national level databases 
to produce poverty estimates disaggregated for rural and urban poverty at 
national levels. 
Table 1.1: Overall Poverty estimates in Kenya 1981-1997 
Region/Province Per cent of the poor 
 1981/82 1992 1994 1997 
Central 25.7 35.9 31.9 31.4 
Coast 54.6 43.5 55.6 62.1 
Eastern 47.7 42.2 57.8 58.6 
Rift Valley 51.1 51.1 42.9 50.1 
North Eastern N/A N/A 58.0 N/A 
Nyanza 57.9 47.4 42.2 63.1 
Western 53.8 54.2 53.8 58.8 
Nairobi N/A 26.5 25.9 50.2 
Rural 48.8 46.3 46.8 52.9 
Urban N/A 29.3 28.9 49.2 
National 46.8 46.3 46.8 52.3 
Source:  Adapted from Manda, Kimenyi and Mwabu (2001:18) 
 
Although this data is limited to the late 1990s, it shows that the incidence of 
poverty has generally been higher in the rural areas. However, the proportion 
of the urban poor has also increased significantly from below 29 per cent in 
the 1980s to 49 per cent in 1997 and currently estimated stands at 34 per cent 
(Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2008). This phenomenal growth in urban 
poverty took place mainly in the City of Nairobi. From the mid 1990s Nairobi 
recorded the highest increase in poverty compared to other urban areas, from 
                                            
1
 Data on changes in poverty at national, regional and local levels are not readily available. 
This is because the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics only started compiling such 
disaggregated data in 2003. However, there have been numerous studies that have 
attempted this analysis. 
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26 per cent in 1994 to 50 per cent in 1997. With an estimated 70 percent of 
Nairobi’s population living in informal settlements (UN Habitat, 2008), it is 
likely that much more than 50 percent in Nairobi are poor. This is because of 
the perpetual political exclusion and skewed allocation of national resources 
(Republic of Kenya, 2008a).  
 
The Society for International Development (2004; 2006) and Republic of 
Kenya (2008a) observed that the Central and Rift Valley Provinces unfairly 
benefitted from national resources because these were the home regions of 
Presidents Kenyatta and Moi respectively (Mueller, 1972; 2008; Oyugi, 
Wanyande and Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003). The Society for International 
Development (2004; 2006) shows that the Central Province and Rift Valley 
Province received inordinately higher allocations of national resources. 
Kiringai (2006) in a related study finds: 
 
During Kenyatta’s era, districts in his political base received a relatively 
higher share of development expenditure for roads. However, when 
Daniel arap Moi took over in 1978, the situation reversed and in 1986-
87, for example, Rift Valley Province alone accounted for 52 percent of 
total roads development expenditure. In 1987-88 Moi base provinces 
received 49 percent of rural health spending and 33 percent of Rural 
Development Fund compared to 18 and 33 percent, respectively, for 
Kenyatta base provinces. By the sixteenth year of Moi’s rule, his 
political base was getting 67 percent of roads budget compared to 16 
percent for Kenyatta base (Kiringai, 2006:38). 
 
Conversely, regions such as Nyanza Province and Nairobi that were 
opposition strongholds were allocated marginal national resources as 
punishment for their political views and opinions (Society of International 
Development, 2004). From the above, it is evident that politics of patronage 
played an important role in the distribution of poverty in Kenya. Poverty in 
urban areas remains at 10 percent lower than in rural areas (Republic of 
Kenya, 2012) because the people in urban areas are generally much more 
dependent on the economy; thus they are susceptible to changes in the 
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economy. Therefore, the changes of poverty in Kenya during the 1990s were 
also attributed to changes in fiscal and monetary policies such as the removal 
of price controls and liberalisation of the foreign exchange markets (Chitere 
and Oyugi, 2005:7). The country also experienced drought, increases in fuel 
prices and suffered ethnic clashes and politically instigated violence that led to 
the displacement of thousands of people in the Coast and Rift Valley 
Provinces and a significant reduction in food production in 1992, 1997, and 
2008 respectively (Republic of Kenya, 2008; Cheeseman, 2008; Lubaale, 
2009; Meijerink, Roza and van Berkum, 2009). 
 
Although there are challenges with the reliability of poverty data in Kenya in 
the 2000s, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) data show that the 
poverty situation has changed favourably, with poverty beginning to reduce. 
For instance, the 2005 – 2006 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 
(KIHBS) estimates the incidence of poverty at 47 per cent. This is the 
population that lives below the U.S. $ 1.25 per day poverty line. In 2004, the 
Society for International Development Study’s study on inequality showed that 
poverty increased in all the regions, indicating that more people were poor 
because they lived below the threshold of the poverty line. The current and 
disaggregated data on poverty in the 2000s shows a steady growth in urban 
poverty (see, for example, World Bank, 2009). 
 
Nairobi has the highest number of poor people amongst all regions of urban 
Kenya, estimated at 880,000. Although Nairobi is classified as a region or 
Province, the area covered by the Province and City of Nairobi are the same. 
Thus, taking into account that Nairobi is indeed a city unlike the other regions 
such as Western, Coast or Central Provinces, Nairobi ironically is the city with 
the highest incidence of poverty in Urban Kenya. 
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1.1.1 Inequality, another dimension of Kenya’s Poverty 
 
Using the Gini coefficient to measure inequality, the distribution of incomes in 
Kenya reveals further dimensions of poverty.2 With a Gini coefficient value of 
0.477 in 2011 (UNDP, 2011), Kenya’s inequality is serious. Table 1.2 shows 
that in Kenya, inequality is most serious in Nairobi. Nairobi not only has the 
highest Gini coefficient of 0.586, but also accounts for close to 45 per cent of 
Kenya’s national income (Economic Survey reports). In Nairobi, the top 10 per 
cent and 20 per cent of households hold 45 per cent and 64 per cent of total 
income respectively. The bottom 10 per cent and 20 per cent of households 
accounts for 1.6 per cent and 4 per cent of total income respectively. 
Moreover, the inequality in Nairobi represents a critical feature of poverty in 
urban Kenya. Thus, unlike the other regions that have both rural and urban 
populations, the inequality in Nairobi highlights the severity of poverty in urban 
Kenya. 
 
Table 1.2: Income distribution by province 
Province Gini 
coefficient 
Proportion of income accruing to 
 Income) Top 10% Bottom 10% Top 20% Bottom 20% 
Nairobi 0.586 45.2 1.61 63.5 3.94 
Central 0.516 39.47 1.07 55.51 3.35 
Coast 0.511 33.77 1.34 50.16 4.33 
Eastern 0.571 42.34 0.94 58.86 3.04 
N.Eastern
3
 0.439 26.57 1.48 47.08 4.7 
Nyanza 0.563 42.81 0.63 60.69 2.15 
Rift Valley 0.575 42.58 0.79 59.76 2.46 
Western 0.586 41.08 0.66 59.07 2.27 
Kenya 0.571 42.72 0.76 59.17 2.51 
Source:  Society for International Development (2004:14) 
 
                                            
2
 The value of the Gini coefficient ranges from zero to one; with zero representing a situation 
of perfect equality and one representing perfect inequality. Thus, the closer a value for 
computed for the Gini coefficient is to zero the more equal that society is; and the conversely, 
the closer the Gini coefficient value is to one, then more unequal the society is. 
3
 This data covered only the urban parts of North Eastern Province 
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1.2 Problem Statement: The Conundrum of Poverty Reduction in 
Kenya  
 
Poverty reduction has been an important policy objective of Kenya’s 
development since independence. With the worsening of the poverty situation, 
as shown above, the analysis of the effectiveness of policy for poverty 
reduction has increasingly been a subject of research especially in the 
development economics discipline. Studies (for example Ikiara, 1998; Manda, 
Kimenyi and Mwabu, 2001; Omiti, Owino, Otieno and Odundo, 2002) have 
clearly identified the policies that have guided poverty reduction in Kenya. The 
policies adopted have mainly been presented as National Development Plans. 
Recent poverty studies (for example Chitere and Oyugi, 2005) note that 
although poverty reduction has remained an important development priority 
for Kenya it was only from the 1980s that earnest attempts were made to 
target poverty reduction. 
 
These studies identify the following as key policy interventions for poverty 
reduction since independence: land resettlement in the 1960s; provision of 
basic needs in the 1970s; promotion of rapid growth in the late 1970s; District 
Focus for Rural Development of the 1980s; promotion of the informal sector 
and micro finance enterprises in the late 1980s and 1990s; free primary 
education in the early 2000s; poverty reduction strategy papers in the late 
1990s and 2000s; and special funds of the late 1990s and 2000s (Ikiara, 
1998; Manda, Kimenyi and Mwabu, 2001; Omiti et al., 2002). Poverty in 
Kenya has been conceived as mainly a rural phenomenon (Republic of 
Kenya, 1965; 1969; 1978; 1983; 1988; 1993; 1996; 1999; 2001; 2004, 2008). 
One of the most disturbing outcomes of the worsening poverty in urban Kenya 
is not only the apparent failure of anti-poverty interventions to reduce poverty 
but also the relative neglect of poverty reduction through the national agenda 
for urban planning. 
 
Only recently the consensus emerged within the planning fraternity that 
poverty is one of the important issues for urban planning in developing 
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countries (UN Habitat, 2009:201-205). In the light of the above discussion, UN 
Habitat (2009) noted that one of the new roles of planning is to reduce 
poverty. However, it is reflectively noted that planning in general is dependent 
on “the nature of the political, institutional and legal systems in place, the 
relative roles of the public, private and community sectors in developmental 
activity, institutional capabilities and professional cultures” (Ibid: 206). 
Similarly, the thinking within influential actors such as the World Bank (2001) 
stressed the vital importance of setting up the right institutions in order to 
effectively address poverty. The World Bank argues that such institutions 
should be heavily dependent on the local context, traditions and political 
culture. However, establishing such ‘right’ institutions remains a practical and 
theoretical challenge.  
 
In the envisaged role of urban planning, it is clear that planning is and 
continues to be dependent on the institutional context. The existing research 
(for example Healey, 1992; Forester 1989; Sager, 1994; Flyvbjerg, 1996) 
investigates the role of planning in highly institutionalised and regulated 
contexts. Yet, how the context influences and shapes urban planning in 
poverty reduction remains speculative. 
 
The relationship between urban planning and poverty reduction in Kenya 
remains conjectural. Ikiara’s (1998) review of government policy for poverty 
reduction since independence establishes that weak political commitment and 
corruption have stymied the effectiveness of policy in poverty reduction. Also 
Omiti et al., (2002: 23), argue that Kenya has had the right policies; but the 
increasing poverty level is caused by lack of political will, dependence on 
donors, poorly resourced institutions, populist policies and exclusion of 
institutions designated for poverty reduction. Thus, four decades into 
independence policy development has been undermined by political 
reluctance to reform the restrictive and marginalising institutions. Furthermore, 
the 20-year bitter and fractious constitutional review process and on-going 
implementation of the 2010 Constitution where institutions for poverty 
reduction have not been established, is a clear example of the unwieldy 
environment for development and poverty reduction. 
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1.3 Research Question for the Study 
 
The main question addressed in this study is: What are the challenges of 
Planning for Poverty reduction by public institutions in Urban Kenya? This 
research seeks to respond to the following research sub-questions: 
 
a) What was the institutional framework for urban planning in Kenya in 
2005-2007? 
b) How did the institutional framework link/affect poverty reduction 
processes? 
c) How did the institutional framework affect citizen participation in urban 
planning? 
d) What mechanisms existed in the institutional framework for citizens to 
express their priorities and preferences in urban planning? 
e) What were the various state attempts to deal with poverty reduction in 
urban areas? 
f) To what extent did (planning) interventions respond to urban poverty? 
g) What was the power dynamics within the institutional and policy 
framework of urban planning for poverty reduction? 
 
1.4 Justification of the study  
 
This research is a historical and exploratory study aimed at a better 
understanding of the challenges of the state in planning for or dealing with 
urban poverty. Research on planning and poverty has been growing and is 
increasingly varying but it is yet substantially to address the challenges of 
urban planning for poverty reduction. In international literature attention has 
been given to a variety of areas such as: the relationship between the urban 
poor and poverty; governance and the poor; urban poverty reduction 
strategies; measurement of poverty; and community based planning and 
poverty reduction. For instance, Amis and Rakodi (1995) bring together 
research that investigates the relationship between the urban poor and 
poverty, showing how the poor cope with and adjust to worsening conditions 
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of poverty in urban areas in several developing countries including Sub-
Saharan Africa, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Jamaica. Rakodi’s 
(2004) research focused on the relationship between governance and the 
poor. Beard (2000) questions the usefulness of urban poverty reduction 
strategies that inadequately understand poverty. She draws on empirical 
studies of Indonesian households on notions of poverty. Beard (2000) finds 
conventional notions of poverty that inform planning and policy interventions 
to be unlikely to alleviate urban poverty. She argues for poverty reduction that 
is subtle and informed by nuanced ideas and life’s experiences of the urban 
poor. 
 
Mason and Beard (2008), in a study in Mexico’s Oaxaca city, sought to 
explain the relationship between community-based planning and poverty 
reduction. The theoretical framework they formulated for this study reflected 
that community-based planning is unique and varies depending on the 
available capabilities for poverty reduction.  
 
Other literature from South Africa has addressed themes bordering on the 
issues of poverty and urban planning. In their book based on South Africa, 
Planning and Transformation, Harrison, Todes and Watson (2008), for 
example, have chapters on ‘Responding to Informality’ and ‘Planning for 
Diversity’ but do not expressly address poverty. The reason for this may have 
to do with a sense of the limitations of planning. In their concluding chapter, 
Harrison et al. (2008) acknowledge the challenge of poverty, citing for 
example a report of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 
which indicated that 51 per cent of South Africans were living below the 
poverty line in 2001. They went on to quote a 2002 government report that 
argued that there is a strong link between integrated development planning 
and poverty reduction. They, however, concluded very cautiously and even 
sceptically: 
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There are a number of assumptions in this statement that are largely 
untested. Reviews of integrated development planning have suggested 
that many IDPs [Integrated Development Plans] do incorporate 
strategies for dealing with poverty (UNDP 2002) – many of these being 
about better service delivery and LED [Local Economic Development] 
strategies – but it is difficult to determine the extent of real impacts. 
There are also indications that attempting to deal with poverty obliquely 
through service delivery does not necessarily work – recent critiques of 
housing policy, for example, reveal that the provision of formal shelter 
may, in fact, have worsened the financial position of households which 
now face additional expenses (Harrison et al., 2008:247). 
For West Africa, Owusu (2008) considers the relationship between poverty 
reduction and policy using experiences of Ghana’s decentralisation policy. He 
looked at the opportunities presented by pursuing the Millennium 
Development Goals in improving service delivery in small towns. He finds that 
because of unequal power relations between the national and local 
governments, poverty reduction and local development are most likely to 
succeed in environments where there is a strong government that supports 
and pursues policies such as decentralisation. 
 
The overall picture is that poverty is spiralling in Sub-Saharan Africa’s cities 
and the effectiveness of urban planning responses to this phenomenon is 
increasingly questioned, given that incidences of poverty are at least 40 per 
cent of the population of these cities (UN Habitat, 2009:34). In the past 
decade, there have been attempts at addressing this increasing poverty, using 
various approaches such as Local Economic Development (Nel, 1994; 2001; 
Nel and Rogerson, 2005); the Integrated Development Plans in South Africa 
(Harrison, 2001; Mabin, 2002; DPLG, 2004); Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (World Bank and IMF, 2000) and the Local Authorities Service 
Delivery Action Plans (Muema, 2002, Lubaale, Agevi and Ngari, 2007). 
However, much of the research on these approaches has been in South 
Africa and not in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of the 
country studies on Poverty Reduction Strategies. 
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Similarly, the research on poverty is characterised by a relative neglect of 
urban Kenya. From the 1970s, the bulk of the studies on poverty have had a 
rural focus. These include the Integrated Rural Surveys (IRS) of 1974, 1977 
and 1982 conducted by the government. Academic research followed a 
similar pattern. For instance, Collier and Lal (1980) in explaining the 
relationship between growth and poverty drew on data from rural Kenya. 
Greer and Thorbecke’s (1986) contribution on understanding food poverty 
also draws on data from rural Kenya. Poverty studies in the 1990s and 2000s, 
in addition to being rural-centred, mainly focused on methods for the 
estimation of poverty (for instance Narayan and Nyamwaya, 1995; Manda, 
Kimenyi and Mwabu, 2001; Kimalu et al., 2002), understanding inequality 
(Society for International Development, 2004), and employment (Oiro, Mwabu 
and Manda, 2004) at the national scale. 
 
Several studies have addressed poverty in urban Kenya. In this thesis, I focus 
on three that reflect the main themes these studies cover. The first is 
Zwanenberg’s (1972) study on the history and theory of urban poverty in 
Nairobi. Drawing on empirical work in the slums of Nairobi, the study explores 
reasons for migration to the city and the effects this had on social services 
such as housing. The study shows that in the colonial era a policy of 
containment of Africans in the rural areas minimised pressure on social 
services. However, Africans in segregated urban facilities did not enjoy high 
quality services. In the early years of independence, while there was no 
segregation, pressure on existing housing stock and other social amenities 
continued to build as the population grew much faster than the services 
provided (Ibid..). In the second study, Ofwona (1991) used data from the 
1982/3 Household Budget Survey to describe the socio-economic differences 
between the poverty stricken and the rich in Nairobi. The third study by 
Wasike and Kimenyi (2001) also focused on urban Kenya; its scope was 
beyond Nairobi. It explored the relationship between micro-providers and 
alternative small-scale infrastructure delivery. This study also sought to 
analyse policy issues for improving access to infrastructure services. 
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In relation to the variegated foci of the research studies above, this thesis 
seeks to contribute in two main ways. First, it complements earlier work. 
Whereas Rakodi’s (2004) work dealt with some aspects of power, especially 
how politics and governance affect decision-making and its impact on poverty, 
this study analyses the relationship between urban planning and poverty 
reduction, and the role power plays in strengthening and/or weakening 
institutions for urban planning. Beard (2000) and Phasha’s (2005) work that 
begins investigation on planning and poverty has been novel in the planning 
field. Phasha (2005) uses Foucauldian ideas of power to assess the potential 
of the Johannesburg Regional Spatial Development Framework (RSDF) to 
alleviate poverty in the inner city of Johannesburg. This study not only builds 
on Foucauldian ideas of power, but also draws on notions of institutionalism 
from governance and international development fields to explore how planning 
interventions for poverty reduction are implemented. 
 
Therefore, by analysing the relationship between urban planning and poverty 
reduction, this study is an important addition to the literature on poverty and 
planning in Nairobi. Moreover, by examining the institutional and policy 
frameworks for urban planning for poverty reduction and how these constrain 
and/or enhance the responsiveness/effectiveness of urban planning in poverty 
reduction, this study shows that urban planning is context-dependent and the 
context is susceptible to and is modified by power. Thus, this research seeks 
to make an important first step on the journey of urban planning for poverty 
reduction. 
 
The study is aimed at describing and explaining the emerging phenomenon of 
urban planning for poverty reduction and to illuminate the impact of policy and 
institutional contexts on urban planning to reduce poverty. The study is also 
intended to be useful mainly for obtaining knowledge on urban planning for 
poverty reduction – an important challenge identified in the new paradigm for 
managing settlements that the planning fraternity conceptualises as New 
Urban Planning (World Planners Congress, 2006). By exploring the 
challenges of urban planning for poverty reduction in Nairobi, this study also 
provides specific information on the role of power and institutions in planning 
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for urban poverty reduction and a basis for testing innovative ideas on 
planning at present being promoted by UN Habitat’s (2012) inclusive city 
campaign. 
 
In order to explore the challenges of urban planning for poverty reduction, this 
thesis draws on ideas of institutions being propounded by the New 
Institutional Economics (for example North, 1990; March and Olsen, 2006; 
Rhodes, Binder and Rockman, 2006) to formulate a conceptual and analytical 
framework to analyse these institutional challenges. By investigating the 
relationship between urban planning and poverty reduction from a policy and 
institutional perspective, this thesis also seeks to contribute to the growing 
body of planning knowledge and new ways of debating theoretical frameworks 
for urban poverty (for instance Gonzalez and Healey, 2005; Vigar et al., 2000; 
Healey, 1990, 1997a; 1997b; 1998; 1999; 2002) that could be used to analyse 
the relationship between urban planning and poverty reduction. Unlike the 
work on institutions cited earlier, this thesis contributes a conceptual and 
analytical framework for analysing both the normative work on institutions for 
planning, and particularly urban planning, for poverty reduction in Kenya. 
Another contribution of the thesis is the assessment of normative planning by 
the use of concepts of participation, accountability, answerability, 
responsiveness, institutional frameworks and power. 
 
There are numerous research studies on the Local Authorities Service 
Delivery Action Plans (LASDAP) that were essentially government 
commissioned. Devas (2002) was the first review of the usefulness of the 
LASDAP. Devas (2002) was commissioned by the Government of Kenya 
(GOK) to assess the effectiveness of the LASDAP. Devas found that the 
LASDAP process was stifled by top-down planning practices. ActionAid 
International Kenya (AAIK) (2006) and Syagga et al. (2007) in later 
evaluations of the LASDAP, like Devas (2002), also found that participation 
was problematic. The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis 
(KIPPRA) (2006) identified numerous weaknesses in the planning and 
budgeting aspects of the LASDAP at the local level. Lubaale, Agevi and Ngari 
(2007) in another commissioned research study found that participation was 
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still notional and that there was fragmentation of resources that subsequently 
undermined the effectiveness of the LASDAP. Moreover, while the LASDAP 
was aimed at addressing the poor, the poor were not directly targeted and 
were often excluded from the LASDAP (Ibid.). 
 
The LASDAP has also been the subject of academic research. Owolabi 
(2011) is the most recent endeavour. Using an international political economy 
framework Owolabi (2011) shows that the history of social development in 
Kenya has been largely defined by international prescriptions and 
expectations. More significantly, Owolabi’s (2011) study shows that the 
LASDAP has had lacklustre results in transforming local communities and this 
has been ineffective in realising grassroots social change, including inequality, 
gender, transparency and inclusiveness. She concludes her study by arguing 
that participatory development envisaged in the LASDAP is a superficial 
solution to the social ills that plague society, thus justifying the need for a 
technical and socio-political approach to development in poverty reduction. 
 
This thesis differs from Owolabi’s (2011) study in several areas. It focuses on 
Nairobi. But even in Nairobi, it concentrates on the Viwandani ward, one of the 
poorest areas in the City of Nairobi. It uses an institutional approach to delve 
into the challenges of planning for poverty in Kenya. The combination of 
archival, participatory action research and qualitative research design render 
a novel perspective in analysing the LASDAP. This study provides further 
information on the LASDAP and urban planning for poverty reduction, an area 
that has not been addressed in any depth yet. Where Owolabi (2011) 
suggests practical changes to the LASDAP, such as creating smaller 
decision-making units and securing appropriate staff, this study shows how 
power affects participation. As a result, this study brings to bear Checkoway’s 
(1994) notion of citizens’ participation in the planning process as advocacy 
and legal rights, Arnstein’s (1969) ideas of participation as manipulation and 
Forester’s (1999) deliberative practice to show how power aggravates the 
institutional challenges of planning, particularly urban planning for poverty 
reduction. 
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1.5 Research Methods: Disentangling the Maze 
 
1.5.1 The Case of Viwandani 
 
A single case study of Viwandani ward in Nairobi, as shown in Map 1.1 was 
adopted for this research. There are four main reasons. Firstly, Viwandani 
ward is the poorest ward in Makadara constituency. The incidence of poverty 
in Nairobi is currently computed at 44 per cent (Republic of Kenya, 2005). The 
incidence of poverty in Makadara is twice that of the richest ward, which is the 
Westlands. Although according to the recent poverty reports Embakasi 
constituency has the highest number of poor people in Nairobi, Makadara 
constituency, with 60 per cent of the households living below the poverty line, 
is the poorest constituency in Nairobi (Government of Kenya, 2005:34). 
Because of huge income difference, residents in Makadara constituency are 
twice more likely to be poor in relation to their counterparts in the Westlands 
constituency. 
 
    Map 1.1:  The Study sites in Nairobi 
 
Source: Ministry of Lands, Nairobi, 2008. 
The Map 1.2 below shows the spatial distribution of poverty in Nairobi’s 
constituencies. Even in terms of the poverty gap differential, that is the 
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average income each poor person would require to climb out of the poverty 
line4, residents of Makadara require at least twice as much income on 
average, to climb out of the poverty bracket as compared to their counterparts 
in the Westlands (See Republic of Kenya, 2005:43-44). 
 
Map 1.2: Map showing the spatial distribution of poverty in Nairobi’s 
constituencies 
 
Source: Ministry of Lands, Nairobi, 2008. 
 
Secondly, the Nairobi LASDAP process, particularly in the Viwandani ward, 
presents a unique case because of the diverse nature of actors involved at 
this level of the City. The range of actors involved in Viwandani is typical of 
other LASDAP processes in the other wards in Nairobi. While Viwandani is 
part of Makadara constituency, there is sufficient complexity and 
differentiation in the ward for this single case to provide rich, illustrative 
material and also for comparison with other parts of the country. 
 
                                            
4
 Kenya shillings: 2,648 per person per month (1 U.S.$ is equivalent to Kenya shillings: 75) 
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Yin (1994; 2003) provides three main circumstances for the choice of a single 
case study approach. These include:  when a single case represents the 
critical case in testing a well-formulated theory; conditions in which the case 
represents an extreme or unique case, and when the case study is a 
revelatory case. As will be shown, the case considered by this study meets 
the third reason for the choice of a single case study. Yin (1994; 2003) and 
Gomm, et al. (2000) further note that the results of case studies can be 
generalised to theory in the form of theoretical propositions which can be 
tested in contexts of other case studies. 
 
This thesis used a qualitative case study of the LASDAP in Nairobi’s 
Viwandani ward to explore what urban planning for poverty reduction entails. 
For such exploratory research, Lincoln and Guba (1985) advise that the social 
phenomena are investigated with minimal a priori expectations if explanations 
for such phenomena are to be availed. The case study approach has been 
subject to great controversy and contestation as regards to its suitability to 
scientific research (see for example Flyvbjerg, 2001). Recent scholarship (for 
example, Yin, 1994; Flyvbjerg 1998; 2001, Watson 2001) has demonstrated 
sufficient rebuttal to some of the earlier misconceptions about case study 
research. In justifying her use of this method to a planning research, Watson 
(2001:10) says, “…case studies are about particularization, not generalization 
[…] generalisation happens in the mind of the reader to the extent that it is 
useful in understanding a new situation.” In the context of planning, Watson 
(2001) argues that the primary purpose of planning theory is to assist planning 
practice and that practical planning problems are aided less by generalised or 
universal theories and more by lessons drawn from context-dependent 
planning experiences. 
 
Thirdly, a study of the Viwandani ward, the poorest in Nairobi, has a high 
potential to produce new insights into urban planning for poverty reduction. A 
key contribution of this study will then be its addition to the knowledge on 
power and urban planning in contexts of poverty. Hitherto, Watson’s (2001) 
study in Cape Town is the main work in SSA that explores power and 
planning but it is explicitly situated in contexts of ‘change and continuity’ but 
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also within a broader poverty and vulnerability environment. Therefore, this 
focus into urban planning for poverty reduction exploring the role of institutions 
broadens an understanding of poverty, planning, power and institutions. 
Fourthly, Viwandani allows for the context-dependent planning experiences 
that can be drawn upon by planners as Watson (2001) suggests in justifying 
the case study approach. Further, as seen in the earlier sections of this 
chapter, there is scanty information on urban planning for poverty reduction. 
From this study in the Viwandani ward, new, rich, context-specific detailed 
information and planning lessons from the Local Authorities Service Delivery 
Action Plans (LASDAP) processes in Nairobi is availed for future debate. 
 
1.5.2 Data Collection from the LASDAP Experience 
 
To establish the sample for this study four factors were considered. Firstly, the 
geographical space; secondly, the key actors; thirdly, the planning and policy 
documents; and finally the first five years of the LASDAP (2002-2006), which 
is the period under consideration. Although the study considered the LASDAP 
planning experience in the city of Nairobi, it specifically focused on projects in 
the Makadara constituency. Makadara was selected out of the eight 
constituencies in Nairobi because according to existing poverty data (Republic 
of Kenya, 2005) it is the poorest in the city. In addition to being the poorest, it 
was relatively easy to access by the researcher because of its central location 
in the city. Makadara also does not have many NGOs or research being 
conducted. The research strategy was that by focusing on Viwandani ward, 
which is also home to Mukuru, the second largest slum/informal settlement in 
Nairobi; it would be easy to interact with the poor and seek their views of 
urban planning for poverty reduction. 
 
The sources of information on planning and engagement with poverty in 
Kenya were two-fold; namely: archival material on planning in Kenya and key 
informants. Archival material included national development plans, laws 
relating to and governing the practice of planning in Kenya and the City of 
Nairobi. The archival investigation covered ten national development plans 
and the two City of Nairobi plans. Other material covered includes planning 
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guidelines, Acts of Parliament and planning reports. Eleven key national level 
planning documents and two City of Nairobi plans were reviewed. The review 
sought to establish the extent to which the content of these documents 
focused on poverty. Arising out of the above, five national level planning 
documents and the two City of Nairobi plans were then selected. At least two 
sets of planning documents are relevant to this study. These include the 
national development plans, sessional papers of the National Assembly and 
other policy documents at the national level. The local level documents 
include the City of Nairobi plans, LASDAP planning material and other 
information of historical value. 
 
Semi-structured and open-ended interviews with purposively sampled 
informants drawn from ten categories identified in Table 1.3 below; and a 
review of secondary sources and published material. The key actors identified 
in the plans determined the selection of the informants that were interviewed. 
These included members of communities who participated in the LASDAP 
process, planners and other staff of the City of Nairobi, chiefs, and central 
government officials. Additional informants were either purposively selected or 
by the snowball sampling method. These respondents were identified from the 
records of the LASDAP kept by the City of Nairobi and the Kenya Local 
Government Reform Programme (KLGRP) at the Ministry of Local 
Government (MLG). 
 
The interviews (see Research Protocol in the Appendix for details) sought to 
establish the following: what was understood by poverty; the responses to 
poverty; the planning process for poverty reduction; frameworks enabling or 
inhibiting actors in poverty reduction; how the LASDAP worked in Viwandani 
and in Nairobi in general; and lessons/insights gained from the response(s) to 
poverty. These interviews were conducted in two main parts. The first batch of 
interviews was conducted in late 2005. The second were conducted between 
October 2006 and February 2007. I conducted all these interviews myself, 
took notes of the interviews and recorded these interviews on tape where the 
interviewees granted permission. These interviews were typically an hour, 
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sometimes more, in duration. In most cases where the respondents were in 
agreement, these were taped and then transcribed. 
 
Table 1.3: Profiles of the Respondents in the Fieldwork 2005–20075 
 
Source of Information Male Female Total 
Focus Group Discussions 14 8 22 
Interviews with community members 14 10 24 
Planners from the City of Nairobi 2 1 3 
Other staff from the City of Nairobi 6 1 7 
Chiefs 2 1 3 
District Officer 1 - 1 
Ministry of Local Government/KLGRP - 2 2 
Ministry of Housing 1 - 1 
Councillors 4 - 4 
Member of Parliament 1 - 1 
Urban Planners 18 7 25 
ALGAK 3 3 6 
Total 66 33 99 
 
For this research, ninety-nine people were interviewed, including focus group 
participants. A number of discussions were held with twenty-five planners 
using structured interviews. These planners were identified because of three 
main reasons: Firstly, they had considerable experience in planning, their 
expertise and seniority and so they were able to speak with authority on how 
urban planning addressed poverty. Secondly, these planners could easily 
articulate their views on the knowledge of poverty and how poverty was 
framed in the planning profession in Kenya. Finally, together these planners 
provided an informed position on how poverty was understood in planning in 
Kenya and more specifically in the Nairobi LASDAP processes. 
 
The other respondents (see Table 1.3 above) provided information by way of 
interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). Five FGDs were conducted 
of groups comprising of three to nine persons. These groups covered the 
following: youth or young men’s group, widows, young women, elderly and 
pioneer women residents in the settlement and a women’s group. The 
remainder of the respondents was interviewed. These included members of 
                                            
5
 This excludes the 25 Planners interviewed; together with 74 in Table 1.3 these comprise the 
99 respondents. 
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the Lunga Lunga and Mukuru Kayaba informal settlements in Viwandani 
Ward, Planners, Engineers and other staff from the City of Nairobi, and 
Central government departments. 
 
With the exception of seven people, all the others agreed to be recorded. The 
interviews were conducted in English and Kiswahili and in some cases using a 
combination of both languages. In some cases interviews with the organised 
communities, focus group discussions were used to collect this information. 
This allowed the respondents to explore a wide range of perspectives on the 
subject of the discussions. A more complete and valid picture emerged as the 
respondents elaborated and extended their responses. This enabled them to 
clearly articulate their views. As these discussions progressed, the 
respondents freely provided unrestricted and spontaneous responses. In 
these cases, a field research assistant took a detailed record of the discussion 
and notes of important observations during the workshop. After these 
workshops, the field assistant and the researcher discussed important aspects 
of the sessions. 
 
To ensure the respondents voluntarily participated in the research, I carefully 
read out and explained the purpose of the study and where the results would 
be published. Although the respondents had the opportunity to terminate the 
interviews or discussions at any point during the study, this right was never 
exercised. Furthermore, the respondents consented to the use of their true 
identities in the written thesis. Nonetheless, where the respondents’ names 
were to appear in the written thesis, these were changed to fictional ones to in 
accordance with best ethical research practice. The Ministry of Education in 
Nairobi granted ethical consent for this research. After review of my research 
protocol by the Ministry of Education and adjustments made, research 
permission was granted. A further requirement for the research permit was to 
submit a copy of the final thesis to the Ministry. 
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 Figure 1.1: A Focus Group Discussion in Mukuru outside the 
Fuata  Nyayo Chief’s Office during the fieldwork 
 
 Source: Photograph by John Ngugi (2007) 
 
Being proficient in both languages, I was able to hold the interviews without 
much difficulty. My research assistants and I transcribed the tapes. I kept the 
tapes and transcripts in the original language. I only translated the Kiswahili 
transcripts during the analysis but endeavoured as best as I could to use both 
the Kiswahili and translated texts in the analysis. Moreover, as an exploratory 
study it was essential that every aspect of the research was meticulously 
documented and recorded because of the possibility that this data and 
methods might be utilised elsewhere. All the material I used for the interviews, 
such as the tapes, transcripts and notes, remained in my custody. To ensure 
credibility of the research and enhance its reliability, the study relied on a 
number of tactics.  
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These are outlined in Table 1.4 below. 
 
Table 1.4 Tests for Improving Research Quality and Validity 
Tests Case study tactic employed Anticipated for data 
collection/analysis 
Construct validity  Used multiple sources of 
evidence 
 Key informants reviewed 
draft case report 
 Triangulation 
 Asked same questions of 
several respondents 
 Cross-checked information 
with existing literature 
Internal validity  Confirmed the nature of 
questions 
 Questions were shaped by 
searching for “why” behind 
relationships and compared 
with similar literature 
External validity  Confirmed nature of 
questions 
 Ensured I sought both 
official and personal 
records on planning and 
implementation of the 
LASDAP 
Reliability  Prepared a detailed case 
study protocol 
 Developed case study 
database 
 Kept detailed record of 
transcript and record of all 
tapes of interviews 
 Prepared a detailed matrix 
to contrast information from 
different categories of 
respondents 
Source: Adapted from Weerd-Nederhof (2001) 
1.5.3 Data Analysis 
 
The biggest challenge faced in this research was effectively analysing and 
processing the data collected. The unit of analysis for this study is urban 
planning at city level. The institutional environment for urban planning for 
poverty reduction was visualised in six main ways that either constrain or 
enable/facilitate situations that affect poverty reduction at a city level. These 
included: the Constitution, the national planning framework, the legal 
framework for planning and poverty reduction, national policies for poverty 
reduction, the way the city is organised, and plans, including plans for poverty 
reduction, of a city. 
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To minimise the weaknesses identified for collecting and analysing official 
documents, I sought to ensure an accurate completion of all records used in 
this research. In this respect, I diligently conducted a number of control tests. 
These are presented in Table 1.4 above. The analytic techniques for this 
study were a hybrid of categorisation, data displays, pattern matching and in 
some cases relying on theoretical propositions. The source of information on 
how planning engages with poverty in Kenya was at least two-fold; namely: 
official documents on planning in Kenya and key informants. Official 
documents included national development plans, laws relating to and 
governing the practice of planning in Kenya and the City of Nairobi planning 
archives. The archival investigation covered ten national development plans 
and the two City of Nairobi plans. Other material covered included planning 
guidelines, Acts of Parliament and planning reports. 
 
Furthermore, using the information gathered from the semi-structured 
interviews and archival investigations, several analyses were conducted. First 
identification of the key antecedents and landmarks for planning in Kenya was 
done. This was useful in beginning a process of documenting important 
aspects of the planning history in Kenya. These antecedents and landmarks 
were identified as converging points in both the literature reviewed as well as 
from the interviews conducted. Second, a framework for planning in Kenya 
was formulated. The additional task was to establish the framework of 
planning for poverty reduction at the local level. These analyses then yielded 
further results, showing the connections between national and local level 
plans. The key concepts and how these are measured in investigating the 
challenges faced by urban planning for poverty reduction are summarised in 
Table 1.5. 
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Table 1.5: The Analytical Framework 
Concept Measurement 
Appropriateness/adequacy 
(of policy) 
 Institutions in existence (North, 1991; 
Chambers, 1997) 
 Policies in existence (Ibid.) 
 Responsiveness to urban poverty/reduction 
(Goetz and Jenkins, 2005) 
Participation (spaces) Extent to which citizens are: 
 Manipulated 
 Subject to Therapy 
 Informed 
 Consulted 
 Placated 
 Involved in Partnerships in decision-making  
 Delegated power to decide (Arnstein, 
1969) 
Accountability: 
Answerability 
 
 
 
 
Sanction 
 
 Obligation of the state to answer or give 
account (Ackerman, 2004; Schedler, 1999; 
Goetz and Jenkins, 2005) 
 Extent of discretion allowed for the 
state/official to answer or give account 
(Ibid..) 
 Name/type of consequences for failure to 
give account (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005) 
Responsiveness  Extent to which public officials exercise the 
moral obligation to consider preferences of 
the citizens/poor in decision making (World 
Bank, 2001; Goetz and Jenkins, 2005) 
Power  Who decides, whose decision matters 
(Dahl, 1957; 1961) 
 Who sets the agenda, whose agenda is 
important (Galbriath, 1983) 
 Which interests are most important in 
policy and decision-making Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962) 
  ‘Facts”, ideas used to generate new 
versions/meanings of the key issue/s 
(Foucault, 1991; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Cahill, 
2008) 
 Representations/ways of speaking (Ibid..) 
 
The information from the interviews was analysed using a content analysis 
method and then reviewed in the light of other sources of data. I analysed the 
content of the interview notes according to the words, meanings and themes 
that were communicated about planning to reduce poverty. Moreover, the 
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data collected was also verified by triangulation and draft stories from the 
information analysed from the above data sources were in most cases shared 
with the respondents to confirm accuracy and fill data gaps that emerged. 
Upon transcription, the analysis involved identification of key themes, 
categories and objects of discourse. Evidence of connections and inter-
relationships between main discourses were also established. This was 
followed by an identification and discussion of the discursive strategies and 
techniques that were employed in these discourses. The analysis also sought 
to highlight any obvious or covert omissions of poverty and the poor from 
these discourses. 
 
1.6 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
 
As a study that employed a qualitative content analysis, I strove to ensure that 
the texts I used were as representative as possible. This was to ensure 
external validity and generalisation of the findings. While the national 
development plans, sessional papers of the National Assembly and other 
policy documents at the national level were useful in providing insights into the 
philosophy guiding planning and the challenges faced, it was not possible to 
access diaries, personal notes and confidential material related to the plans. 
Thus an important perspective is unavoidably excluded. To address the above 
problem, I sought to interview more respondents. These interviews reduced 
greatly the gap evident by the inability to access confidential material. 
Nonetheless, substantial information on the policy and institutional 
frameworks was gathered to highlight the constraints this places on planning 
for poverty reduction. 
 
The second limitation relates to the extent to which findings of the study may 
be generalised. This limitation was manifested in two ways. First, the 
discourse analysis I conducted, like other discursive practices, are dependent 
on the context. Being so context specific, it has been argued, invariably 
affects the extent to which a study may be generalised (see for example 
Mouton, 2001:169). The second aspect in which generalisation was affected 
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relates to the case study approach itself. In my earlier justification for the case 
study, I cited Yin (1994), Flyvbjerg (1998; 2002) and Watson (2001) as 
examples of the robustness of the case study and the contribution this has 
made. Watson (2001:10) makes a significant point about the case study as 
being about “particularisation” and not generalisation because “generalisation 
happens in the mind of the reader to the extent that it is useful in 
understanding a new situation” (ibid.). Nonetheless, Yin (1994) recognises the 
restricted use of the results of a single case study. In this study, generalisation 
to a population is not possible. But generalisation to theory is possible by way 
of theoretical propositions as Yin (1994) suggests. Moreover, the theoretical 
and analytical frameworks employed in this study could have a broader 
application in studying urban planning for poverty reduction in contexts similar 
to that of Nairobi’s LASDAP. 
 
This thesis is principally about urban planning and poverty reduction, the 
policy and institutional contexts for planning to reduce urban poverty as well 
as the limits of urban planning. The thesis also relies on information on urban 
planning law and governance. The City of Nairobi and the Viwandani ward in 
Makadara constituency are used as a case study in urban planning to draw 
implications for the city of Nairobi and Kenya in general but it is not 
representative of urban planning to reduce poverty in the entire Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
1.7 Road Map of the Thesis 
 
Chapter One introduces the problem of urban poverty as a perennial 
challenge in Africa and in Urban Kenya specifically. It reflects on the 
magnitude of poverty in Nairobi and raises the research question for 
identifying challenges for urban planning and poverty reduction. The chapter 
also outlines the research methods for exploring the question which entails: 
the need for a single case study, strategies for data collection, and the 
framework used to analyse the information gathered. Chapter Two outlines 
the theoretical background to the study and discusses the conceptual 
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approaches to institutions and the institutional challenges of urban planning 
for poverty reduction. The chapter also discusses a framework for analysing 
the institutional challenges of urban planning for poverty reduction.  
 
Chapter Three details the growth and development of political institutions in 
Kenya, showing how this has invariably been egregiously inimical to urban 
planning for poverty reduction for the last fifty years. Chapter Four and Five 
turn to an analysis of the institutional framework for poverty reduction. This 
chapter examines the new constitution, including the legal and policy 
frameworks for urban planning for poverty reduction, to determine the extent 
to which participation and accountability are supported in urban planning for 
poverty reduction.  
 
Chapters Six to Eight shift from analysing the institutional framework to 
discussing the challenges of planning for poverty reduction in urban Kenya, 
using the case of the LASDAP in Viwandani ward. Chapter Six examines the 
ways in which the LASDAP addressed the exclusion of the poor and their 
participation in planning. Chapter Seven shifts to detailing how the institutional 
framework ensured accountability in the LASDAP and accommodated the 
preferences of citizens, particularly the poor, in the planning decisions. 
Together, Chapters Six and Seven are important in showing how power is 
used to deliver token participation and the poorest form of accountability, thus 
ensuring the poor are unsurprisingly and easily disempowered and rendered 
even more powerless. 
 
Chapter Eight turns from the effects of oppressive power and the 
powerlessness of the poor in Viwandani to resistance, hope, and ingenuity 
that sustained and helped adapt the lives of the poor to incredibly harsh 
conditions. Finally, Chapter Nine shifts to the future of urban planning for 
poverty reductions. The chapter concludes by presenting the implications for 
theory, urban planning for poverty reduction and further urban planning 
research. 
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1.8 Conclusion 
 
In Kenya the challenge has been how urban planning should respond to 
poverty. Very little is known about how institutions enable or constrain urban 
planning in general and urban planning for poverty reduction in particular. The 
question of how power works in institutions to promote and/or undermine the 
realisation of urban poverty reduction is very crucial in urban planning, and to 
this study in particular. Is this question addressed? That is the challenge of 
this thesis.  
 
This chapter has presented the problem and the research methodology. The 
remainder of the thesis systematically addresses the challenges posed above. 
First, by providing the conceptual framework, and then a detailed discussion 
of the institutional context and finally applying this to the empirical results from 
perceptions and analyses of the community in Viwandani and professionals in 
the City of Nairobi and sections of the central government of Kenya. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN PLANNING FOR 
POVERTY REDUCTION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a conceptual framework for analysing the institutional 
challenges within which urban planning for poverty reduction is situated. A 
range of theoretical insights are brought together from notions of power and 
institutions to tease out the different ways in which institutions constrain 
and/or enable urban planning processes. The argument provided here is that: 
to understand the challenges of urban planning in poverty reduction, the 
relationships between institutions and citizens, particularly between planners 
and the poor, are more important than an instrumental notion of urban 
planning for poverty reduction. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into six sections. Starting with power, 
the following section elaborates on the main pillars of the conceptual 
framework for the study. This is followed by a discussion of the conceptual 
background to poverty and poverty reduction; and approaches to institutions 
with specific reference to contributions from development economics and 
sociology in the third and fourth sections respectively. The fifth section 
continues with a discussion of the institutional challenges in urban planning. 
The chapter again turns to formulating the analytical framework for assessing 
the institutional challenges for urban planning in poverty reduction in the sixth 
section. In the final section, the chapter draws conclusions that justify the 
need for a new conceptual framework to analyse the institutional challenges of 
urban planning for poverty reduction. 
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2.2 Conceptual Frames of the Study 
 
This study is framed by four main ideas. These ideas are power, poverty and 
poverty reduction, urban planning, and institutions. In this framework, as 
stated by Alexander (1986:126), it is postulated that urban planning for 
poverty reduction is dependent on the institutional and policy frameworks 
(Chambers, 2005; Fukuyama, 2007). However, the relationship between 
urban planning for poverty reduction and the institutional framework is 
invariably impacted by power (Forester, 1989; 1999; Flyvbjerg, 1998). 
 
The framework below in Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the 
concepts and how these are theorised in this study. The institutional 
framework shows that the behaviour of political actors is shaped by a system 
of constraints, rules and procedures in contexts within which these actors are 
found. I draw on rational choice theory and institutionalism (North, 1990; 
Morgenthau, 2006; Ostrom, 1986; 1991; Shepsle, 1979), which suggests that 
because political actors are rational by nature, they participate in political 
activities from which they derive maximum benefits at the least possible cost. 
It is also observed that actors are aware of their preferences and those of the 
other actors, hence they use clearly defined strategies to achieve their 
interests (Steinmo, 2001). It is further assumed that actors voluntarily choose 
to be constrained by institutions because they are confident their individual 
goals and interests can be achieved. Here institutions are conceptualised as 
vitally important in creating stability in complex contexts. By minimising 
uncertainty, there is always space to achieve both self-interest and collective 
goals (Steinmo, 1992). 
 
Against this backdrop, institutions create stability in complex situations and 
they do not change easily. This institutional equilibrium is possible and a norm 
because the actors are generally reluctant to change the rules of the game for 
fear of the unknown after the changes are made. Second, since actors are 
rational and always aware of the other actors’ interests and preferences, their 
behaviour is invariably influenced and shaped by institutional contexts. 
Moreover, the rational quality of individual actors means that individual and 
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national interests always matter in decision-making. Therefore, I 
conceptualise the relationship between institutions, citizens, particularly poor 
citizens, planners and other professionals as co-dependent. 
 
In this thesis, power has been conceptualised as an intervening feature that 
shapes the relationship between urban planning for poverty reduction and the 
institutional frame. The distribution of power determines the institutions 
adopted in urban planning for poverty reduction as well as shaping how this is 
practiced. Power is the ubiquitous thread that runs through institutions and 
urban planning for poverty reduction (Foucault, 1991). This thesis also adopts 
the view that power manifests itself in elaborate but complex ways and for that 
reason adopts, for the analysis, a multi-faceted notion of power from a range 
of perspectives: power as decision-making (Dahl, 1957; 1961); power as non-
decision-making (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962); three dimensions of power 
(Luke, 1974; 2005); governmentality (Foucault, 1991; 2001; Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988; Cahill, 2008). 
 
Power as decision-making 
 
The notion of power as decision-making is associated with the work of Dahl 
(1957). Dahl (1957) sought to show that, A had power over B to the extent to 
which A could get B to do something that B would not have ordinarily done. In 
this perspective, power refers to the act of prevailing in decision-making. 
Further, power is not equated with power in resources, which in this 
perspective are only potential power. To make decisions, Dahl argued that 
resources were not always deployed. 
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Figure 2.1: Summarised Conceptual Framework 
 
To Dahl, resources and the political sphere where the resources are used are 
important in distinguishing between potential power and the degree of power. 
Where two individuals have the same resources, the one who is considered 
powerful is the individual who influences and/or controls the political sphere 
where the resources are used. In this perspective, resources are important in 
determining power, but only potential power and not the extent of that power. 
By conceiving power in the terms of Dahl, in this study, power is then 
analysed in terms of: which actor participates, what does the actor gain or 
lose, and -ultimately - who is most powerful and prevails in decision-making. 
But there are drawbacks in analysing participation such as non-participation.  
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
Framework 
Actors: Citizens, 
Public Officials, 
private sector, other 
POWER 
 
Urban Planning for 
Poverty reduction 
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Power as non-decision making 
 
Building on Dahl’s (1957; 1961) theory of power, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) 
made an important contribution to the power debate; that power was not only 
decision-making, but is also non-decision-making (the decision not to make a 
decision) could also be conceptualised as agenda setting. From Dahl’s 
relationship between A and B, they further argued that not only does A 
exercise power over B in overt decision making, but A may also exercise 
power over B by limiting the scope of the political process to issues that A 
wants – introducing the “second dimension” of power. In the second 
dimension, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) take into account the manner in 
which decisions made may be influenced. In this perspective, both not making 
decisions and preventing issues from making the agenda exercise power. In 
this stream, the analysis of power is concerned with the exclusion of some 
actors. In the case of urban planning for poverty reduction, these are 
invariably the poor, particularly women and youth. Actions such as 
labelling/classifying some matters as private and confidential, exclusion of 
ideas and people through extensive bureaucratic processes and endless 
committees that never resolve issues are examples of power in the second 
dimension. 
 
Radical View of Power 
 
While Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974) criticized Dahl’s (1957; 
1961) perspective of power mainly as being narrow, Lukes (1974) also found 
Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962), and Dahl’s (1957; 1961) work on power 
inadequate because of what he (Lukes, 1974) calls a behavioural focus. To 
address this weakness, Lukes (1974) proposed the radical view of power as 
being formed by the dialectical relationship between structure and agency. 
Lukes’ (1974) radical view of power completes the third dimension of the 
power debates. Building on the relations between A and B that Dahl (1961) 
and Bachrach and Baratz (1962) use to articulate their positions on power, 
Lukes notes that A exercises power over B when A affects B in ways contrary 
to B’s interests. According to Lukes, biases are invariably not reducible to 
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individuals’ actions or non-actions, they are instead carried on from the past in 
the form of structured or culturally patterned behaviour of groups. 
 
The other important aspect of Lukes’ conceptualisation of power is his 
attention on the relationship between power and knowledge. Power here 
specifically is postulated to shape the way in which particularly the poor 
understand their wants. Influenced by Gramsci’s (1971) notion of “hegemony,” 
Lukes argues in the third dimension of power, that power “distorts” knowledge 
or “the truth” in ways that are arguably beneficial to the specific interests of 
the dominant group. He also suggests that consensus and social order are 
bound up in a conspiracy of the powerful in which the “truth” is hidden from 
the powerless. Thus, in Lukes’s third dimension of power, he emphasises 
“false consciousness” or ideology, where the less powerful are not aware of 
their “real interests.” 
 
Governmentality – power as immanent 
 
The notion of power as immanent, or being everywhere, was inspired by the 
work of Foucault (1991; 2001) and Deleuze and Guattari (1988). In this 
approach, power is organised through sophisticated webs of discourses, 
relationships and practices that produce some as powerful and others as less 
powerful. The immanence of power through discourses and practices shapes 
everyday life. Because the discourses and practices that maintain power 
relations are always being reproduced, the effects of power are dynamic and 
not static or stable. To Foucault (1991), this process of reproduction is 
“governmentality.” Here reproduction is “…not only enacted by the powerful 
but is also dominated by subjects acting socially defined roles and identities” 
(Cahill, 2008:298). The main contribution from governmentality then is that 
power is continually reproduced. However, Allen (2003) acknowledges the 
processes of domination and resistance, yet he also highlights the seductive, 
manipulative, coercive, cooptive, and authoritative aspects of power. Allen 
(2003) further argues that the conceptualisation of power as immanent 
inadvertently restricts the appreciation of the relationship between power and 
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place; and obscures the recognition of nuances of how power operates in 
specific places and specific times. 
 
Power determines knowledge … power is knowledge 
 
Informed by the Machiavelli-Nietzsche-Foucault tradition, Flyvbjerg (1998) 
critically analyses the history of the award-winning Aalborg project aimed at 
reducing private car use whilst promoting public transportation, including non-
motorised transport. Flyvbjerg explores the relationship between knowledge, 
rationality, and power. While he does not explicitly define these concepts, he 
strongly suggests that the ‘real politics’ in Aalborg defines both the knowledge 
and rationality of the planning intervention. From Aalborg, it is clear that good 
and commonly shared objectives, however well intentioned and widely 
believed in, cannot guarantee that these objectives will be successfully 
implemented and realised but rather that a thorough understanding of the 
political context and its implications on implementation invariably assures 
successful implementation and realisation of good and commonly shared 
objectives. 
 
By failing to implement measures aimed at reducing private care use but 
succeeded in implementing those for promoting public transportation, 
Flyvbjerg is convinced the Aalborg project and planning failed: 
 
There is considerable evidence to indicate that Aalborg’s situation 
would have been better had the Aalborg Project not been implemented 
at all (Flyvbjerg, 1998:224). 
 
In Aalborg, Flyvbjerg (1998) shows that through power, institutions that were 
to represent public interest were embedded in covert power relations and 
brutally protected and promoted special interests: “Power procures the 
knowledge which supports its purposes, while it ignores or suppresses that 
knowledge which does not serve it” (Flyvbjerg, 1998:319). From the Aalborg 
case study, Flyvbjerg contributes ten propositions that are useful in studying 
rationality and power in other contexts. These propositions are: 1) power 
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defines rationality; 2) rationality is context-dependent, the context of rationality 
is power, and power blurs the dividing line between rationality and 
rationalisation; 3) rationalisation presented as rationality is a principal strategy 
in the exercise of power; 4) the greater the power, the less the rationality; 5) 
stable power relations are more typical of politics, administration, and 
planning than antagonistic confrontations; 6) power relations are constantly 
being produced and reproduced; 7) the rationality of power has deeper 
historical roots than the power of rationality; 8) in open confrontation, 
rationality yields to power; 9) rationality-power relations are more 
characteristic of stable power relations than of confrontations; and 10) the 
power of rationality is embedded in stable power relations. 
 
Cousins and Hussain (1984:10) note that in the Foucauldian approaches, 
discourse provides the shape, form and constitution of objects, yet the 
subjects are constituted by discourse. Interestingly, it is from Foucault’s notion 
of power, particularly his ideas on surveillance, that Giddens’ (1984) 
structuration theory builds. Although Giddens rejects the Foucauldian 
understanding of surveillance (Cowton and Dopson, 2002:207), through the 
notion of resources, Giddens acknowledges Foucault’s view that the context 
influences behaviour. Unlike Foucault who denudes individuals of agency, 
Giddens retains the possibility of individual agency. 
 
Power in things, power through mobilisation 
 
Allen (2003) challenges the notion that in development, power is in finite 
resources and institutions (Kilby, 2002; Mayoux, 2002). In this view of power, 
an increase in accumulated ‘things’ is an acceptable indication of power. 
Thus, the powerful are those with ‘things’ and, conversely, the powerless are 
those without ‘”things.” Allen (2003) considers conception of power 
disempowering to the powerless. Allen (2003:5) contends that possession of 
resources is always equal to being powerful, but instead power is based on 
the use of resources through established social relations. Therefore power is 
available in all contexts – at the centre and at the margins.  
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Allen (2003) also builds on ideas of network theory and collective action (for 
example Castells, 1996; 2000; Mann, 1993), to engage the idea of power 
through mobilisation. Allen acknowledges the usefulness of the 
conceptualisation of power through mobilisation such as participatory 
development (for example Chambers, 1997; 2005) and collection action (for 
example Arendt, 1958; 1970). However, he argues that power through 
mobilisation “…neglects power dynamics within and across groups….”(Cahill, 
2008:297). Like Allen (2003), Cahill also notes “…power is not some static 
capacity, but constantly shifts across time and space.” (Cahill, 2008:298). 
 
Condign, compensatory, conditioned power 
 
Galbriath (1983) is the main proponent of the views of power as condign, 
compensatory and conditioned. Galbriath presents power as “…the possibility 
of imposing one’s will upon the behaviour of other persons (Galbriath, 
1983:2). In this respect, Galbriath is not too different from Dahl’s (1957) 
conception of power as decision-making. But for Galbriath (1983) there is a 
correlation between the types and sources of power. Beginning with condign 
power, some of the important sources or instruments of power include 
personality, quality of physique, mind, speech, and moral certainty. With the 
above sources, then condign power “…wins submission by the ability to 
impose an alternative to the preferences of the individual or group that is 
sufficiently unpleasant or painful so that these preferences are abandoned.” 
(Galbriath, 1983:4-5). 
 
Compensatory power, wins by offering something of value to the person 
submitting, for example: payment of money for services. According to 
Galbriath, compensatory power is exercised by persuasion, education, and 
social commitment so that belief(s) may be changed. The main sources of 
and instruments for exercising compensatory power include property and 
incomes. Conditioned power Galbriath adds, “…more than condign or 
compensatory power is central to the functioning of modern economies” 
(Galbriath, 1983:5-6). It is assumed that when the exercise of power is 
 40 
needed, organisation is also required. In addition to organisation, persuasion 
is necessary for subsequent submission. 
 
Galbriath (1983) makes two important contributions from his conception of 
power. The first contribution points to the extent to which one is powerful 
being directly proportional to the sources or instruments of exercising power. 
The implication is that if one only has access to personality, they are 
invariably less powerful than one with personality, property and organisation. 
Galbriath’s (1983) focus on conditioned power is arguably the second 
contribution. The clear focus on conditioned power or organisation enables 
the visualisation of the ubiquitous nature of conditioned power. An 
understanding of the pervasive presence of conditioned power shows the dark 
side of organisation. The role of propaganda in managing or even detracting 
from deserved criticism, the use of media in shaping the interpretation of the 
public on key public interest issues such as corruption, bad governance and 
dictatorship as some of the examples that illustrate the pervasive presence of 
conditioned power. 
 
Therefore, to be able to determine the extent of the distribution of power and 
subsequently how the institutions adopted it in urban planning for poverty 
reduction, or how institutions shape planning, it is vitally important to 
determine the role/s played by the various forms of power. 
 
The definitions of urban planning have changed over time; but the focus has 
also been clarified with these changes in the course of time. In some cases 
urban planning refers to governance with a growing focus on institutional and 
policy analysis. But urban planning has also been understood as a political 
activity. As in Watson (2002), in this study, urban planning means “those 
intentional public actions which impact on the built and natural environment 
and which are frequently accompanied by political processes” (Watson, 
2002:28). Accordingly, urban planning for poverty reduction would be: those 
intentional, public and political actions aimed at providing and or increasing 
the poor people’s wellbeing, goods and services, and their capabilities, but 
also impacting on the built and natural environment. In the framework above, 
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the operation of power in institutions ultimately determines the type, form, and 
focus that urban planning for poverty reduction takes at any given time in 
specific contexts. 
 
2.3 Poverty and Poverty Reduction 
 
Discussions of poverty have revolved around two subjects: the individual and 
the space the individual occupies, namely communities, regions, countries 
and continents (World Bank, 2001; 2005; UNDP, 2005; Sachs, 2005; Collier, 
2007; Green, 2008). Graaff (2003:6) notes that the “term poverty often applies 
to individuals, whilst development refers to countries.”  George (1988:1-23) 
also notes differences in time and space in the ways in which poverty is 
discussed. 
 
In contemporary debates, for example, there are considerable differences 
between the discussions around poverty in the rich, northern countries and in 
the poorer southern countries. Discussions in the global north are mainly 
concerned with “affluence poverty” dealing with issues of income disparity, 
joblessness, and the effects of inflation; and in the global south with 
“subsistence poverty” –focusing on the minimum requirements a person 
should have for subsistence. But “affluence poverty” related concerns are also 
increasingly important. 
 
Mainly for the purposes this study, poverty in the Sub-Saharan African cities 
goes beyond the notions of the people, the space, affluence, and subsistence 
above, to include the social relations that confine the poor to chronic and 
excruciating inhuman conditions and indignity. In defining poverty there are 
three distinct schools of thought that must be considered: welfarist, basic 
needs and capability. The following section focuses on these schools. 
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2.3.1 Welfarist school 
 
As Asselin and Dauphin (2001:20) note, poverty refers to the absence, 
inadequacy or even the missing of ‘something.’ In the welfarist school, whose 
proponents are the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
other International Financial Institutions (IFIs), this ‘something’ is economic 
well-being or economic welfare; to the basic needs school it is “a subset of 
goods and services specifically identified and deemed to meet the basic 
needs of all human beings” (Asselin and Dauphin, 2001:21); and it is human 
abilities or capabilities in the capability school of thought. For that matter, 
poverty reduction seeks to provide for or even increase this ‘something’: 
economic wellbeing, goods and services, and human abilities or capabilities. 
 
The Welfarist approach is anchored in the classical micro-economic theory, 
which holds that the main aim of economic behaviour is to increase economic 
well-being (Duclos and Araar, 2006:3). Ravallion (1994) elaborates that 
economic well-being is sometimes referred to as economic “welfare” or utility 
or as a standard of living. Utility itself is conceived as a psychological feeling 
such as happiness, pleasure, or desire fulfilment generated by commodity 
consumption. Because preferences also vary from person to person, this 
approach leads to the formulation of a first principle, that individuals 
themselves are the only ones who know what truly is in their best interest. In 
other words, the assessment of someone’s well-being should be csonsistent 
with the ordering of preferences revealed by that person’s free choice. A pure 
welfarist approach faces important practical problems: preferences are not 
observable, how to measure the ‘psychological happiness’ of an individual or 
her economic well-being, and how to compare subjective preferences. 
 
Welfarist comparisons of poverty thus use less than perfect observable 
proxies for utilities such as consumption or income (Tinbergen, 1990; Lipton 
and Ravallion, 1995). Because of its use of incomes as a proxy, the welfarist 
approach is also seen as ‘the income approach to poverty’ (Asselin and 
Dauphin, 2001). But income or consumption cannot adequately provide 
 43 
conclusive measures of economic well-being. Some of the aspects of 
economic well-being that cannot be adequately measured include public 
goods such as peace, health, and literacy. Notwithstanding the weaknesses, 
the welfarist school is currently the dominant approach amongst poverty 
analysts, especially development economists. In Kenya, as in other Sub-
Saharan African countries, the income approach is not only the official way 
poverty is computed, but also the most prevalent in literature (see for example 
Ravallion and Chen, 2008; World Bank 2001; Republic of Kenya, 1999; 
Government of Kenya, 2004). 
 
2.3.2 Basic Needs School 
 
In the poverty analysis literature (for example Duclos and Araar, 2006) the 
basic needs school ranks second to the welfarist school in importance. The 
main proponents of this approach have been Seers (1969), the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) (1973) and Streeten (1974; 1982), among others. It 
focuses on the need to attain some basic multidimensional outcomes that can 
be observed and monitored easily. They are not initially perceived as 
generators of well-being. In the traditional Basic Needs approach, the basic 
goods and services usually include: food, water, sanitation, shelter, clothing, 
basic education, health services, and public transportation (Streeten et al., 
1981). Poverty is therefore defined as the sustained inability of a family to 
meet its basic needs for survival. One of the main problems which confront 
this school is the determination of what the basic needs are. On the 
determination of needs, Cutler (1984:1120) notes that this is problematic as 
the precise measurement is always contested. It is generally specialists such 
as nutritionists, physiologists and other specialists who are called on to 
determine the basic needs of individuals. 
 
While the basic needs approach provides a multi-dimensional perspective to 
understanding poverty, this approach has not always been well-embraced. 
Economists both in the IFIs and national governments such as Kenya have 
successfully questioned the benefits of adapting a laborious, expensive and 
 44 
contentious system of measuring poverty. Notwithstanding the reservations by 
mainstream economists, in Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa and Kenya have 
successfully built on the ideas of the basic needs school to constitutionally 
guarantee these as minimum entitlements and rights for all human beings 
(see for example the Constitution of Kenya, 2010). 
 
2.3.3 Capability school 
 
This school of thought was borne out of Amartya Sen’s engagement with the 
concept of economic well-being. According to Lipton and Ravallion (1995), 
Sen rejected the welfarist approach as the only measure of welfare. In 
addition to the role of utility in an individual’s life, Sen showed that there are 
other things of value. The vision of Sen’s work was much more global and 
aimed at developing a new concept of what has value for the human being. 
Outlining the capability approach, Sen says: 
 
The capability approach differs from utilitarian evaluation (more 
generally welfarist evaluation) in making room for a variety of doing and 
being as important in themselves […] In this sense, the perspective of 
capabilities provides a fuller recognition of the variety of ways in which 
lives can be enriched…(Sen, 1992:44). 
 
It is the ability of the individual to function well in society; it is not the function 
actually attained by the person. The major characteristic of the approach is 
the idea of free choice. A person will not be judged poor even if he chooses 
not to achieve some functionings, so long as he would be able to attain them 
if he/she so desires. This distinction between outcomes and the capability to 
achieve the outcomes also recognises the importance of preference, diversity 
and individuality in determining functioning choices. So, functionings are 
achievements, where having utility is an example where capability to function 
refers to the liberty to choose from among different functionings. Since “acting 
freely and being able to choose in this view, is directly conducive to well-
being” (Sen, 1983:160), the value of someone's life is better seen in terms of 
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capabilities than functionings. The capability school thus considers a person 
to be poor if he does not have the possibility to achieve a certain subset of 
functionings. 
 
Looking at capabilities and functionings instead of commodities obliges one to 
take into consideration personal characteristics. In the capabilities 
perspective, three definitions of poverty arise. First, poverty as lack of 
command over commodities or severe constriction of the choice set over 
commodities; lack of specific consumption/s; and broadly, as simply lack of 
capability. The functionings relevant to the analysis of poverty and its 
reduction can vary from such elementary physical ones as being well-
nourished, being adequately clothed and sheltered, avoiding preventable 
morbidity, to more complex social achievements such as taking part in the life 
of the community, being able to appear in public without shame, and so forth. 
 
The Human Development Index and global Human Development Reports 
published by the UNDP have put the ideas of the capability school to the 
greatest test. The debates that are associated with the Human Development 
Reports have resulted in a shift of the focus of development economics from 
national income accounting to people-centred policies. The above shift is 
arguably the most significant outcome of the capabilities school. However, this 
has not been without criticisms. Not least of all, the Human Development 
Reports, and by extension, the capability school, are perceived as redundant 
(McGillivary, 1991), a reinvention of the wheel (Srinivasan, 1994), legitimise 
the arbitrary ranking of countries (Rao, 1991; Hopkins, 1991), and do not 
include moral development (Basu, 2005). Whilst the criticisms are justifiable, 
the capability school never set out to achieve what it is criticised for. 
Curiously, there are no discussions that engage the merits of shifting the 
focus of development economics from national income accounting to people-
centred policies. 
 
 Notwithstanding the shift to people-centred policies, the income approach 
dominates and is fully owned by national governments. Unfortunately in 
Kenya the human development report remains largely a UNDP matter with 
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marginal interest from the government. Governments are yet to adopt the 
capability approach. Even in Kenya with its current shift to a people-centered 
constitution that provides for an institutional framework supportive of 
participation, accountability, and respect of human rights, this approach has 
not been prioritised. 
 
Apart from the three schools of thought on poverty, poverty can also be seen 
as deprivation in terms of both material and non-material goods and assets 
(Chambers, 1995). From a material poverty perspective poverty is seen and 
measured in terms of income and/or consumption. The non-material 
perspective allows for poverty to be perceived in terms of poor health, low 
education or illiteracy, insecurity, social exclusion, insecurity and lack of 
freedom. Poverty can also be understood from an objective or subjective view 
(Chambers 1992; 1995). An objective view of poverty occurs when 
quantifiable indicators and measures are used for material and non-material 
dimensions. A subjective view of poverty is when individuals’ own judgement 
on their well-being is used to determine both material and non-material 
dimensions of poverty (ibid.). The above conceptions of poverty indicate an 
aspect of livelihoods that further elaborates the complexity of poverty. 
Chambers (1995) defines livelihoods as “…a living which is adequate for 
satisfaction of basic needs, and secure against anticipated shocks and stress” 
(Chambers, 1995:175). Chambers’s (ibid.) view of livelihoods points to subtle 
relationship between livelihoods, assets and vulnerabilities; a relationship 
explored in greater detail in the sustainable livelihoods approach (Chambers 
and Conway, 1992). 
 
The sustainable livelihoods approach builds on ideas from the three schools 
of poverty (discussed above) making it possible to conceptualise poverty in a 
complimentary way. The antecedent to the sustainable livelihoods approach 
was the 1992 Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development that 
sought to link socio-economic development to ecological concerns. As Moser 
(2009) notes, three issues influenced the development of the asset 
vulnerability framework, namely: the need to distinguish between poverty and 
vulnerability, operationalising vulnerability (identifying the threats and shocks 
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on one hand, and the resistance on the other hand), and categorising coping, 
survival, and response strategies (Moser, 2009: 20-21). From the sustainable 
livelihoods approach, it is possible to determine the extent to which poverty 
may be reduced or the degree to which one may be susceptible to becoming 
poor. Moser (2009) summarises this idea very well, “The more assets people 
had, the less vulnerable they were; the greater the erosion of people’s assets, 
the greater their insecurity.” (ibid.: 21) 
 
In this thesis, I adopt the ‘all-inclusive’ notion of poverty, which is clearly a 
hybrid from the three schools shared above and sustainable livelihoods 
approach. This is necessary because such conceptualisation makes it 
possible to relate poverty reduction and the institutions that constrain poverty 
reduction and exacerbate poverty. In the literature poverty is intrinsically a 
political problem (Moser, 2005; Mosse, 2005). Moreover, the intractability of 
poverty “…reflects its institutionalisation within social and political norms and 
structures, and its legitimisation within political discourse” (Mwangi and 
Markelova, 2009:314). Thus, by encompassing the multi-dimensionality of 
poverty, it is possible to analytically explore how institutions constrain or 
enhance poverty reduction efforts. 
 
2.4 Approaches to Institutions 
 
The notion of institutions is variously understood. The word ‘institution’ has 
been defined as organisations such as an NGO, government department, 
rules in use, or even referring to working rules, procedures and norms 
expressed in repeated activities and relationships between individuals in 
organisations (Chambers, 1997:121). North (1990:3) defines institutions as 
the rules of the game in a society. He (North, 1991: 97) views them as 
“humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction” (Uphoff (1987) also defines institutions as “stable, valued 
recurring patterns of behaviour” (Uphoff, 1987:8). They include both formal 
rules (such as constitutions, laws and property rights) and informal rules (such 
as sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct) whose 
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function is to structure incentives in political, social or economic exchange 
(North, 1991). Fukuyama (2007) observes important differences between 
formal and informal institutions as; “…formal institutions can be established, 
abolished or changed with the stroke of a pen. […] But informal institutions 
reflect embedded social practices which are often hard to perceive and 
measure, and harder to manipulate through the levers provided by public 
policy” (Fukuyama, 2007:23).  
 
From these definitions, institutions are evidently critical to how a society is 
organised and institutions indeed shape how societies evolve from time to 
time. Institutions empower and constrain actors in different ways and inhibit or 
enhance their capacity to act in accordance with the invariably prescriptive 
rules of appropriateness. In terms of poverty reduction, institutions would 
therefore be important in understanding how best poverty can be reduced and 
how urban planning is organised, or even constrained, to respond to poverty. 
In this study, the idea of institutions is limited to mainly formal political 
institutions, particularly the laws and policies, including plans that govern 
urban planning and poverty reduction. This focus is influenced by the fact that 
poverty, as shown earlier, is a political problem (Moser 2005; Mosse, 2005) 
and urban planning for poverty reduction is also a public and political process. 
I shall briefly highlight the contemporary perspectives to institutional analysis 
in economics and sociology. 
 
2.4.1 Institutions in Economics 
 
From an economics perspective, institutions offer a basis for lasting economic 
growth when they ensure reliable property rights, manage conflict, maintain 
law and order, and align economic incentives with social costs and benefits 
(Rodrik, 2003). There also have been scholars who have explored the 
relationship between institutions and economic modernity. Putnam (1993), for 
example, explores the relationship between institutional performance and 
economic modernity. His work on civic traditions in Italy showed a strong 
correlation between performance of political institutions and the nature of civic 
 49 
life or civic engagement. In the economics discipline, four main thrusts of 
institutional analysis can be identified. The first group is concerned with 
choice among constraints. Buchanan (1990) is a good example of scholars 
who have been pursuing this line of investigation. It follows, therefore, from 
this view that planning as an institution shapes the role and behaviour of the 
public, planners and political institutions. Lane’s (2005) argument that the 
model of planning being used determines the role of the public further 
underscores the significance of institutions from the perspectives of scholars 
such Putnam (1993) and Buchanan (1990). 
 
The second group has focused on the evolution of property rights. The work 
of North (1990) is exemplary in this respect. The main argument in this group 
is that institutions constrain behaviour and hence provide justification for 
change of these constraints. According to North (1990), institutions affect the 
performance of the economy by determining the costs of exchange and 
production as well as the opportunities in line with the constraints of economic 
theory. Organisations are therefore imposed to harness these opportunities 
and as they evolve they invariably change the institutions and institutional 
arrangements tremendously. 
 
For North (1990) institutional change occurs incrementally because actors in 
political and economic markets frequently make decisions based on 
incomplete information and subjective mental constructs that influence the 
information received by an individual and how it is processed. North compares 
the differences in economic growth of the United States and other developing 
countries to show the relevance of institutions. North (1990) argues that in the 
nineteenth century institutions facilitated the tremendous growth of the 
economy of the United States of America. These ensured incentives for 
organisations to engage in productive activity. In contrast, in many developing 
countries that have pursued institutional change that increasingly favours 
redistributive over productive activity, monopolies instead of competitive 
conditions are created, thereby adversely affecting economic growth. These 
institutions that support redistribution invariably constrain opportunity and 
productivity, thus slowing down economic growth. In urban planning for 
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poverty reduction, power, institutional change and reform can be ominous as 
they can undermine planning objectives such as the redistribution of income 
and reduction of inequality. 
 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and Williamson (1990) are some of the 
scholars in the third group. This group builds on the idea of property rights 
and contracting to explain the difference in organisations and contracts. 
Williamson (1990) uses the ex-post aspects of contracting or the ‘transaction 
costs economics’ to explain the difference in organisations. Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1990) focus on the ex-ante aspects of contracting or the agency 
theory to explain the difference in organisations and contracts. 
 
Others addressed relationships between institutions and economic behaviour. 
Barzel (1989) is typical of this group of research. In this group, the analysis 
focuses on how rights affect behaviour such as investment, productivity, use 
of resources and contracting, amongst others. Baumol (1990) explores the 
relationship between institutions and economic productivity. In his analysis of 
the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth, Baumol 
(1990) shows the correlation between productivity and entrepreneurship, 
arguing that institutions determine the distribution of entrepreneurial resources 
in three ways: productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurship. In 
urban planning for poverty reduction this means that institutions not only affect 
the efficiency of a planning intervention, but also determine the extent to 
which poverty will be reduced. 
 
The productive entrepreneurship includes activities that result in increase in 
wealth and net gains for society. Unproductive entrepreneurship is comprised 
of behaviour or actions that lead to wealth for a minority in the society; and 
are of doubtful importance for society, for example innovative rent-seeking or 
the non-productive pursuit of economic profit. Finally, destructive 
entrepreneurship is evident in a behaviour that is parasitic and destructive to 
the economy and society, such as warfare and mercenary activities. Overall, 
rent-seeking behaviour stymies economic growth. Murphy et al. (1993) find 
that when more resources are allocated to rent-seeking, these lower 
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incentives tend to produce reduced output in the economy. Consequently, the 
returns to production may fall faster than returns to rent-seeking. However, 
rent-seeking behaviour is also a disincentive to innovative activity and hence 
invariably adversely affects economic growth. 
 
Hugon (2004) emphasises the need for critical analysis of the role of 
institutions in economic development. Such analysis, Hugon (2004) continues, 
needs to take into account both political and economic factors reflected in 
formal structures that have recognised legitimacy as well as socio-political 
factors that often reflect the compromises of the accumulated stocks of 
relational or social capital. Woolcock (1998) asserts that it is impossible to 
understand the prospects of development policies and projects without 
knowing the characteristics of social relations at both the micro and macro 
level, “whether and how” these levels articulate with one another and the 
historical emergence of this degree of articulation (Woolcock, 1998: 183). 
Woolcock (1998) also argues that a complementary relationship between a 
government and its citizens is required for sustained economic development. 
This is because the nature of state-society relationship is crucial for a better 
understanding of the economic prospects of citizen groups and their efficacy 
in moulding the state’s willingness and ability to act in a developmental 
manner. 
 
Since the quality of state-society relations affects the development of citizens, 
it is imperative for urban planning for poverty reduction to ensure that 
interventions do not reinforce power relations that are detrimental to the 
interests of the poor. Gonzalez and Healey (2005) draw on institutionalist 
approaches to a design methodology to show how governance capacity may 
emerge. In this methodology, three issues are addressed: identification and 
assessment changes and how these might affect the status quo; emerging 
changes in urban governance and how these support social innovation; and 
the various power dynamics mobilised in initiatives which promotes a socially 
innovative behaviour. 
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The foregoing sections reflect that political institutions are critical for 
development because they provide public goods and services, design formal 
rules that regulate social relations, and ensure the efficient allocation and 
equitable distribution of resources to enhance the welfare of the people. From 
an economic perspective, thinking on institutions has been enriched in terms 
of the way institutions constrain behaviour and provide incentives for 
reforming the constraints or institutions. The new institutional economics 
offers an analytical framework that integrates institutional analysis into 
economics and political science (Williamson, 2000). But sociology also 
influences how the economics field has understood and analysed institutions. 
I consider institutions from a sociological perspective next.  
 
2.4.2 Institutions in Sociology 
 
The analysis of institutions in the field of sociology is concerned with social 
order. Two schools of thought have been influential in addressing the key 
question of institutional analysis in sociology: how does social order occur? 
The first school is associated with works of Durkheim (1938) and the second 
with Weber (1978). To Durkheim (1938), social order comes about through 
processes where individuals are socialised into collective ways of thinking and 
acting. At any given time, for these individuals, the collective ways of thinking 
and acting are always outside their own thought and action. But the 
individuals also have to conform to the collective action and thought. By 
formulating the analysis of processes of legitimacy and showing that social 
reality is continually [re]-constructed, Zucker (1986) and Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) respectively, have further developed the core ideas of 
Durkheim (1938). The innovations notwithstanding, the main idea of 
‘institutions’ in this school of thought refers to the reality of collective thought 
and action. 
 
Weber’s (1978) school of thought contributed the notion of ‘orders’ or 
institutional spheres to institutional analysis. Each of these orders is 
comprised of sets of interests. The institutional spheres or orders are 
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elements that portray consistency; and each institutional order comprises 
rules stabilised internally by legitimacy and externally through informal 
sanctions (Lindenberg, 1992:126). Weber’s (1978) ideas have been 
instrumental in deepening thinking on institutional theory of organisations. The 
work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) on organisational fields is an example of 
how productive the use of Weber’s idea has been in advancing knowledge on 
institutional theory. 
 
The main contribution on institutions from sociology is evident in the 
significance given attention to role of legitimacy in minimising the costs of 
conforming to institutions. A useful proposition from the structuration theory 
for understanding institutions is that rules and resources drawn upon in the 
production and reproduction of social action are at the same time the means 
of system reproduction (Giddens, 1984:19). Although remarkably similar to 
Foucault’s notion of power in several respects, Giddens’ idea of agency 
emphasises the capacity of actors: Thus: 
 
Agency concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator in the 
sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of 
conduct, have acted differently. Whatever happened would not have 
happened if that individual would not have intervened (Giddens, 
1984:9). 
 
The individual is therefore an integral part of a network of power even when 
s/he may not necessarily have the capacity that Giddens points out. 
Conceptualising the poor with agency certainly provides new ways of 
understanding empowerment – creating stable relations where poverty is not 
reproduced, but also creating unstable relations and resistance where new 
and hybrid knowledge and ‘truth’ of poverty is reproduced. In Giddens’s 
(1984) structuration theory, structuralism and functionalism underline the 
primacy of the social whole over its individual parts. To understand human 
social activity, Giddens (1984) turns to the relationships between structure 
and agency. In this theory, structure refers to the “structuring process that 
makes it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying 
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spans of time and space” (Giddens, 1984:17). Agency, on the other hand 
refers to an individual(s) capability of doing things (ibid.:9). 
 
From Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory, rules and resources are drawn 
upon in the production and reproduction of social actions that are at the same 
time the means of the system(s) reproduction. New institutionalist thought 
builds on the notion that even though institutions shape our practices per se, 
however, they do not really shape individuals. Building on Giddens 
Structuration theory, it is “…common sense of the sociology of knowledge 
these days that institutional structures are both constraining and enabling” 
(Hajer, 1995:48). 
 
In the new institutionalism, for instance, it was possible to conceptualise 
institutions as empowering, constraining, regulatory, and enabling. As Dale 
(2000) observes, with new institutionalism it is also possible to conceptualise 
how institutions shape decision-making and action through shared norms, 
values, beliefs and discourses. In political science, several theoretical 
approaches are considered in the study of political institutions. These include 
normative institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, international institutionalism, constructed institutionalism and 
network institutionalism. In this section these institutionalisms are briefly 
outlined into their respective strands. Starting with normative institutionalism, 
the focus is on rules and appropriateness in political institutions and how 
these shape behaviour of individuals (for example Simon, 1965; Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1998; Goodin, 2000). In rational choice institutionalism, political 
institutions are considered in three main ways: as exogenous constraints, 
rules as provided by the players themselves, and as macro-sociological 
practices (Shepsle, 2006:24-26). Historical institutionalism addresses itself to 
questions of how decisions and choices made about institutional design 
subsequently shape decision-making of actors and individuals (Tomlins, 1985; 
Sanders, 1999). 
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International institutionalism looks at how nation states are affected by formal 
and informal structural constraints of international politics (for example 
Keohane, 1989; Peters, 1999; Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, 1999). Constructed 
institutionalism shows ways in which institutions create meaning for 
individuals (for example Hall, 1993; Campbell, 2001; 2004; Schmidt, 2002). 
Current literature on political institutions (for example Rhodes, Binder and 
Rockman, 2006) shows that this strand of institutionalism has been useful in 
building theory for normative institutionalism in the broader political science 
field. Finally, network institutionalism addresses itself to questions of how 
regularised informal relations between individuals/actors and groups shape 
political behaviour. Some of the work in this stream includes Heclo and 
Wildavsky’s (1974) study on the importance of personal networks between 
politicians and technocrats in the United Kingdom Treasury department and 
Chisholm’s (1989) work on the role informal networks play in coordinating 
multiple transport agencies. 
 
New institutionalist thought has been expressed in variants of research (Hajer, 
1995; Gonzalez and Healy, 2005). The significance of New Institutionalism to 
this thesis is the relationship between action and the practice it articulates. In 
this research, New Institutionalism makes it possible to explore how 
institutions may constrain, regulate, empower and enable the poor in poverty 
reduction. The social context in which poverty occurs becomes important in 
shaping the discourses on poverty as well as the practice and/or action taken 
(or not taken) in reducing poverty. 
 
Furthermore, from a new institutionalism perspective, the notion of human 
agency makes it possible to visualise how the poor relate to conditions of 
poverty and the relations of power that sustain poverty at the local level. 
Obviously, such an institutionalist tenor would be faulted on account of its 
inherent failure to redress relations of power that sustain poverty. 
 
Vigar et al. (2000:49-51) summarise the contribution of institutionalism to the 
analysis of planning practices thus: first, institutional approaches are founded 
on a dynamic relational view of the world focusing on processes of living and 
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change and how patterns are established, and maintained; second, 
institutional approaches afford networks of people active in agency in shaping 
processes of change; third, institutional approaches embed processes of 
governance in the wider relations of economic activity and civil society; finally, 
institutional approaches emphasise analysis of the discourses and ‘taken for 
granted’ frames of reference or representations of different communities. 
 
2.5 Institutional Challenges in Urban Planning 
 
According to the UN Habitat urban planning is a form of government practice 
that can be found in most parts of the world (UN Habitat, 2009). Urban 
planning is clearly practised in a variety of forms, thus its role also varies from 
place to place (UN Habitat, 2009:11-19). In most of the literature on planning 
theory, planning is understood as being a progressive, a reformist and a 
modernist societal project. The practice of planning on the other hand entails 
public policy that affects urban and regional development, zoning and land 
use. Planning literature also indicates that unacceptable and inhumane living 
conditions of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries adds an overall 
response to the nineteenth century city as the main antecedents of planning 
(see for example Hall, 1988). 
 
In the planning literature (for example Hudson, 1979; Alexander, 1986; 
Campbell and Marshall, 1999) six types of planning are identified. These are: 
synoptic or rational comprehensive planning, incrementalism, transactive, 
advocacy, radical planning, and communicative planning. Although there are 
many planning scholars who have investigated institutions and 
institutionalism, Healey (1990; 1997a; 1997b; 1998; 1999; 2002; 2004a; 
2004b) is easily the most prolific and influential on this subject. Others include 
Forester (1999), Harrison (2006), Alexander (1994) and Flyvbjerg (1998). In 
planning, the idea of institutionalism has been applied and useful contributions 
have been made in heightening the understanding of normative behaviour for 
practice. In the remaining parts of this section, I consider the institutional 
challenges in each of the five streams of planning. 
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Synoptic planning is also known as the rational comprehensive approach. 
This is unarguably the most dominant approach in planning practice (Hudson, 
1979; Campbell and Marshall, 1999). This approach to planning typically 
considers problems from a systems perspective. The use of conceptual or 
mathematic models in addressing planning problems is a key distinguishing 
feature of synoptic planning. This planning approach consists of four classical 
elements: goal setting, identification of policy alternatives, evaluation of 
means against ends, and implementation of decisions (Hudson, 1979). 
Synoptic planning brings to the fore tensions between professionals, 
especially planners and politicians. It is assumed that a rational and scientific 
approach to analysing any problems such as poverty is sufficient in realising 
planning objectives. However, with contending political institutions such as 
political parties, planning authorities and the state, to mention but a few, it is 
clear that rationality on its own cannot ensure the success of planning. In 
synoptic planning, the urban planner is an unwitting player in both an 
institutional and power contest (Forester, 1989). 
 
Moreover, synoptic planning by its nature is a catalyst for “…respect for 
democratic decisions by improving the preparatory stage of decision-making 
and professional quality of the plans handed over to politicians” (Sager, 
2005:2) and therefore is invariably hostage to the operations of political 
institutions and power. Furthermore, since democracy is not a universal socio-
political reality, a synoptic planning approach for urban planning for poverty 
reduction is even more complicated. Democracy in many Sub-Saharan 
African cities is at varying stages. In some cases such as Kenya, even with a 
shift to a democratic order (Constitution of Kenya, 2010), it is yet to establish 
functional political institutions supportive of democracy. If planning in liberal 
democratic societies such as the global north with comparatively operational 
political institutions is stymied by power (Forester, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 1998), 
then the prospects for synoptic planning for urban poverty reduction in 
contexts with less supportive political institutions and more unequal power 
relations are arguably bleak. In synoptic planning, institutions from a 
sociological perspective are germane.  
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Incremental planning or incrementalism is mainly associated with the work of 
Lindblom (1965) on policy and decision-making, commonly referred to as the 
science of muddling through. The literature (for example, Hudson, 1979) 
shows that incremental planning was borne out of the weaknesses of synoptic 
planning, such as insensitivity to existing institutional performance capacities 
when planning. According to Lindblom’s theory, the nature and extent of 
action is mainly decided upon incrementally (Lindblom, 1965). This seems to 
be the most pragmatic and widely used approach in day-to-day decision-
making in planning. In this stream of planning, “…knowledge is acquired by 
doing and experimentation and is therefore fallible and temporary” (Campbell 
and Marshall, 1999:471). 
 
In an incremental planning approach, as in the case with synoptic planning, 
the tensions between professionals, especially planners and politicians, 
remain; but these are mitigated by “… encouraging multiple and competing 
inputs from a broad array of groups and organisations” (Sager, 2005:2). 
Nonetheless, as for synoptic planning the main and powerful political 
institution is the state that exercises its power and authority as a consequence 
of power relations by competing political actors and institutions. Input from 
other groups and organisations, while pragmatic, does not significantly alter 
power relations that disadvantages the powerless. If in the synoptic planning 
approach the planner is a player in institutional and power contests, and it is 
improbable to realise a poverty reduction agenda with weak political 
institutions and fledgling democratic conditions, then inputs from other groups 
and organisations introduced by incremental planning, even while these 
increase acceptability of planning, they do not significantly address the 
underlying institutional and power architecture that sustains poverty. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that an incremental urban planning for 
poverty reduction is more likely to be politically acceptable, but less likely to 
be effective in addressing poverty. 
 
Friedmann (1973) was the main proponent of transactive planning. 
Transactive planning sought the inclusion of people in decision-making and 
planning. Transactive planning is based on personal knowledge and mutual 
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learning. In this planning approach, participatory and decentralised planning 
are key hallmarks. By focusing on “…intact experiences of people’s lives” 
(Hudson, 1979:3), transactive planning introduces citizens as a key political 
institution. Therefore, to be able to increase the communities’ control of social 
processes that govern their welfare, Allen’s (2003) notion of power through 
mobilisation, such as participatory development (for example, Chambers, 
1997; 2005) and collective action (for example, Arendt, 1958; 1970) is 
necessary to confront unequal power relations that had hitherto kept the 
communities from participating in decision-making and planning. In this 
regard, transactive planning, unlike synoptic and incremental planning, clearly 
focuses on institutions from an economic perspective. But as promising as 
transactive planning appears for urban planning for poverty reduction, the fact 
that mobilisation neglects power dynamics within groups (Allen, 2003) and 
that power constantly shifts across time and space (Cahill, 2008), means that 
planners and the community need to be extremely adept at managing 
changing power relations in the processes of both planning and 
implementation. 
 
Advocacy planning seeks to offer a planning that confronts injustice. Davidoff 
(1965) was the main proponent of advocacy planning. As Alexander 
(1986:103) notes, advocacy planning “…was a reaction to the centralist and 
technocratic values of planning modes which prevailed in the mid 1960s.” 
Davidoff argued that because value-neutrality was a high planning ideal, 
planners needed to be committed practitioners. In this school of thought, 
planners need to engage in the political processes as advocates of interests, 
not only of governments but also of other groups because “…a plural society 
needs plural plans” (Davidoff, 1965:332). It is argued that advocacy planning 
is necessary because of unequal power and unequal access to resources. 
The advocate planner is therefore “…a spokesperson for the poor, 
neighbourhoods, or other groups with inadequate access to government” 
(Alexander, 1986:104). By advocating for other and sometimes even marginal 
interests, advocacy planning promotes competition for the ‘best’ alternative, 
thus ensuring more fairness and not simply interests of specific groups. 
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In advocacy planning several political institutions contend for social justice. 
These include the state, citizens, planners, the judiciary, and the private 
sector. By ensuring “that even disadvantaged and weak groups are heard in 
the political process” (Sager, 2005:2) advocacy planning thrusts the judiciary 
at the centre of power struggles. The planner in advocacy planning is both 
handmaiden (planner/s in the public sector), and insurgent (planner/s as an 
advocate for the disadvantaged such as the urban poor). Virtually all forms of 
power are at play in advocacy planning, but the notion of power as immanent 
or being everywhere as inspired by the work of Foucault (1991; 2001) and 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988); and governmentality (Foucault, 1991), is 
significant. In the case of immanence, power is organised through 
sophisticated webs of discourses, relationships and practices that produce 
some as powerful and others as less powerful. The immanence of power 
through discourses and practices shapes everyday life. Because the 
discourses and practices that maintain power relations are always being 
reproduced, the effects of power are dynamic and not static or stable. 
Invariably, advocacy planning tends to focus on institutions from a sociological 
perspective. 
 
“Governmentality” is “…not only enacted by the powerful but is also 
dominated by subjects acting socially defined roles and identities” (Cahill, 
2008:298). Allen (2003) acknowledges that processes of domination and 
resistance would also involve the seductive, manipulative, coercive, cooptive, 
and authoritative aspects of power. The production and reproduction of power 
in advocacy planning, Allen (2003) argues, is context-specific. While 
advocacy planning for poverty reduction is arguably the most appropriate for 
urban poverty in Sub-Saharan African cities, planners and the poor should 
beware of complexities and nuances of how power operates in specific places 
and specific times. Thus, for advocacy planning for poverty reduction to be 
effective it cannot be standardised across cities. 
 
Furthermore, the judiciary’s roles as arbiter is based on constitutions and the 
extent to which political institutions, including the judiciary, respect the rule of 
law. In addition to the constitution, judicial officers such as judges and 
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magistrates also use condign power. Some of the important sources or 
instruments of condign power include personality, quality of physique, mind, 
speech, and moral certainty. With the above sources, then condign power 
“…wins submission by the ability to impose an alternative to the preferences 
of the individual or group that is sufficiently unpleasant or painful so that these 
preferences are abandoned” (Galbriath, 1983:4-5). Compensatory power is 
also applied in advocacy planning. According to Galbriath (1983), 
compensatory power is exercised by persuasion, education, and social 
commitment so that belief(s) may be changed. The main sources of and 
instruments for exercising compensatory power include property and incomes. 
From the above, therefore, a major implication for urban planning for poverty 
reduction is that in cases where the rule of law is selectively applied, 
advocacy planning is unlikely to be effective. 
 
According to Hudson (1979), radical planning is comprised of two main 
variants of planning. The first is linked spontaneous activism. Here radical 
planning views issues and problems as a consequence of class conflict and 
question the usefulness of capitalist ideology. Hudson (1979:390) further 
notes that although this variant of radical planning is “…guided by an idealistic 
but pragmatic vision of self-reliance and mutual aid”, the main distinction with 
other approaches to planning is the “…substantive ideas about collective 
actions that can achieve concrete results in the immediate future” (ibid.). The 
second stream of radical planning whilst focusing on the large-scale social 
processes is more critical and holistic. As Kravitz (1970) contends, radical 
planning questions the ‘subservient’ role conventional planning plays in 
sustaining conservative politics; and reluctance to confront class conflict, 
unfair economic relations and control exercised by culture and media. 
 
Communicative planning is generally understood as being about how political 
communities organise to improve the quality of their places (Harris, 2002). In 
this type of planning, knowledge is recognised as socially constructed and 
invariably applied in both practical and scientific ways (Healey, 1993). 
Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (2002) add that communicative planning 
include collective decision-making, participation of all actors (or their 
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representatives) affected by the planning decision and decisions in this type of 
planning are made through arguments by participants and to participants 
committed to rationality and impartiality. This type of planning emphasises the 
context, diverse interests of participants, and the consequences of unequal 
power, hence a focus on consensus building as opposed to competitive 
interest. Communicative planning tends to embrace economic institutions. 
 
In the development and political science literature participation has been 
subject to numerous debates. In political science, participation remains 
significant in the promotion, nurture and development of democracy. Indeed, 
citizen participation is a distinctive feature of political systems where the level 
and quality of citizen participation is often used as an acceptable measure of 
the democracy. Scholars such Albaek (1995) argue that citizen participation is 
vitally important if policy-making is to be democratic. Wagle (2000:4) identifies 
a number of things that are important in citizen participation as: outcomes of 
policy-making are important to citizens, experts in policy-making play a 
facilitator role, and even though citizen participation is the ideal concept, it is 
difficult to implement. This is because attaining full citizen participation on 
every policy problem and with every actor is impractical. 
 
In the development literature (see Cornwall, undated) debates on participation 
have sought the best ways to involve citizens in their development. But it is 
Cornwall’s overall assessment of the challenges of participation in reducing 
poverty that is revelatory. She argues thus: 
 
The challenge for participation over the last decades has been to open 
spaces for public engagement, by transforming institutions and 
promoting invited participation at all levels. Lessons from experience 
indicate that inviting ‘the people’ to participate as beneficiaries or 
consumers is not in itself enough to bring about meaningful change. 
The challenge for the future is both to enable those excluded by 
poverty and discrimination to take up opportunities extended to them 
for influence and control and to exercise agency through the 
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institutions, spaces and strategies they make and shape for 
themselves (Cornwall, undated: 78). 
 
It is important to explore how theories of participation explain the different 
ways that citizens participate. Five main strands of theory of participation are 
identified.6 These include: the socio-economic model, social capital theory, 
rational model, general incentives model, and the civic voluntarism models of 
participation. The socio-economic model of participation postulates the 
relationship between social conditions of actors or stakeholders and 
participation in political activities. Social factors such as financial status, age 
and level of education attainment, it is argued in this stream of participation, 
predispose actors to specific forms of participation (see Parry et al., 1992). 
The main argument in this model is that actors’ socio-economic conditions, 
including personal status, avail them of varying political skills and resources. 
These differences subsequently shape their attitudes towards political 
participation. This conceptualisation of participation while useful has not been 
without criticism. Lyons and Alexandra (2000), for example, show that the 
relationship between achievement and political participation is not always 
strongly correlated. 
 
In the social capital theory of participation the main argument is that 
communities with rich associational life have greater advantages over those 
with impoverished associational life (see Pattie et al., 2000). Social capital is 
understood as the connectedness amongst actors or stakeholders that stands 
for social networks and resulting norms of reciprocity. Social capital includes 
civic engagement, and trust. This model posits a strong relationship between 
social capital and institutional performance of governments. It then follows 
that actors tend to participate in areas and issues where their stock of social 
capital is high and unlikely to be significantly eroded. This model of 
participation has shortfalls. It is said that this model does not take into account 
the influence of individual actor’s motives for participation, and it also does not 
                                            
6
 This exploration of theories of participation draws on the work of Phang, C.W. and 
Kankanhalli, A. (2005) 
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consider the effect of political institutions on the participation of actors 
(Rubenson, 2005). 
 
The rational model of participation conceptualises participation as a rational 
activity where actors seek maximum benefits at the least cost (see Green and 
Shapiro, 1994). Because the actors are motivated by the need to derive the 
greatest benefits and the least possible cost, actors then invariably participate 
in activities where they are likely to realise this objective. But this explanation 
of participation is said not to fully explain participation. For instance, Phang 
and Kankanhalli (2005:3) show that the decision of a single voter may not 
substantially affect the outcomes of an election. 
 
Syed and Whitely (1992; 2002) in the general incentives of basic logic 
approach argue that without obvious incentives, actors are unlikely to 
participate in political activity. Thus, actors only participate in political activities 
that have attractive incentives. The incentives referred to here include 
collective, group, selective, expressive and social norms derived incentives. 
An increase in pension is one such incentive considered. The general 
incentives model of participation is shown not to fully account for socio-
economic factors in its explanation of participation. 
 
Finally, the civic voluntarism model (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995) to 
explain participation advances the presence of wants, invitation to participate 
and ability to participate as the explanations for citizen participation in political 
activities. These factors are expressed as resources, motivation and 
mobilisation. Thus, more resources, motivation and mobilisation available to 
actors, the more likely these actors are to participate in political activity. In this 
thought, the inverse would also explain the limited or non-participation in 
political activity. Resources here refer to time, money and civic skills that 
actors possess. Communication and organisational abilities are the civic skills 
indispensable in participating in political activities. Interest in politics and 
sense of belonging or group identity refer to motivation and mobilisation 
respectively. However, the civic voluntarism model is said to suffer similar 
shortfalls as the socio-economic model of participation. 
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From the above, participation of citizens is a key feature of successful 
accountability. Here the concept of participation is important in terms of the 
kind of space the institutional and policy frameworks allow for citizens, 
particularly the poor. The relevant inquiry in this respect is then: are 
citizens/the poor given a direct role to participate in decision-making or are 
citizens only offered consultation? The other question to be addressed relates 
to how actors, especially the poor, participate within the institutional context of 
urban planning for poverty reduction. But the five models of participation are 
useful in showing that the idea of participation is both complex and 
problematic to study. 
 
Furthermore, in conceptualising public or citizen participation, the idea of actor 
or stakeholder is indispensable. Literally speaking, anyone with a stake is a 
considered a stakeholder. But in this thesis, I adopt the understanding of a 
stakeholder mainly as promoted by the World Bank: 
 
A stakeholder is any person, group or institution that has an interest in 
an activity, project or program. This includes intended beneficiaries, 
and intermediaries, those positively affected, and those involved and/or 
those who are generally excluded from the decision-making process 
(Mekong River Commission, undated: 2). 
 
The above understanding of a stakeholder is particularly useful in urban 
planning for poverty reduction because this captures the various categories of 
the poor who are often excluded in decision-making on matters that affect 
them. In institutionalism, it is thus that the relationship between stakeholders 
and decisions made about programmes, projects or activities that make 
participation important. Moreover, in deploying the idea of stakeholder, a more 
comprehensive conceptualisation of actors is possible. Following the World 
Bank’s perspective, participation is a process through which key stakeholders 
gain influence and take part in decision-making in the planning, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects (ibid.). 
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In his analysis of institutions and accountability, Ackerman (2004:7) notes: 
“the only way to guarantee good government is by institutionalising a power 
accountability that holds every public official responsible for his/her actions as 
a public servant.” If we take the exclusion of the poor in poverty reduction as a 
given framework condition, then participation should be a process that 
addresses inequality, injustice and powerlessness that institutionalises the 
exclusion of the poor. To this end, Arnstein’s (1969) idea of participation 
becomes very useful. She defines participation as the redistribution of power 
that enables the powerless citizens, excluded from the political and economic 
processes, to be included in the future (Arnstein, 1969). In this view, through 
participation citizens can induce social reform and share in the benefits of the 
affluent in society. 
 
To assess participation and understand how the institutional and policy 
frameworks for urban planning and poverty reduction enable and/or constrain 
such participation, I adopt Arnstein’s (1969:217) eight-step ladder of citizen 
participation. This ladder is comprised of three types of participation: non-
participation, tokenism and citizen power respectively. The first two steps are 
manipulation; therapy-form non-participation. The next three steps; informing, 
consultation and placation follow this; then the final three steps of partnership, 
delegating power and, finally, citizen control which form tokenism and types of 
citizen power respectively. In the eight-steps, Arnstein (1969) shows that the 
participation trajectory ranges from simple non participation or exclusion to 
exercising power or influence to ultimately significantly controling the decision-
making process. A justifiable criticism of Arnstein (1969) is the difference in 
contexts – Arnstein analyses citizen participation in the United States and this 
thesis investigates the challenges of planning particularly citizen participation 
in a sub-Saharan and Kenyan context. Since participation is only one of the 
parameters that will be used in the analysis, the contextual differences are not 
likely to be accentuated. 
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2.6 Towards a Framework for Analysing Institutional Challenges 
 
The institutional environment for urban planning for poverty reduction can be 
visualised in six main ways that either constrain or enable/facilitate situations 
that affect poverty reduction at a city level. These include: the Constitution, 
the national planning framework, the legal framework for planning and poverty 
reduction, national policies for poverty reduction, the way the city is organised, 
and plans, including plans for poverty reduction in a city. The link between 
institutions and urban planning can be seen in two main ways. The first way is 
how a type of planning comes into existence and how this develops over time 
and how institutions also influence this. For instance, the creation of 
Environmental Impact Assessments/Auditors and the formulation of the 
Environmental Management Plans have followed the enunciation of laws and 
policies in several African countries. Once established, environmental 
planning has in turn influenced the development of the relevant institutional 
frameworks. 
 
The second way in which institutions affect urban planning is seen in how 
established types of planning, here following on the example of environmental 
planning, represent a set of norms and behaviour that persists because these 
are valued and accepted as useful. Thus, a once-off response to an 
environmental problem would not constitute environmental planning. Similarly, 
in terms of poverty reduction a once-off intervention to poverty in an urban 
area would not necessary be urban planning for poverty reduction. Instead, 
urban planning for poverty reduction is conceptualised as a practice that 
comes into existence by way of changes in legal frameworks, policies and 
regulations; how the political institutions together with the above frameworks 
shape the development of the practice and, finally, how the established 
practice in turn represents sets of norms and behaviour valued as useful in 
reducing poverty. Here the processes of urban planning for poverty reduction 
are both concomitant to one another and also occur simultaneously. 
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Chang (2006) highlights key challenges that must be borne in mind whilst 
studying institutions. He posits that because there is no agreement on the 
notion of institutions, there is also no agreement on the relationship between 
institutions and economic development: 
 
The problem is that there are many different ways and levels of 
abstraction in which the conceptual ‘pie’ may be cut. … Moreover, even 
if we can agree on the list of functions that are essential for economic 
development, this does not mean we can agree on the exact kinds and 
forms of institutions that we need in order to fulfil those functions 
(Chang, 2006:2). 
 
Although Chang’s (2006) paper is about institutions and economic 
development, the definitional problem is true in the case of institutions and 
urban planning and poverty reduction. The World Bank (2001) argues that in 
making state institutions work better for the poor, removal of social barriers 
and supporting poor people’s organisations were critical in making economic 
growth more equitable, consequently reducing poverty. This position also 
espoused other equally influential actors such as the IMF and other IFIs that 
have shaped the global and national responses to poverty reduction. 
However, Fukuyama’s (2007) conclusion on political institutions and 
development is instructive when thinking about the usefulness of institutions in 
poverty reduction. He observes that: 
 
First, there is no such thing as an optimal political institution or 
universally valid design criteria. […] Second, institutions often come as 
complex, interdependent packages. Thus it often is not possible to 
achieve one particular outcome without adjusting several dimensions of 
institutional design simultaneously. […] Third, good institutions are 
heavily dependent on local context, traditions, habits and political 
culture. People without this local knowledge often do not understand 
how even existing institutions actually work, much less how to reform 
them. […] Fourth, we need to invest, more in regional or areas studies, 
which focus on local knowledge. Large cross-country regressions 
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which to uncover general causal relationships are much less useful at 
this point. […] Fifth, leadership matters. While this reduces the ability to 
predict behavior or influence outcomes, it is a fact of political life. 
(Fukuyama, 2007:38-39). 
 
Sager and Ravlum (2005) consider the relationships between context and 
action, and the approach to social change. Exploring why politicians act 
differently from expected behaviour, Sager and Ravlum (2005) use evidence 
from scientific reports submitted by planners to a Parliamentary committee on 
transport in Norway. From an institutional perspective, Sager and Ravlum 
(2005) contribute to understanding how institutions shape action and 
ultimately behaviour even with scientific inputs. The five questions explored 
are useful in appreciating the role of institutions in decision-making. These 
questions included: why do politicians not always take into consideration 
expert inputs in their decisions? Why is public policy not always scientifically-
based? Why is there so little decision-oriented use of the results of analytic 
planning models? Why do elected politicians demand more analytic planning 
models only to ignore them? And why do planners produce policy-making 
inputs but Parliamentarians do not find these useful? Sager and Ravlum 
(2005) are useful in understanding why politicians may not implement 
planning proposals for poverty reduction. Some of the propositions from 
Sager and Ravlum (2005) will be considered in analysing politicians’ action 
and behaviour in the City of Nairobi to poverty reduction. 
 
To conceptualise how institutions empower or constrain actors, and inhibit or 
enhance their capacity to act in accordance with the consistently prescriptive 
rules of ‘appropriateness, three ideas are adopted from the wide literature on 
institutionalism as entry points. These are accountability, answerability, and 
participation. I also draw on a variety of notions of power to determine the 
power structure of the political system, and how power shapes the 
relationships between institutions, citizens and planners and other 
professionals. Together, these are used to operationally assess and analyse 
to a large extent the level to which institutions for planning for poverty 
reduction in Kenya enhance and/or undermine poverty reduction in urban 
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Kenya. The policies for poverty reduction are also analysed/measured in 
terms of their appropriateness and adequacy for poverty reduction in urban 
Kenya. 
 
2.6.1 Accountability and Answerability 
 
The idea of accountability has been widely explored in the governance 
literature (Goetz and Jenkins, 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2006; Ackerman, 2004; 
Kamath, 2006). Some of the definitions of accountability have included: ‘the 
means by which individuals and organisations recognise authority and are 
held responsible’ (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 967); ‘the process of holding 
actors responsible for actions’ (Fox and Brown, 1998:12); and ‘the capacity to 
demand someone engage in reason-giving to justify behaviour or the capacity 
to impose a penalty for poor performance’ (Goetz and Jenkins, 2002:5). From 
the definitions of accountability provided, accountability is important in 
constraining action and behaviour of actors through control, sanctions and 
demands for justification. In urban planning for poverty reduction, 
accountability can be applied to the following relations: between the citizens, 
particularly the poor and elected politicians and policy makers; between 
technocrats including planners and the citizens/poor; and between 
citizens/poor, politicians, policy makers and the technocrats. Goetz and 
Jenkins (2005) argue that within institutions entitlements are decided, 
resources allocated and markets regulated. Thus exclusion of individuals and 
their interests operating within a political arena can be conceptualised in 
institutions. 
 
The literature shows that the concept of accountability has two dimensions 
(Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; Schedler, 1999). Answerability is the first 
dimension. This refers to the obligation of state officials to answer or give an 
account for action or behaviour. This could be to citizens, or in the case of 
urban planning for poverty reduction, to the poor directly or to some 
representative body, such as parliament. The accounting or giving of an 
account must be as a matter of obligation, not discretion, and it must be to a 
public forum or public record that is accessible to all, not the privilege of a few. 
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The second dimension of accountability is sanction or enforcement. There 
must be provision for some consequence flowing from the failure to give 
account or failure to discharge a public function, preferably accompanied by 
remedies for those negatively affected by such failure. Thus, the institutional 
channels for urban planning for poverty reduction to be analysed will have met 
the ideal of accountability if both answerability and sanction are present. 
 
The other important aspect of accountability is the idea of responsiveness. 
Compared to answerability, this is a relatively weaker concept. It refers simply 
to a sense of moral obligation on the part of a public official to take into 
consideration the preferences of the citizens in making a decision (Goetz and 
Jenkins, 2005:12-13). In the case of urban planning for poverty reduction, 
public officials such as planners, policy makers and even politicians would be 
expected to take into consideration the preferences of the citizens in general 
and the poor in particular when addressing poverty. Responsiveness has 
been defined as a “desired attitude of power-holders towards citizens: to be 
responsive to the concerns and problems of ordinary people, to listen with 
impartiality and fairness to divergent views…”(ibid.). Although responsiveness 
is a weak moral obligation rather than a legal obligation, it does not render this 
concept unproductive. When responsiveness becomes routinised or a norm 
and is less of an isolated personal attitude it does have potential to shape 
institutional culture and deliver something akin to accountability. However, in 
the absence of a defined framework mandating it, sustainability of 
responsiveness institutionalising is doubtful. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
Since the relationship between urban planning for poverty reduction and 
political institutions has not been explored in any depth, a new framework for 
analysing the institutional challenges for such urban planning was justifiable. I 
have brought together theoretical insights from institutionalism and power to 
build a conceptual framework to examine the different ways in which political 
institutions constrain and/or enable urban planning processes for poverty 
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reduction. I have argued that to understand the institutional challenges of 
urban planning for poverty reduction the relationships between political 
institutions, citizens — especially the poor —and planners are more important 
than an instrumental notion of urban planning for poverty reduction. 
 
“Poverty and poverty reduction”, “urban planning”, and “institutions” are the 
main concepts that frame the study. But these are singly and collectively 
influenced by power. In the manner of Alexander (1986:26), it is postulated 
that urban planning for poverty reduction is dependent on political institutions. 
Despite the role power plays in each of the main concepts, power is also 
conceptualised as an intervening variable that shapes the relationship 
between urban planning for poverty reduction and the institutional/policy 
frame, the dependent and independent variables respectively. Having 
provided this framework, the next chapter considers how the growth of 
political institutions has shaped urban planning for poverty reduction in Kenya. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  THE NURTURINGOF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
KENYA, 1920-1990 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the development of political institutions 
and how this has affected the current institutional framework for urban 
planning in poverty reduction in Kenya. This chapter reflects that the growth 
and development of political institutions in Kenya has invariably been 
remarkably hostile to urban planning for poverty reduction. The discussions 
here are guided by four key questions: What have been the main changes in 
the institutional framework for urban planning in poverty reduction? In which 
ways has power affected accountability and participation in these institutional 
changes? How has poverty been addressed throughout the changes in the 
institutional framework? And, how does power affect the institutional 
frameworks for urban planning in poverty reduction? 
 
To answer the above questions, the discussions are organised in three main 
epochs. The discussions start with the period of the difficult formation of the 
Kenya Republic. This reviews key political developments from the 1920s to 
the early 1960s that led to the birth of the Kenyan state. The 1920s are 
significant in the history of the Kenya Republic because these mark the birth 
of the country as a Colony and Protectorate of British East Africa. Further, the 
1919 Ordinance of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) allowed participation and 
representation of the then recognised Kenyans – the White settler population. 
Later, at independence, Kenya gave rise to the notorious institution of the 
imperial presidency. This section is followed by discussions of the growth and 
development of political institutions during the decade of 1966–1976, the 
fleeting golden era. This period is also important in two main ways: the rise of 
the imperial presidency is synonymous with the growing abuse of power, and 
the systematic atrophy of political institutions. The discussion of the 
treacherous developments begins from the late 1970s to 1990; the virtual 
destruction of institutions follows. The Chapter ends with a conclusion that 
explores the implications of the peripatetic trajectory of the growth and 
development of political institutions on urban planning for poverty reduction. 
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3.2 The Difficult Birth of the Kenyan Republic: 1920s - 1966 
 
The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (2005) and other research on 
constitutional development in Kenya (Kindiki, 2007; Bannon, 2007; Kibwana, 
1999; Kituo Cha Katiba, 1999) trace the origins of the constitution to the 1887 
agreement between the British and the Sultan of Zanzibar for a fifty-year 
lease over the coastal strip. Sir William MacKinnon as the inaugural 
Administrator represented the British Empire. But within the first six years, the 
arrangement with the Sultan for control of the coastal strip territory changed 
from British Suzerainty to the British East Africa Protectorate (BEAP). In July 
1895, the British government granted a charter to the Imperial British East 
Africa Company (IBEAC) to operate and manage the coastal strip and 
sections of the hinterland, as a private company. 
 
As a result of this, there were also changes of Administrators. After 
MacKinnon, Mackenzie, de Winton, Matthews and Portal respectively acted 
as surrogate Administrators of the British Suzerainty. Arthur Henry Harding 
was the Administrator when the IBEAC started its operations as a company. 
This was a tumultuous period (Hornsby, 2012). Land belonging to indigenous 
Kenyans such as the Maasai, Kikuyu, and others was alienated for white 
settlers through immanence and governmentality. During this period, a major 
infrastructure project – the Uganda Railway which is routed from Mombasa on 
the East African coast to Kisumu on Lake Victoria was launched with the 
purpose of further opening up of the East African hinterland for colonial 
economies. 
 
Thereupon, in December 1901, on reaching Kisumu, the Uganda railway was 
completed. With the completion of the railway, the white settler population and 
Indian community embarked on commerce and farming. For Sir Charles Eliot 
who was a Commissioner for the BEAP, this marked a significant milestone 
for Britain. Other trading communities such as the Arabs also settled in key 
towns of Kenya from Mombasa through to Kisumu. Eight years after the 
formation of the BEAP, in addition to the Administrator and the IBEAC, 
another important political institution formed.  
 75 
Consequently, in 1906 when Sir James Sadler was Governor, the Legislative 
Council (LEGCO) was established (Hornsby, 2012: 30). The main purpose of 
the LEGCO was to enhance citizen participation in the governance of the 
Protectorate as well as law-making. Records of the Parliament show that the 
main and lingering contention was representation and taxation (ibid.). 
Instructively, these were contentions between the white settler population and 
Consular-General for East Africa/Colonial office. The indigenous people could 
not vote or even participate in decision-making. Even if participation was to be 
equated with representation and subsequent involvement in decision-making, 
it was still problematic. Records of Parliament show that the Governor made 
all nominations to the all whites LEGCO. 
 
Literature and archival records of this period do not show that there was any 
poverty in the white settler population. But there was poverty mainly amongst 
the local indigenous population that was not prioritised in the LEGCO. 
Because the Protectorate government exempted and did not recognise the 
indigenous African population, participation and accountability for all were 
clearly not recognised as important values. By encouraging representation via 
nomination by the powerful state or colonial government and the Governor, 
other alternatives of representation and participation for the excluded majority 
of the indigenous African population were rendered inactive. 
 
Thus, the excluded indigenous African population was effectively silenced and 
also wielded less power compared to the white settler population and the 
colonial government. Moreover, focusing on the non-poor also made 
endeavours such as poverty reduction unattainable or even not worth 
considering by the LEGCO. Hence it can be justifiably argued, that as key 
political institutions were being established in the Protectorate, the 
foundations for an institutional framework that neither recognised the poor nor 
provided for their participation in decision-making were also firmly laid through 
condign power. 
 
A centralised system of government with a powerful executive with the 
Governor at the helm was established. This powerful system of government 
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was essential for both containing an increasingly restive indigenous 
population and an equally restless white settler population that also wanted 
independence from the British colonial authority (Rosberg and Nottingham, 
1966; Atieno Odhiambo, 1981). This was to continue until July 1919 when Sir 
Edward Northey was appointed as Governor. A year later in 1920, Sir Edward 
Northey was to preside over the birth of the Kenya Colony and Protectorate. 
 
3.2.1 The Rise of the Colony: 1920 –early 1950s 
 
To respond to the growing tensions between the indigenous Kenyan 
population and white settler demands for an independent territory, the 1922 
Constitution was promulgated as a framework that would guide the 
governance and development of the colony (ibid.). The 1922 Constitution is 
significant in Kenya’s history because it was also the first constitution. As 
mentioned earlier, the LEGCO comprised of whites only that represented the 
white settler interests in the colony. As commerce thrived in the colony, the 
population of white settlers, Indians and Arabs – communities that participated 
in the booming commerce - changed and the representation and governance 
of the colony became inevitable. 
 
With the LEGCO (Amendment) Ordinance of 1924 that created the provision 
to elect additional members – five Indian members and one Arab member to 
represent the Indian and Arab communities respectively - the Crown 
Secretary of State effected key changes in the LEGCO. Whilst the Indians 
and Arab representatives were to be elected by electorates of their 
communities, a white clergyman, Rev J.W. Arthur, was nominated by the 
Governor to represent African interests in the LEGCO. 
 
Having succeeded in establishing the British Suzerainty, then the British 
Protectorate, and finally the colony, the whites and by extension the British 
colonial government, were powerful and the black Africans held less power. 
More importantly, the governance system outlined above through the LEGCO 
further demonstrated where the power lay. In terms of participation, this was 
 77 
done only at the invitation and the pleasure of the whites. Therefore, from the 
perspective of power as decision-making (Dahl, 1957; 1961), the exclusion of 
the blacks almost ensured that their interests such as dispossession and the 
ensuing poverty would never be considered, let alone be addressed. 
Moreover, the imposition of white supremacy through colonialism clearly 
demonstrates Galbriath’s (1983:2) notion of power as the possibility of 
imposing one’s will upon the behaviour of other persons. Given the 
domination of the whites and exclusion of the blacks during this period, it is 
not surprising that urban planning did not address poverty, as that was never 
a priority for the whites. 
 
As if to acknowledge the ‘disenfranchisement’ of the indigenous Africans, the 
colonial government, through the Local Native Council Ordinance, established 
Native Councils in the African enclaves then designated as reserves. But 
there was a growing disheartening disquiet within the Indian community who 
protested the proposed voters roll. It was not until after ten years in 1934 that 
the elected Indian members joined the LEGCO. In the same year the Rev L.J. 
Beecher was also nominated to increase the representation of African 
interests in the LEGCO. 
 
A second Arab member joining the LEGCO as an elected member also 
closely followed the nomination of the Rev Beecher. By the late 1930s and 
early 1940s the LEGCO had transformed from an all white settler institution to 
one that comprised of elected and nominated whites, elected Indians and 
Arabs, and two white clergymen who were trustees of African interests. When 
the Rev J.W. Arthur retired in October 1944, the Governor, Sir Philip Euen 
Mitchell, nominated an African, Mr Eliud Wambu Mathu to the LEGCO 
(National Assembly, Kituo Cha Katiba, 1999; Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission (CKRC, 2005). 
 
The nomination of the Eliud Mathu was important in at least two main ways. 
First, it was an oblique recognition of the need for Africans to be seen as 
participating in the decision-making. Second, the nomination also confirmed 
the continued weakness of the pre-independence model of participation and 
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accountability. In terms of urban planning, Kingoriah (1980) and Kiamba, 
(1986) show that planning studies by Feetham and others in the 1920s 
highlighted the need to address poverty. By the early 1940s, the planning 
initiatives of the 1920s were clearly inadequate even for the white settler 
community. Although the earlier planning initiatives did not directly address 
themselves to poverty, an important effect of these studies and their 
implementation was the dramatic creation of the poor through a dispossession 
of their properties and lands. 
 
The African population that previously owned land and engaged in agricultural 
production in areas covered by Nairobi, with the creation of borders were 
immediately dispossessed, their movement restricted and they had to rely on 
‘illegal’ employment in Nairobi. During the administration of Sir Philip Euen 
Mitchell as the Governor, a team of South African Consultant Town Planners 
led by Thornton-White was tasked with preparing the Master Plan. The 
Nairobi: Master Plan for a Colonial Capital, commonly known as the 1948 
Master Plan, was prepared with a twenty-five year horizon. 
 
The 1948 Master Plan 
As this Master Plan claims, Kenya arguably “made town planning history by 
experimenting with a team of three planners” (Thornton-White et al., 1948: 1).  
This team comprised: Thornton-White, an Architect Planner and leading 
academic at the University of Cape Town; Anderson, a Senior Town Planning 
Engineer in private practice; and Silberman, then a leading sociologist at the 
University of the Witwatersrand on various social problems of colonial Africa.  
With such a diverse and inter-disciplinary team, their analysis of the “Nairobi 
Problem” was undoubtedly expected to be much sharper. As it turned out, this 
team missed important connections between Nairobi and its fringes. 
 
Naturally, even when this team recognised the multi-racial composition of the 
residents/citizens of Nairobi, its vision for Nairobi remained alien and 
European colonial. Their analyses of the “Nairobi Problem” (Thornton-White et 
al., 1948: 3) espoused a cautious ambivalence about the real needs and 
challenges facing these people and instead argued for breaking down the 
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municipality to cater for the more divergent and complex interests. Breaking 
down in the context of the Master Plan meant maintaining the racial divide 
and responding to needs of these different peoples in designated spaces. 
 
Of course, it is also apparent that what was known as planning at the time 
greatly influenced and shaped how the colonial government approached the 
planning for Nairobi. Reservations of the colonial planning system 
notwithstanding, an appropriate understanding of what the Master Plan 
broadly required was presented. Their analysis of the “Nairobi Problem” was 
two-fold.  First, that Nairobi was faced with numerous challenges:  
 
Nairobi with over 100,000 inhabitants is the largest town in East Africa. 
It is the capital of Kenya, but is also serves as headquarters to a 
number of East African institutions. Its hinterland is the area of 
European farming settlement as well as some densely inhabited 
African reserves. Its inhabitants are engaged in government services, 
in commerce, in industry, in the armed forces, in domestic service and 
in those mutual services which are effectively summarised as “taking in 
one another’s washing (ibid. 2). 
 
The planning problem in their view was also about nurturing industrialisation.  
They argued that if Nairobi was to prosper, general industry was of absolute 
necessity to be encouraged. They claimed; “a layout that will satisfy both the 
municipality and the railway has to be evolved” (ibid. 2); providing for the 
physical expansion of Nairobi and related political challenges; mediating multi-
cultural and racial needs; ensuring sufficient space for the growing population; 
retaining the aesthetic character of Nairobi; and providing for transportation 
and a road plan (Thornton-White et al., 1948: 2-4). 
 
Second, they argued that even though the “Nairobi Problem” was indeed 
multifaceted, it was “…simplified by the absence of a number of difficulties so 
often met in European towns” (ibid.:4). In their view, intricate slum clearance 
was one of those difficulties that would have complicated the implementation 
of the Master Plan. Although the analysis and eventual focus on a zoning plan 
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was justified, the growing poverty of the African population was not 
acknowledged. Whilst the European settlers’ population in Nairobi at the time 
was generally wealthy, the same was not true for the Black Kenyan population 
that served the economic interests of the city. The crypto-apartheid planning 
approaches of zoning and the attendant creation of African or native reserves 
formed the cradle of the dispossessed, contained and increasingly poor 
Africans whose controlled entry to Nairobi was strictly enforced. Yet this part 
of the population, in addition to the restricted African population in Nairobi, 
played an important part in the life and growth of the city. 
 
Although the Thornton-White team and the Master Plan in general were 
concerned about the growing population and the need to provide adequate 
space for the city, they were completely oblivious to the increasingly 
marginalised people, their living conditions in Nairobi and in the African 
reserves and the long-term impacts thereof on Nairobi. The view that by 
providing zoning plans, considering the industrial, residential, communications 
and transportation development (generally read as economic development) 
Nairobi arguably responded to poverty, was doubtful. Without evidence to 
support these views, such arguments would justifiably be viewed as a 
specious campaign for colonial interests and segregation/discrimination 
against the indigenous population. The construction of Nairobi’s planning 
problem during the colonial era as seen in the 1948 Master Plan then showed 
that, as an outcome of discrimination, planning was as an important tool in the 
creation, growth and sustenance of poverty and the poor in Nairobi. 
 
It was instructive that the poor were acknowledged for the first time in the 
conceptualisation of urban planning in Africa in passing by the planning team. 
It is useful to note that the word ‘poor’ only appears seven times in the 1948 
plan. Some of the instances include: 
 
As the poor have in the past not been represented on the councils and 
are not able to influence non-native election figures, progressive 
taxation has tardily been applied. … As soon as there are rich and 
poor, intellectual and lowbrow, professionally trained and unskilled, as 
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recognisable types in every race, with inter-racial organisations, each 
pressing for bigger slices of the cake, multiracial society is normalised 
(ibid.: 10). 
 
The number of times that the words ‘poor’ and ‘poverty’ appear in the plan 
may not at once appear significant, but given the growth of the number of 
poor during the colonial period, such an omission in the plan was significant. 
Moreover, even when these appeared in the plan, it was not because they 
were the direct foci of the plan but rather a peripheral matter. ‘Poverty’ as a 
word is mentioned only once: “Some omissions in the provisions of health 
services indicate the relative poverty of even so advanced a city of Colonial 
Africa as Nairobi” (ibid.: 32).  Only twice is the word ‘poor’ used in reference to 
the poor and specifically the Black African population. 
 
From the information on the poor and poverty in the Master Plan, some 
portraits of the poor and of poverty emerge. First, the poor were mainly 
understood to be Africans with marginal wages; mainly in the countryside. The 
poor were also not represented on the council and as a result were without 
power to influence any changes in their lives. Thornton-White et al. 
highlighted the circumstances of the poor and identified what and where they 
were; yet they made no suggestions to address their plight in the Master Plan. 
Examples are when the planning team infers to the poor when they highlight 
the declining housing conditions (ibid.) but do not follow with concrete 
proposals to address the problem. 
 
While the poor were, by inference, correctly identified as without adequate 
housing, there was also a weak attempt to show that this problem was 
ameliorating. Nonetheless, evidence to support these claims was never 
provided for from Africa or even Nairobi at the time. Furthermore, evidence 
from countries such as South Africa with similar planning challenges 
(Harrison, Todes and Watson, 2007) does not seem to support the Thornton-
White et al. view. There was also an attempt to show that the poor and 
poverty were an interracial phenomenon as “recognisable types in every race” 
(Thornton-White et al., 1948:10). Again, as in the case of improvements in 
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housing, there was no evidence of the same or an analysis showing the 
prevalence of poverty within the different races. Thus, I contend that such 
presentations of the poor and poverty were not helpful in addressing poverty, 
especially amongst the dispossessed Black African Kenyans. 
 
Finally, despite their contradictions with respect to the poor and poverty, 
Thornton-White and his team provided useful insight on the role of institutions. 
By showing that the African was not represented in the planning team 
(Thornton-White, 1948:10), it implicitly acknowledged the nexus between 
institutions and policy for poverty reduction, particularly amongst the poorly 
represented Africans. Simply put, this meant that without supportive 
institutions it was impossible to address poverty. However, their 
conceptualisation of institutions was in the deliberative sense where through 
representation and debate and in the council issues like poverty would be 
addressed. But there was no evidence to show that poverty was ever 
addressed in the debate. 
 
At the time of publishing the Master Plan, Councillor F.J. Khamisi was the only 
African on the Council (ibid.: vi-vii). It is possible that in 1948 the non-Black 
councillors also represented the Black Africans, but this is improbable. At the 
national level, representation in the LEGCO was not any different. The 
LEGCO then comprised of four Africans, sixteen government members, 
eleven white members, five Asian members, and two Arab members. Even 
with the increased representation, because the colonial government, by sheer 
number of actors who dominated decision-making, it was highly unlikely that 
the interests of the excluded black African population was addressed in the 
LEGCO or in the City of Nairobi. The above was a typical illustration of the 
use of conditioned power. 
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3.2.2 Confronting the Colonial Powers: 1952–1963 
 
James Griffith’s, the Secretary of State for the colony, came up with new 
proposals to increase the membership of the LEGCO as the main 
development in the constitution at this time (Mboya, 1963; Odinga, 1967; 
Hornsby, 2012). These proposals were implemented in 1952 and resulted in 
the increase of the number of members. Even with the implementation of the 
changes, with twenty-eight unofficial members compared to the twenty-six 
official members, the government dominated the LEGCO. Two years later, in 
1954, the Lyttelton Constitution replaced the 1922 constitution. Sir Evelyn 
Baring, the then Governor, was responsible for implementing these changes. 
Of the fifty-four members of the LEGCO, the Governor nominated all six 
Africans, and the Governor also elected the six Asians and one Arab. The 
other changes included a Council of Ministers that replaced the Executive 
Committee. The Council of Ministers like its predecessor was comprised of 
twelve persons. While B.A. Ohanga as the only Minister replaced Mathu, the 
other unofficial members of the LEGCO who were ministers included three 
whites and two Asians. The remaining eight ministers included six civil 
servants and two nominated members who were all white. The nomination of 
Black Africans in the LEGCO and the City of Nairobi was a clear use of 
compensatory power (Galbriath, 1983:4-6). By offering these nominated 
representatives allowances and other privileges, the representatives 
continued to legitimise these institutions. 
 
During the early 1950s the colonial administration embarked on a national 
planning project. Since the colonial economy was mainly based on agriculture 
to produce inputs for the industries in Britain, this responsibility was 
undertaken by the Department of Agriculture. Hence the 1953 Colonial Plan to 
Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya was prepared by 
the then Assistant Director of Agriculture, R.J.M. Swynnerton, thus its popular 
reference as the Swynnerton Plan. I shall discuss this plan presently. 
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The Swynnerton Plan 
Poverty – nationally - was mainly understood in terms of individual traits. The 
poor in this respect were the native African farmers, mainly drawn from the 
high agricultural potential areas like Central Kenya and Western Kenya and 
not the White settlers (Society for International Development, 2004). 
Furthermore, the poor would also be seen in terms of Africans that lived off 
marginal lands in the “Northern Province” (Swynnerton, 1953:8) with small 
parcels of land; people living in “the semi-arid pastoral areas” (ibid.: 9). 
 
Swynnerton further provided instructive indicators of the poor in colonial 
Kenya as: unemployed “Kikuyu repatriates” (ibid.: i); and unproductive African 
farmers on the “African lands” (ibid.: 1). As a result, even with an ambivalent 
notion of poverty espoused by the colonial government, it is reasonable to 
conclude that poverty was at the heart of this plan. Surprisingly, however, 
despite their (poverty and the poor) centrality they were not directly 
addressed. Swynnerton proposed a number of strategies that would have 
debilitating effects on the poor in the sense that these strategies enhanced 
the regulation and control of the poor in specific spaces such as the so-called 
Reserves. 
 
As the Hon. Cavendish-Bentinck, the Colonial Minister for Agriculture and 
Natural Resources said, the plan was motivated by the twin objectives of 
increasing agricultural production and providing some livelihoods for the 
displaced African native populations (Swynnerton, 1953: i). The Swynnerton 
Plan also established the 5-year planning cycle that has since largely 
characterised planning at the national level. Improvement of agriculture was 
pursued by supporting the progressive relatively large scale native African 
and white settlers’ agricultural industries (ibid.: 8). 
 
Although the Swynnerton Plan acknowledged poverty obliquely, poverty and 
the poor were addressed in three main forms: broad policy pronouncement; 
provision of skills/knowledge; and cash crop development regulation. The plan 
outlined policy directions, including maintaining the tribal system of tenure, 
preventing the African from borrowing money against the security of his land, 
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providing the African farmer with an increased agricultural and veterinary 
service, and charging an annual rent on all land on which a right of occupancy 
has been taken out (ibid.: 10). 
 
In addition, by focusing on the African in the high potential areas who were 
privileged farmers, however justifiable, the plan inevitably discriminated 
against the poor. Yet even among the Africans in the high potential areas, a 
sound land tenure system was not feasible as these Africans had lost their 
land to the conquering and colonising white settler community. Imposing 
ownership criteria such as land titles issued by the Crown government meant 
that the proposed policy was not only highly unjust, but also unlikely to be 
effective in addressing the poor and poverty in these areas because the 
implementation aggravated the inequalities in the population. Cash crop 
development regulation was another important proposal that was to address 
the plight of the poor and poverty. Like the policy on land, it seemed attractive 
and beneficial (ibid.: 14). 
 
On the surface, the strategies and policies in the plan were arguably sound. 
Yet, without addressing the issues of dispossession that accompanied the 
establishment of the colony of Kenya, it would be difficult to argue that with 
successful agricultural production poverty would decrease. Considering the 
effectiveness of the plan with respect to the poor, poverty and poverty 
reduction would also present serious conceptual difficulties, since the notion 
of colony and colonisation failed to address equity, justice and fairness across 
all races. It would, however, be possible to argue that the Swynnerton Plan 
addressed the poor, poverty and poverty reduction within the privileged white 
settler class and to some extent among the privileged Africans. But with the 
attention on the rich African and landed farmers, such arguments were clearly 
strenuous. 
 
Focusing on specific regions like Central Kenya and specific groups such as 
the rich farmers were important features of the Swynnerton Plan. Regrettably 
this practice of privileging some areas over the rest of the country persists in 
planning even today. The Society for International Development (2004) 
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argued that the plan exacerbated inequality and poverty. In laying the 
foundations for inequality and the operations of power by excluding some 
from the plan, the Swynnerton Plan was also an important building block for 
subsequent plans in independent Kenya. This plan was also significant for its 
silence on poverty. The omission would suggest at least two of several things: 
that poverty did not exist in Kenya in the 1950s or if it did then it was not 
important for this plan. On the contrary, poverty existed (see for example 
Leys, 1926; Leakey, 1952; Corfield, 1960; Elkins, 2005). Foucault (1991) 
argues that power is constituted through discourse. Since poverty is not 
mentioned in the Swynnerton Plan, it then can be concluded that this specific 
knowledge of poverty did not count as important, thus its absence in the plan. 
 
How then could this plan seek to improve the economy of the African farmer 
whilst at the same time ignoring thousands of Africans that had been 
dispossessed of their land and rendered poor because they had to create 
space for the settler white and some privileged African farmers? Of course, it 
is also plausible to argue that since the strategies of this plan were: to provide 
loans to the poor African farmers using large-scale production reform of 
African customary land tenure to allow large scale economic farms, the 
Swynnerton Plan implicitly addressed poverty reduction. Such arguments, on 
the contrary, only confirmed the urgency for reforming agriculture and not 
necessarily poverty reduction. Since discourses transmit messages of norms 
and what should not be seen as norms, in the planning discourses of 1950s, 
as exemplified by the Swynnerton Plan, poverty per se was not a norm and 
thus did not need any attention. 
 
3.2.3 Towards the Dawn of Independence 
 
After the publication of the Swynnerton Plan a government survey confirmed 
that the indigenous African population was increasingly restless because the 
colonial administration nominated their representatives for them (Kirui and 
Murkomen, 2011). In response to the results of the survey, in 1955 Sir Evelyn 
Barring appointed Mr. W.F. Coutts to lead a Commission of Inquiry to 
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establish ways by which the indigenous Africans could elect their 
representatives. Subsequently, an amendment was made to the Legislative 
Council (Amendment) Ordinance, 1924 to provide for the election of eight 
African representative Members (Mboya, 1963). In March 1957, the first 
election of African representatives to the LEGCO was held; but this was for a 
paltry eight electoral areas (ibid.; Odinga, 1967). 
 
The election of the African members to the LEGCO did not resolve the 
disquiet among the African population (Mboya, 1963; Odinga, 1967; Kirui and 
Murkomen, 2011). The members-elect declined offices in the government. Sir 
Evelyn Baring was clearly overwhelmed as the European and Asian ministers 
resigned their positions as ministers. In late 1957, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Lennox Boyd, intervened (Mboya, 1963; Odinga, 1967). His 
intervention resulted in the changes to the 1954 constitution to what is 
popularly known as 1958 Lennox Boyd Constitution (ibid.). The main changes 
included: increases of African ministers from one to two; increasing African 
members in the LEGCO from six to fourteen; and forming a twelve member 
electoral college specially chosen by the LEGCO but comprising of four 
members each from the white settlers, Asians, and Africans (Kituo Cha 
Katiba, 1999). Unsurprisingly, the Lennox Boyd Constitution did not address 
the African population as the contentious issues around representation and 
participation were not taken into account. 
 
In 1959, the African members led by Messrs. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and 
Thomas Joseph Mboya as president and secretary, respectively formed an 
informal political movement, the Kenya Independence Movement to respond 
to the growing disenfranchisement and powerlessness of the African 
population (Mboya, 1963; Odinga, 1967). Analysis of the Lytletton and Lennox 
Boyd constitutions, and literature on constitutional development in Kenya (for 
example CKRC, 2005; Kibwana, 1999; Mulisa, 2009) shows that in the sixty-
one years of colonial rule, the courts, the Legislative Council (LEGCO), and 
the laws were used to minimise to the barest minimum the power of the 
Africans. The renowned constitutional scholar, Okoth-Ogendo has argued, 
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“…constitutions from Westminster were almost exclusively concerned with 
state institutions, power distribution and limitation” (Okoth-Ogendo, 1971:9). 
 
The developments in Kenya were not dissimilar to other liberation and 
resistance struggles against colonialism in Africa. In 1960, the British Prime 
Minister, Sir H. Macmillan, acknowledged the inevitability of independence in 
the colonies, including Kenya in the famous “wind of change is blowing” 
speech (Mboya, 1963; Odinga, 1967). To deal with the demands for 
independence by the African members, under the guise of mapping a future 
for constitutional development in Kenya, Ian Macleod, the Secretary for the 
Colonies, convened the first Lancaster House Constitutional Conference in 
January 1960 (ibid.). 
 
Albeit, in 1960, political parties organised by Africans were allowed to operate. 
The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and the Kenya Africa National 
Union (KANU) were launched (Mboya, 1963; Odinga, 1967; Anderson, 2005; 
Branch and Cheeseman, 2006). These quickly became the main vehicles for 
seeking increased participation of Africans in decision-making and 
representation. It was through these two parties that more Africans were 
elected to the LEGCO and Africans participated – using mobilisation of power 
- in the constitutional conferences held at the Lancaster House in London 
(1960, 1962, and 1963) and in Nairobi (1963). By the time of full 
independence in December 1963, the executive, judiciary and legislature 
were established as key political institutions. 
 
3.2.4 The Rise of the Independent Republic 
 
As a newly independent state, Kenya had a parliamentary system of 
government with a Prime Minister appointed by the Queen of England, 
Members of Parliament (MP) and leader of the majority party. The Queen 
remained Head of State and was represented by the Governor General as 
Commander-in-Chief (Mboya, 1963; CKRC, 2005). The National Assembly 
was comprised of two houses: the Senate and Parliament. The former 
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represented regional interests while the latter stood for national interests. 
Several commentators on constitutional development in Kenya (for example 
Okoth-Ogendo, 1971; Ghai and Ghai, undated) note that no sooner had 
Kenya been granted full independence or the country embarked on a path of 
intense regulation where public participation in decision-making and 
accountability were curtailed. With a parliamentary amendment in 1964 on the 
constitution, Kenya became a republic, the senate and regions were 
abolished and the notion of an “imperial president” was on the ascendency in 
earnest (Kindiki, 2007; Ghai and Ghai, undated). Therefore, the “imperial 
president” had unfettered access to power and unashamedly abused such 
power – applying a combination of conditioned and condign power - by 
appointing whomever he deemed fit to public service (CKRC, 2005:30). 
 
According to the CRKC, participation was characterised by ‘majoritarianism’ 
where the smaller tribes feared the domination by the bigger tribes (CKRC, 
2005:22). Subsequent amendments saw the reduction in space for 
participation and accountability for citizens while the executive; particularly the 
president was egregiously strengthened as the other political institutions were 
weakened. Kindiki (2007:153) lists these amendments as: 
 
(i) The 1964 amendment that unified “the offices of the Head of State 
and the Head of Government”; 
(ii) The 1964 removal of “the constitutional protection against the 
redrawing of regional and district boundaries or the creation of new 
regions or districts”; 
(iii) The 1965 amendment that changed the state of emergency 
approval from 65% to simple majority and the 1966 amendment that 
removed the time limitations on state of emergencies; 
(iv) The 1966 amendment requiring Members of Parliament who defect 
or start a new party, to seek a fresh mandate from their constituents. 
 
However, since voting was the main mechanism for participation, the merger 
of Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) in 1964 (Mboya, 1963; Odinga, 1967; Gertzel, 1970), which 
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subsequently eschewed dissent, was an important antecedent for subverting 
political institutions. Kenya moved from a multi-party democracy to a de facto 
single party. Although multi-partyism was analogous to citizen participation, a 
singe party ‘democracy’ ushered through a 1964 constitution amendment that 
had direct impact on participation by reducing the space where competition by 
political parties enhanced decision-making. Answerability of public servants 
was typically eroded by an imperial presidency. 
 
There were several efforts devoted to reversing the imperial presidency; these 
experienced varying success. There were various implications for planning for 
poverty reduction as the CKRC (2005) report notes, “…while the constitution 
provided for a democratic system, there were inadequate provisions for 
separation of powers and insufficient participation in the affairs of the state” 
(CKRC, 2005:27). Furthermore, because of the “…dismantling of the 
democratic and accountability mechanisms….” (Ghai and Ghai, undated: 8), 
Kenya experienced a very difficult birth as a republic. 
 
From a constitutional perspective it is clear from the above that the overall 
framework for urban planning for poverty reduction stymied considerable 
space for accountability and citizen participation. Key political institutions such 
as the judiciary, the public service, legislature, police and military had been 
emasculated by the presidency. It is, however, difficult to determine the 
effectiveness of the constitutional changes in terms of poverty reduction. This 
is because much of the struggle during the period of early independence 
focused on the overall governance of the country. 
 
During this period two plans (the short-lived 1964–1970 National 
Development Plan and the 1966–1970 National Development Plan) were 
produced. The government also produced the extremely influential “African 
socialism and Africanisation”, a policy paper that outlined the philosophical 
position and government priorities for the newly independent nation. In these 
documents, my analysis of the discourses unravelled the centrality or 
otherwise of poverty and the poor in the early national plans. 
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It is worthy of note that barely eighteen months into her independence Kenya 
unveiled her roadmap for development, including poverty reduction, the 
African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 
1965); also popularly known as Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965. Important 
foundations on how the government would address poverty and other issues 
such as economic development were established. Building on the colonial 
government, rural areas where the Black African resided were created as 
enclaves of poverty and aptly labelled as reserves where movements were 
tightly controlled. Focusing on a select few African farmers and concentrating 
investments in some areas not only enhanced inequality but also created 
poverty in excluded areas (Chege, 2005). But the Sessional Paper No. 10 
failed to explain poverty. Although it may be argued that it was not necessary 
to delineate the poverty that required a “carefully planned attack” (Republic of 
Kenya, 1965:1) for one to address the poverty, it was unlikely that such an 
approach would have been feasible with ambiguously defined targets. It was 
argued: 
 
The progress wanted cannot be easily won and it cannot be achieved 
by reverting to pre-colonial conditions. The best of Kenya’s African 
social heritage and colonial economic legacy must be recognised and 
mobilised for a concerted, carefully planned attack on poverty, disease 
and lack of education in order to achieve social justice, human dignity 
and economic welfare for all (Republic of Kenya, 1965:1). 
 
With the exception of the first page where poverty was mentioned, this word 
(poverty) did not feature anywhere else in the Sessional Paper. From the 
paper, a five-fold strategy of development was outlined:  
 
(i) to attack directly the two principal limitations on growth [shortages of 
domestic capital and skilled manpower]; (ii) revolutionise agriculture; (iii) to 
develop industry as rapidly as opportunities are created; (iv) to develop 
transport, power and marketing facilities and other infrastructure; and (v) to 
provide for a more equitable distribution of benefits achieved (ibid.:48). 
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The mention of poverty once in such an important policy document at that 
time in Kenya’s life is instructive. While it may not be important to mention 
poverty for it to be addressed, it is unlikely that poverty may be meaningfully 
addressed without clarity. Moreover, with a single mention of the word poverty 
it is not possible to confirm what ideas of poverty the government held. It also 
does not mean mentioning poverty several times in a policy document 
necessarily amounts to a cogent explanation or even a subsequent poverty 
reduction. From the above, it was clear that poverty was identified as a 
priority, a proposal to address the same was provided and efforts were also 
made to formulate a framework for addressing poverty reduction and 
development in general. Odhiambo-Mbai’s (1996:30-33) review of this 
framework shows that whilst an elaborated framework was established, it was 
bifurcated (Odhiambo-Mbai, 1996:36). 
 
3.3 The Fleeting Golden Era: 1966–1976 
 
As the CKRC (2005:28) observes, the authority of Parliament was severely 
weakened and all constitutional offices were subordinated to the presidency. 
As regards the public service, the President was given further discretionary 
powers to appoint and dismiss public servants in 1966. In the 1966–1976 
decade, the constitution of Kenya was severely mutilated by way of gratuitous 
amendments (Ojwang, 2003; CKRC, 2005; Kindiki, 2007; Branch and 
Cheeseman, 2006). These included: 
 
(i) The 1966 amendment requiring Members of Parliament who defect 
or start a new party to seek a fresh mandate from their constituents; 
(ii) The 1968 removal of “the constitutional protection against the 
redrawing of regional and district boundaries or the creation of new 
regions or districts”; 
(iii) The 1968 abolition of the Senate; 
(iv) The 1968 amendment that gave the President the authority to 
appoint the twelve nominated Members of Parliament; 
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(v) The 1969 constitutional amendments consolidation Act was passed 
(Act No. 5); it introduced a few new amendments and reproduced the 
Constitution in a revised form; and  
(vi) The 1975 amendment that allowed the President to waiver the 
penalty on persons found guilty of an election offence and to allow 
them to contest elections after five years (Kindiki, 2007:153). 
 
The net effect of the above amendments was the creation of a president so 
powerful that he could only be compared to the powerful medieval monarchs, 
thus the notion of an “imperial presidency” (Schlesinger, 1973). The imperial 
presidency was so powerful that it effortlessly emasculated other arms of 
government and institutions such as the judiciary and parliament (Ghai and 
McAuslan, 1970; Tamarkin, 1978; Mueller, 1984; Branch and Cheeseman, 
2006; Amutabi, 2009). Kenya’s politicians succeeded in enhancing the 
discretionary powers of the executive whilst virtually obliterating any spaces 
for accountability and participation in the constitution. If the macro-institutional 
framework – the constitution - because of the above amendments was not 
supportive of participation and accountability, then it was not possible that the 
planning law rubric for poverty reduction, including at the local level, could 
have had any broader space for participation and accountability. 
 
As shown in section 3.2 above, for the colonial government to subjugate the 
natives, much force, coercion and sometimes even consensus were applied. 
From Allen’s (2003) conceptualisation of power in things, it is clear that there 
were two categories: the powerful and powerless. The colonial government 
and then the early independence state and the citizens were the former and 
latter respectively. Because the colonial government and the new Kenya 
government amassed resources and therefore had enormous capacities to 
“hold” or “have power over others” (Cahill, 2008:296) they were unsurprisingly 
able to subjugate the citizens as shown above. Likewise, in the dismantling of 
mechanisms for accountability and participation, it was imperative to have 
power and use the same skilfully. Continued assault on political institutions 
was facilitated in three main ways: amendments to the constitution, 
assassination of political leaders, and intolerance and intimidation of 
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dissenting voices (Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007; Kindiki, 2007; Oyugi, 
Wanyande and Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003; CKRC, 2005; Bujra, 2005). 
 
3.3.1 The 1966–1970 Development Plan 
 
The 1966-1970 Development Plan was the first national development plan 
prepared by an independent Kenya. After the Sessional Paper 10 of 1965, the 
government produced this plan. According to President Jomo Kenyatta, 
 
The Plan laid the framework for a large number of programmes and 
projects in all fields of the nation’s economic and social life, but the 
time for preparation of the plan was too short to permit details to be 
worked out for most of them (Republic of Kenya, 1966: i). 
 
Like the Swynnerton Plan before it, in this plan the Government sought to 
develop “small-scale farming into a modern and productive activity which will 
ensure better living for our millions of farmers, their family members and hired 
labour” (ibid.). Again in the words of President Kenyatta, the plan sought an 
“agrarian revolution”. Unlike the Swynnerton Plan that shied away from 
identifying the causes of poverty, the President stated thus: 
 
An agrarian revolution cannot lead to the promised goals unless the 
people are determined to produce more and accept the necessary 
discipline and sacrifice. The door to prosperity is open for those who 
are willing to work hard and regularly follow the advice given by the 
Government officers. For those who prefer to work two or three hours a 
day, the Government cannot promise anything. Both sacrifice and 
discipline in financial matters are necessary (ibid.: ii). 
 
The poor for whom the plan sought to address matters and poverty were 
clearly identified as “those who prefer to work two or three hours a day” (ibid.). 
The view of poverty espoused by the President and his government was a 
typical example of the growth paradigm that attributed poverty to personal 
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traits of the poor, such as sloth. But the poor or the small-scale farmers in 
Kenya in the 1950s and 1960s were neither lazy nor lacked the discipline that 
the President alluded to. These farmers were disadvantaged mainly because 
they had been dispossessed of their lands by the colonial government and the 
strategies that Swynnerton proposed, such as credit provision through the 
African Land Development Board (Swynnerton, 1953:55), did not necessarily 
benefit them or restore their lands. 
 
The colonial government had earlier identified the poor as: “unemployed 
Kikuyu repatriates” (ibid.); “unproductive African farmers on African lands 
(Swynnerton, 1953: 1) amongst others. The key strategies of the 1966 – 1970 
plan such as: land reform, intensified farming, development of cash crops, 
control of development and marketing of cash crops, livestock management, 
provision of credit and development of water resources were not directly 
targeting the ‘unemployed Kikuyu repatriates’ or ‘unproductive African 
farmers”. 
 
The connections between local and central government were also made 
manifest in much of the confusion and conflict that sometimes existed 
between local authorities and Districts or Provinces. In Nairobi, for example, 
there was the City Council of Nairobi and Nairobi Province, which covered the 
same geographical space. My analysis of the national development plans 
1966 to 1976 revealed a glaring blind spot - the City of Nairobi and issues 
related to its development were not covered in these plans. Such a 
phenomenon could have been justified on the grounds that these were 
national plans. Yet given the primacy of the City of Nairobi in terms of its 
contribution to the national economy, its population in relation to the total 
population (this is currently estimated at 10 percent of Kenya’s population), 
and being the political and administrative capital, the inclusion of Nairobi, 
although critical, was never done. 
 
Whilst the entire country were supposed to benefit from planning and funding 
for development through the District Development Planning system, this 
arrangement saw a systematic exclusion of key urban areas from 
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development financing. For instance, Nairobi the major city in Kenya, was 
conspicuously omitted within the elaborate planning and financing 
arrangement that linked the National level and local level because as a city it 
was not a District and for over three decades planning was financed and 
implemented through the District Development Plans. 
 
3.3.2 National Plans in the 1970s 
 
This period started off with the 1970 – 1974 Development Plan. The Minister 
for Economic Planning and Development clearly stated the main objective of 
the Government as, “the development of our economic resources to achieve 
the goal of economic independence” (Republic of Kenya, 1969: iii). The main 
objective was broad enough to accommodate the concerns of the poor, even 
poverty reduction. Nevertheless, the underlying instrument and assumption in 
the government approach was trickle-down economics. In his assessment of 
the government’s performance in the 1966–1970 plan the Minister was 
cautiously enthusiastic (ibid.). Yet it was from the Minister’s assessment of 
targets for the 1970-1974 plan that the significance of addressing poverty, and 
by extension the plight of the poor, is discerned. 
 
The view that poverty was a rural phenomenon also clearly emerged in the 
official position. A close scrutiny of the strategies and ideas that were 
advanced to address poverty reveals that these were similar to those 
suggested in the 1966–1970 Development Plan. These included rural 
development, Kenyanisation and promoting equality among others. The 
1970–1974 plan was organised in fifteen broad thematic areas. These were: 
economic and physical planning; employment, manpower and incomes; 
targets and finance; rural development; local authorities; agriculture, livestock 
and co-operatives; forest, fisheries, mines and geology; building and 
construction; electricity; water supply; transport and communications; 
commerce; tourism and wild life; education; health and housing. The 
organisation of this plan reveals an important pattern that reflects both the 
thematic foci and the organisation of central government departments. 
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From the organisation of the plan, some insights on the priorities for the 
national plan are also revealed. With approximately 15 percent of the plan 
devoted to agricultural development, this confirmed that even with a shift to 
modernisation and industrialisation, agriculture remained an important basis 
for the envisaged economic development. In this respect, the positions in the 
1970–1974 plan were similar to the colonial governments’ Swynnerton plan 
and even the 1966–1970 plan. In the major policies and programmes for the 
development of agriculture including livestock and co-operatives, there was 
some recognition, again by inference, of the poor and poverty. An important 
policy tool for increasing agriculture was land transfer and settlement. 
 
The 1974–1978 plan attributes the failure to realise policy priorities and 
objectives to the effects of the inflationary changes in the global economy. 
The prices of imports were increasing by leaps and bounds due to changes in 
the crude oil prices but the economy was still on an upward swing. Perhaps 
because of a generally booming economy, the government was also 
committed to the agenda of poverty reduction. Stringent macro economic 
policy was critical in realising poverty reduction. Implicit in this position was 
the quintessential trickle-down notion of development that assumed that if the 
economy grew then the benefits at the macro level would trickle down to the 
micro levels, including poverty reduction amongst the poor people. 
 
Accordingly, the 1974–1978 plan, in agreement with the emergent tradition of 
preparing national plans, was also highly sectoral. It is organised in twenty-
four chapters. The first two chapters provided an outline of the strategies and 
the government’s assessment of her performance in the first decade of 
independence. With the shift to modernisation and industrialisation that was 
smugly embraced in the 1970s, much of the 1974–1978 plan was dedicated 
to these themes. However, like the plans before, considerable space was 
devoted to agricultural development. Since the poor, poverty and poverty 
reduction were not specifically addressed by way of a chapter in this plan, and 
the government had clearly not significantly changed her position on poverty. 
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Evidently, income redistribution had become an important policy objective in 
addressing inequality and by extension poverty. But this was mainly in favour 
of the rural areas. Transfer of land was the other important strategy employed. 
Here the government sought to purchase land and then re-distribute it by way 
of competitive sale. Generally speaking, the proposals for agricultural 
development like the other strategies did not necessarily cater for the poor, 
poverty or poverty reduction. In the case of the redistribution of land, it was 
not plausible that the poor even with credit could purchase and acquire land in 
a competitive market.  
 
Although there were plans to develop housing, in the case of urban housing, 
the emphasis was more on housing for government staff, local authorities and 
citizens who were able to purchase housing provided by the private sector. 
This strategy for housing excluded a substantial part of the population, mainly 
the poor who could not participate in the housing market as guided by the 
strategies proposed. The only objective, as stated below, that seemed to 
address the poor was ambiguous: 
 
To ensure that (a) no additional unauthorised housing settlements are 
erected, (b) slums are removed when satisfactory alternative housing 
has been found, and (c) sub-standard urban housing is improved (ibid.: 
473). 
 
3.3.3 The 1973 Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy 
 
Although it built on the 1948 Master Plan, the Nairobi Metropolitan Growth 
Strategy (NMGS) was also different from the Master Plan in several ways. 
First, unlike the Master Plan that was prepared entirely by three foreign 
Planners, a multidisciplinary team of twenty-seven professionals prepared the 
NMGS. Nineteen of these professionals were from the Planning Section of the 
CCN and the other eight were drawn from the United Nations Technical 
Assistance Programme (UNTAP) and the Overseas Development 
Administration (ODA). But, like the planning team that was led by an 
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expatriate for the 1948 Master Plan, the NUSG was also led by a senior 
economist from UNTAP “to ensure a pre-investment approach” (City Council 
of Nairobi, 1973:iv). 
 
The NMGS just like its predecessor, the 1948 Master Plan, neither specifically 
identified nor discussed, poverty and the poor. An interesting convergence, 
though, was the inferences to poverty and the poor by the two plans. There 
are some disparities and similarity on how the poor and poverty are kept on 
the fringes of the two plans – the Master plan and the NMGS. Nevertheless, 
to their credit, the NUSG identified the poor broadly along the income and 
employment dichotomies. Moreover, dichotomies such as modern/non-
modern and formal/informal that were used to describe un/employment 
resonated with the modernist views of development in which society was 
conceptualised as evolving from primitive to modern. The poor tended to be 
associated with the informal sector and unemployment. The NMGS’ first 
reference to poverty was in its projection of unemployment. 
 
The NMGS provided sound analysis of the employment conditions in Nairobi. 
However, there were two problems with this analysis. First, it did not 
adequately show how the City of Nairobi, despite its limitations, was going to 
create the employment that would deal with the type of poverty identified. The 
NMGS envisaged a 4 percent rate of employment creation in the city. Many of 
these jobs were expected to result from the burgeoning informal sector. The 
NMGS also correctly predicted that the growth in the informal sector would be 
inadequate, thus resulting in a sizeable proportion of the population in Nairobi 
being poor – at least in terms of unemployment and low incomes. 
 
From the NMGS it was evident that the City of Nairobi’s knowledge of the 
informal sector and even poverty was somewhat superficial. As such, the 
projections for addressing poverty based on the informal sector could not 
have been convincing. The second weakness was the seeming reliance on 
the central government, even without a clear institutional and policy 
framework, that would ensure the delivery of the required jobs for the City of 
Nairobi. The third weakness of the NMGS was confusing low-income groups 
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with the poor and/or poverty. Whilst the poor may have low incomes, it is not 
always true that low-income groups are always poor. On the whole, even with 
its weaknesses the NMGS seemed more responsive, albeit obliquely, to 
poverty and the poor than the 1948 Master Plan. 
 
The NMGS also caveats action with financial capacity. In this sense, 
therefore, the City of Nairobi acknowledged the poor and poverty but was 
constrained by the limited resources. While it could then be argued that the 
City of Nairobi understood the poor and poverty, but could not directly address 
these without financial resources, it could also correspondingly be argued that 
when the City of Nairobi had the financial resources it would directly address 
the poor and poverty in their plans. Nevertheless, such arguments would be 
much too weak without evidence of interest by the City of Nairobi to address 
poverty. It would be highly improbable that even with increased financial 
resources, poverty and the poor would be centre staged in planning. I now 
turn to the measures adopted to address the poor and poverty. 
 
The plans’ response to the poor was exemplified by the proposals for land use 
and housing and how these were in turn implemented. The City of Nairobi 
engaged numerous interventions such as provision of permits and licences for 
the informal sector (ibid.: paragraph 14) and provision of better market 
information (ibid.: paragraph 15). Moreover, the City of Nairobi engaged many 
bold proposals, for example the subsidies received from the Central 
government (ibid.: paragraph 18) and provision of grants and subsidies to the 
indigent (paragraph 31–33). 
 
3.3.4 Assassination of Political leaders 
 
Even if it was not officially stated as government policy, literature (for instance 
Gimode, 2007) strongly asserts that assassinations were an effective strategy 
for dealing with opposition. The murder of Pio Gama Pinto in 1965, Tom 
Mboya in 1969, and J.M. Kariuki in 1975 revealed a frightening pattern of the 
cost of opposition (Gimode, 2007). All these leaders who were killed were 
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highly respected by the Kenyan public, especially among the poor and 
marginalised, and thus posed a considerable threat to the interests of the 
ruling and powerful elite. 
 
Even if the government and/or President may not have been directly 
implicated, the death of the above politicians seemed to benefit them more 
than the interests of the poor and marginalised that the assassinated 
politicians represented. Moreover, their growing influence and popularity was 
a clear challenge to an established imperial presidency. With the death of 
Gama Pinto and J.M. Kariuki7, it was difficult for public servants to propound 
poverty reduction interventions. In the context of a powerful president with 
such sweeping powers, the public service was transformed into a subservient 
and malfeasant institution (Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007; Odhiambo-Mbai, 
2005; Gimode, 2007). 
 
The seeds of intolerance and intimidation sprouted into more complicated ills 
for Kenya’s governance systems. Wanyande (2005), Odhiambo-Mbai (2005) 
and Gitu (2005) explored some of the challenges such as the collapse of the 
public service, corruption, and abuses of human rights that Kenya has had to 
contend with and experience along Kenya’s transition to democracy. With 
respect to poverty reduction, it is instructive to note that one of the causes of 
the irredeemable differences in the political leadership at independence 
related to how to address poverty. 
 
After the assassination of Tom Mboya, the sunset of the golden era of 
independent Kenya was apparent. Political institutions were “…stripped of 
most of their powers, functions and sources of revenue” (Wanyande, 
2005:48). The competitive multiparty politics and elections that gave birth to 
                                            
7
 Gimode (2007:234-235) states that in the ideological war that emerged in Kenya in the 
1960s, the more capitalist-orientated group led by Kenyatta himself and his lieutenants such 
as Njoroge Mungai, Mbiyu Koinange, Tom Mboya and James Gichuru favoured close 
partnership with Western multinationals. Others with a leftist orientation led by Jaramogi 
Oginga Odinga, Pio Gama Pinto and Bildad Kaggia considered the policies espoused by 
Kenyatta’s government as neo-colonialist and exploitative. During Kenyatta’s rule, three 
clearly state-linked assassinations took place, namely that of Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya 
and J.M Kariuki. 
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independence were also abolished. Jaramoji Oginga Odinga’s Kenya 
People’s Union (KPU), which was also the official opposition party in 
parliament, was banned and their leadership detained without trial (Kituo Cha 
Katiba, 1999; Schmidt and Kibara, 2002). The 1969 general elections ushered 
in the politics of control and authoritarianism that became the hallmark of the 
final years of the Kenyatta presidency. 
 
Interestingly, Kenya’s economy was booming and with poverty at 29 percent 
(Collier and Lal, 1980) the return to the golden era seemed possible. Within 
the context of the political institutions outlined above, the framework for urban 
planning for poverty reduction did not significantly support participation and 
accountability. Although independence sought to expand the role of citizens in 
decision-making, the transformation of Prime Minister Kenyatta to President 
Kenyatta in 1964 rolled back many of these intentions. Instead, the president 
made all the decisions and the citizens continued to be excluded. Applying 
Arnstein’s (1969) concept of participation as manipulation, dissenting voices 
within government were ruthlessly silenced as participation was contrived and 
manipulated. Moreover, since power was highly concentrated in the president 
and his advisors, citizen participation was virtually non-existent. 
 
3.4 The Virtual Demise of Institutions: 1977–1990 
 
The 1968 amendments that abolished the senate, recentralised government 
and removed the constitutional protection for districts and regions, heralded a 
shift in the centre-local relations (Wainaina and Okoth, 2002:38-39). With the 
enactment of the Local Government Act, Cap 265 in 1977, the framework for 
local government and governance, and urban planning in poverty reduction 
was drastically rearranged and power relations were also significantly altered. 
The President and the Minister for Local Government virtually controlled 
governance and determined the form and scale of development at the local 
level. The districts were under the control of the Office of the President; and 
towns and cities were controlled both by the Office of the President and 
Minister for Local Government. 
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3.4.1 The Local Government Act (Amended 1977) 
 
The Local Government Act (chapter 265 of the Laws of Kenya) established 
local authorities, set out their functions and also spelt out the powers of the 
Minister for Local Government with regard to the supervision of local 
authorities. The provisions relevant to interaction with citizens were found in 
Part V of the Act, which dealt with Meetings and Proceedings. Under this Act, 
all local authorities were required to hold one annual meeting, and at least 
three other meetings in the year, unless smaller councils (not counties or 
municipalities) were specifically permitted by the minister to hold fewer 
meetings (Section 74(1)). 
 
Section 84 enjoins that every meeting of the council shall be open to the 
public and to accredited members of the press, subject to available 
accommodation. However, proceedings of committees (including a committee 
of the full council) shall not be open to the public or the press, unless the 
council constituting the committee explicitly resolves to admit the public and/or 
the press. Section 86 further provided that a local authority chairman may 
“from time to time, summon at such place and time as he may determine, 
public meetings of the inhabitants of the area of jurisdiction of the local 
authority for the discussion of any local government matter affecting the 
inhabitants which he considers to be of public importance.” 
 
This Act permitted but did not obligate councils to publish summaries of the 
budget estimates in local newspapers. Citizens may also request copies of 
the council’s annual estimates and the council must provide these summaries, 
but at a fee (Commonwealth Local Government Forum 2005). Citizens were 
enabled to request these copies through a general provision allowing access 
to minutes of proceedings of the council - section 82. In section 82 the local 
authority is also required “at all reasonable times” to open minutes of their 
proceedings for inspection by any ratepayer or voter of the area, and allows 
the ratepayer or voter to obtain a copy or an extract from such record. This 
section applied to the records of committee proceedings as long as such 
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minutes of committee proceedings have been formally adopted and deemed 
part of the minutes of the proceedings of the local authority in question. 
 
This Act did not create an entitlement to participation by citizens. Although 
residents were allowed to attend full council meetings, they did so only as 
observers. The Act did not provide any provision for the council to consult 
their opinions. In addition, they did so only as long as there was available 
accommodation, which only the council could determine. Using such a 
mundane condition local authorities could totally exclude the public and the 
press from proceedings and other planning exercises. Even though there was 
provision for public meetings called by the local authority chairman under 
section 86, these took place at the discretion of the council chairman. 
 
First, he had to determine whether the issue at hand was of public 
importance; then he also determined that the matter affected the residents; 
then he would have to further determine what time and place would be 
appropriate for a public meeting. The frequency of when such public forums 
should be convened was also an issue that was at the absolute discretion of 
the council chairman. The Act did not have an explicit provision for citizen 
initiative in interaction with local authorities. 
 
While citizen-initiated contact was not outlawed within the framework, any 
such citizen-initiated interaction would only proceed if it had the chairman’s 
sanction, or if the residents managed to convince at least one-third of the 
council members to sign a request for a special meeting of the council. 
Section 75 says that if not less than one-third of the members of the local 
authority (council) send a request to the chairman, the chairman must 
convene such special meeting within five days of receipt of the request, and 
the special meeting must be held within fourteen days from the date the 
request was received, failing which the clerk of the council should call a 
special meeting with the council. If the citizens failed to secure the backing of 
the requisite number of councillors, then such an issue was unlikely to get 
onto the agenda of a council meeting. The Local Government Act as enacted 
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in 1977 was thus very poor in terms of enabling a strong degree of citizen 
participation in urban planning and governance in general. 
 
Section 82, which provides for the inspection of Council minutes, was 
powerful space, because it placed an obligation (not discretion) on the council 
to routinely give an account of its work to citizens. Moreover, this requirement 
potentially created access for the public in general, not to some few, and 
therefore fulfilled the requirement that the presentation of information must be 
to a publicly accessible forum. This provision also created a freedom of 
information that guaranteed access to official records, despite the absence of 
a national law on freedom of information. The fee imposed must be a 
reasonable one that does not amount to restricting access to a privileged few. 
Thus on the face of this provision, the Local Government Act enabled 
answerability, but this was not empirically proved. 
 
Consequently, the other provisions in the Act do not meet the threshold for 
answerability. The use of “may” rather than “shall” in the provision concerning 
convening of public meetings (section 86) meant that the council chairman 
was not being compelled; rather he was being permitted to convene these 
public meetings. It was a discretionary power. The same was true of the 
publishing of summaries of budget estimates in local newspapers: councils 
were under no legal obligation but they may choose to publish. 
 
From the above, it is clear that the second dimension of accountability was 
accommodated: there was no sanction attached to failure to account since 
this was not in itself obligatory. The only sense of obligation attached with 
respect to section 82 on inspection of minutes and provision of copies at a fee 
to ratepayers and voters. But the law did not specify what recourse citizens 
had in the event a council failed or refused to provide the copies as 
requested. The Local Government Act did not deliver accountability to 
citizens. Similarly it was not clear whether in practice the Act encouraged 
responsiveness of local government officials to citizens’ needs. 
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3.4.2 Developments in the late 1970s 
 
Political anxiety and uncertainty characterised the late 1970s, which was also 
the beginning of the third phase in the growth of political institutions in Kenya. 
Jomo Kenyatta, the founding Prime Minister and President, was arguably 
senile, frail, and with flagging health. He finally died in 1978 and was replaced 
by President Moi who went on and won the 1979 general elections in his own 
right. Kenyatta’s demise in many ways, as the rest of this section will show, 
was a harbinger of the dark era in the development of political institutions. The 
death of Jomo Kenyatta sparked intense power struggles within the political 
elite that only aggravated the destruction of institutions such as the public 
service, the police, and judiciary (Adar, 2000; Branch and Cheeseman, 2008; 
2009). Of this period, Ghai and Ghai vividly portray the dearth of institutions 
thus; “the careful sharing and balancing of power and the safeguards of 
citizen’s rights and freedoms were done away with, giving rise to destructive 
ethnic politics and sowing seeds of disunity” (Ghai and Ghai, undated: 8). 
 
The most vulnerable were invariably the poor. But the late 1970s and 1980s 
were not entirely bleak; there was some deviation from tradition when the 
government lurched back into poverty reduction in the 1979–1983 National 
Development Plan. The 1979-1983 plans made the boldest statement yet with 
respect to poverty reduction. Indeed as newly inaugurated President Moi 
observed, “reduction of poverty is not only an objective in our development 
efforts: it is also a major instrument for ensuring that our development is rapid, 
stable and sustained” (Republic of Kenya, 1979: ii). 
 
Unlike the earlier plans, the first chapter was dedicated to the analysis of the 
“development” problem of Kenya and progress made as well as identifying the 
key strategies for implementing the plan. Specific measures for addressing 
poverty were identified. These included, “emphasis on continued growth, 
raising household incomes by creating more income-earning opportunities, 
increasing the output and quality of services provided by Government, and 
improving income distribution throughout the nation” (ibid.: iii). 
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The 1979–1983 Plan acknowledged for the first time that “poverty has several 
dimensions” (ibid.: 10). In this plan, poverty was essentially expressed in 
terms of income/expenditure and (mal) nutrition/standards of living (ibid.: 10 -
11). Because of the fast growing population, increasing 
joblessness/unemployment and worsening inequality, poverty in this Plan was 
understood as being more prevalent in rural areas (ibid.: 1-23). As a corollary, 
it was understandable that the measures proposed sought to increase 
incomes and jobs in these areas. However, it was evident that the 
government also sought to enhance her knowledge on poverty, the poor and 
poverty reduction. 
 
In the 1970s, the conceptualisation of poverty in international literature 
widened to include the basic needs. The Government of Kenya 
correspondingly extended her conceptualisation of poverty and a basic needs 
approach was evident; as shown above. Furthermore, an entire chapter in the 
plan was devoted to explicating these basic needs (Republic of Kenya, 1979: 
125-204). The basic needs that the plan focused on were health and nutrition, 
education and training, housing, social services and water. In terms of health, 
the focus was on increasing access to health services. An elaborate plan to 
expand hospitals, dispensaries and training and research was laid out. 
 
While addressing accessibility in terms of distance, the other aspects of 
accessibility, especially social and economic access where the poor were 
most susceptible to exclusion, was not addressed in the plan.  Moreover, the 
major vehicle for accessing health was the National Hospital Insurance Fund 
that remained useful only to the non-poor who could afford the required 
contributions. 
 
The trend of marginalising urban poverty was evident throughout all the fields 
identified as basic needs in the plan. By increasing the reach to include the 
low-income groups, and yet not catering for the population group with less 
than low incomes, it was clear that whilst poverty reduction was central to the 
1979–1983 Plan, it was kept at the margins of this plan. Perhaps it was 
assumed that by increasing coverage the poorest would have benefited from 
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the philanthropic benevolence of the low income population and others who 
benefited from the interventions in housing, water, education and income-
earning opportunities, amongst others. 
 
With the 1979–1983 Plan, the Government of Kenya not only laid out its plans 
to further industrialise and modernise Kenya, but it also exhibited an unusual 
grasp of poverty and the need to reduce it. But conflating “low income groups” 
with “poverty’ and the “poor” was a significant blight on the plan and again 
showed how the poor and poverty were excluded. 
3.4.3 The Early 1980s 
 
Although there had been numerous amendments to the constitution, the June 
1982 amendment that made Kenya a de jure one party state was most 
ignominious. The justification for the amendment, the state argued, was to 
forestall the registration of an opposition party by former vice president 
Jaramoji Odinga Oginga and Moseti Anyona (Kituo Cha Katiba, 1999; 
Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007). In this austere environment, a few months 
after the turn to single party politics, on 2 August 1982, the military attempted 
a coup d’état. Predictably, President Moi also ruthlessly quelled this 
insurgency. This was also the zenith or peak of the power of an imperial 
president, but the growing disquiet and rebellion revealed surprising 
vulnerabilities in the hitherto powerful president. 
 
While intimidation and harassment of dissenters had been deployed 
previously, changes such as the 1982 amendment of the constitution and 
attempted coup d’état heralded an era of unprecedented intimidation, 
harassment, and even torture of dissenters. As Willy Mutunga, the current 
Chief Justice, related in an interview on the incarcerations of this period, 
“Under President Moi, it was dangerous to be a teacher with a critical mind. 
The ominous signs had started in July 1980, when he banned the University 
Staff Union….” (Badejo, 2006:102). The 1980s also achieved notoriety for the 
gross abuse of human rights, and the highest number of illegal detentions in 
independent Kenya (Schmidt and Kibara, 2002: 11). This was perhaps only 
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surpassed by the gulags of the departing colonial government when hundreds 
of Kenyans were illegally held in prisons, others killed as a means of 
containing the Mau Mau revolt (Elkins, 2005). 
 
President Moi, with the support of a pliant judiciary, employed an elaborate 
provincial administration structure, the police, and public service - 
departments in the office of the president, to intimidate, harass, torture, and 
even illegally imprison dissenting citizens (Patel, 2001; Branch and 
Cheeseman, 2006; Bannon, 2007; Alston, 2009). The public service and 
judiciary acquiesced to the whims of President Moi and were totally 
subservient. The vigorous defence of a single-party democracy and 
detentions without trial by the Attorney General and judges; and the ease with 
which constitutional officers were stripped of tenure (Badejo, 2006: Ghai and 
Ghai, undated) were indicative of the extent of pliability of the legislature, 
public service and judiciary. Moreover, the judiciary acting in tandem with 
President Moi invariably expeditiously meted out harsh punishment for 
dissenters, radical academics and opposition politicians (Badejo, 2006; 
Schmidt and Kibara, 2002; Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007; Ghai and Ghai 
undated). 
 
Just like the controversial British author Arthur Koestler’s depiction of Stalin’s 
ruthless purges and murder of dissenters in the 1930s Russia; in Kenya’s 
1980s under an extremely powerful President Moi, the destruction of political 
institutions and muzzling of dissent in the 1980s, was indeed “darkness at 
noon” (Koestler, 1940). Unsurprisingly, poverty reduction was a marginal 
government priority. There were two priorities: on the economic front 
restructuring the economy using the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
to address the worsening public debt and balance of payment position 
(Republic of Kenya, 1984); and politically, to “…control the state, 
consolidation of power, the legitimation of his [President Moi’s] power base 
and popular support” (Adar, 2000:75).  
 
Besides, the demise of political institutions had dire consequences and with a 
great many of Kenya’s citizens sliding deep into the abyss of abject poverty. 
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Analyses of the significance of a robust institutional framework in poverty 
reduction were powerfully shown in Kenya’s darkest period of the 1980s. Ghai 
and Ghai (undated) show this causation. An excessively powerful President 
Moi and President Kenyatta before him prevented any changes in the 
institutional framework that would buttress urban planning for poverty 
reduction. From the above the demise of the political institutions not only 
increased poverty but also made it impossible to plan for its reduction. 
 
Interestingly, elections continued to be held during this period. General 
elections were held in 1979, 1983, and 1988 respectively. But it was the 1988 
elections based on voters queuing behind contestants that showed the 
depravity of the institutional framework and flagrant abuse of citizen 
participation. The ‘winners’ of these elections were generally stooges of the 
presidency and were reported to have had the shorter queues (Badejo, 2006; 
Maathai, 2007; Murunga, 2007). There was widespread condemnation of 
these elections, including within the political elite. The schisms in the political 
elite and growing disquiet among the citizens triggered a series of public 
protests and calls for changes to the constitution, an end to illegal detention of 
political prisoners and other dissenters. 
 
President Moi responded in his characteristic style: using excessive force by 
the police and other security apparatuses, murder, and a national commission 
to inquire on the value for competitive multiparty politics (ibid.). Although the 
persecution intensified, so did the resistance. In many ways the rebellion that 
errupted in 1982 marked the beginning of the decline of President Moi’s 
power. The call for and need for fundamental change and reconfiguration of 
political institutions by citizens, politicians, civil society, and the global north 
was unstoppable; and for once in Kenya’s history, the reign of imperial 
presidents was clearly imperilled (Bujra, 2005; Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007). 
 
Following the 1988 botched general elections public disquiet heightened. The 
church, civil society activists such as journalists, human rights lawyers and 
proscribed politicians led by the quintessential public-spirited politician 
Jaramoji Oginga Odinga relentlessly spoke out against the Moi dictatorship 
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(Odinga, 2013). Furthermore, Kenya was also grappling with the adverse 
effects of failed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and faced 
pressure from the International Finance Institutions (IFIs) to liberalise the 
economy (Ikiara, 1996). Notwithstanding these conditions, when the demands 
for reforms increased, President it was correspondingly obstinate and instead 
deployed more violence (Adar, 2000). 
 
3.4.4 The Policy Framework in the 1980s and National Planning 
 
Just as the international basic needs discourses affected the national planning 
policy discourses in the 1979–1983 Plan, the rise of the World Bank and IMF 
inspired Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and adverse global 
economic conditions similarly directed national planning policy discourse in 
the 1980s (Republic of Kenya, 1984: 40). 
 
The adverse global and national macro economic conditions in this period 
necessitated a significant change in tack. The shift from provision of basic 
needs in the 1970s to significantly reduce interventions by the state ensured 
that the economy grew. To energise the threatened economy, however, the 
central government turned to the private sector (ibid.: 58). The low-income 
groups that had previously benefitted from the programmes that provided 
basic needs such as water and health, suffered with the shift in the 1980s. 
 
With the rise of the SAPs where the government stopped investments that 
promoted and provided basic needs, poverty increased. This was because the 
low-income population groups now joined the poor, as they could no longer 
access many of the basic needs that used to be provided. Yet the central 
government was so convinced in its pursuit of a private sector led model that 
it claimed, “without growth in the private sector, there can be no effective or 
widespread development in Kenya” (ibid.: 39). Even though generally 
accurate, the challenge lay in the fact that “effective or widespread 
development” was not the same as development with reducing poverty. The 
ineffectiveness of the SAPs, especially with poverty reduction, was the subject 
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of copious research (for example Therien, 1999; Riddell, 1997). Needless to 
add, even for Kenya the SAPs that informed national planning decisions for 
close to two decades were debilitating, poverty spiralled from 28 percent in 
the early 1970s to an unprecedented 54 percent in late 1980s (Republic of 
Kenya, 1969; 1978; 1983; 1988). 
 
The resistance to the powerful President Moi was unrelenting. But President 
Moi was determined to stop the resistance. In addition to the incarceration of 
clergy and journalists, assassinations were also deployed, the most notable 
being the February 1990 murder of Foreign Affairs minister, Robert Ouko 
(Anguka, 1998). Others who died in equally suspicious circumstances include 
the late Anglican Bishop Alexander Muge (Badejo, 2006; Maathai, 2007). 
Even though there was widespread and massive human rights abuse by the 
state under President Moi, local and international pressure was too much for 
the president to deflect (Patel, 2001; Bannon, 2007).  
 
The February 1990 assassination of the Foreign Affairs minister, Robert Ouko 
signalled the end of the era of aborted institutions. Mass demonstrations and 
civil disobedience started that led to the arrest and subsequent detentions of 
politicians such as Raila Odinga, Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba in July 
1990. But this did not stop the pressure for democracy. Jaramoji Oginga 
Odinga again tried to register a political party which the state and courts, 
together with the presidency, thwarted (Schmidt and Kibara, 2002). During 
this period, Kenya’s development partners and donors withheld development 
investments and loans until multiparty democracy was restored. The fall of the 
oppressive state was now unstoppable and a new and progressive 
constitutional order, coupled with the rise of institutions that promote and 
secure citizen participation and accountability, was inevitable. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has shown the ways in which the growth of political institutions 
affected the institutional framework for planning for poverty reduction in 
Kenya. The political developments from the 1920s to the early 1960s that led 
to the birth of the Kenyan state are significant in the history of the Kenya 
Republic because this marked the birth of the country as a Colony and 
Protectorate of British East Africa Protectorate. Further, the 1919 Ordinance 
of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) that allowed participation and 
representation of the then recognised Kenyans – the White settler population 
provides useful antecedents for the limited participation of the under 
privileged. At independence, Kenya gave birth to the notorious institution of 
the imperial presidency. The decade of 1966–1976, the fleeting golden era 
was also important in two main ways: the rise of the imperial presidency 
synonymous with the growing abuse of power, and the systematic atrophy of 
political institutions. The treacherous developments from the late 1970s to 
1990 saw the virtual demise of institutions. The peripatetic trajectory of the 
growth and development political institutions discussed in this chapter was no 
doubt inimical to urban planning for poverty reduction. The next chapter turns 
to the ways in which specific institutional frameworks enhanced and/or 
constrained participation and accountability. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE REBIRTH OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
HOPE FOR POVERTY REDUCTION IN KENYA, 1991-2010 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The 1991 constitutional amendment that repealed the infamous Section 2A, 
and three subsequent constitutional amendments marked the creation of the 
second republic and the subsequent rebirth of institutions. In addition to the 
1991 amendment, the 1997 Constitution of Kenya Review Act, the 2008 
Constitution of Kenya Review Act and the 2008 National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act were important institutional changes that ensured the 
successful formation of the second republic and provided for a dramatic even 
though reluctant shift in power from a powerful president and state to the 
possibility of previously powerless citizens, especially the poor, becoming 
powerful. 
 
In 2010 a new, progressive Constitution was promulgated. Through this 
Constitution the rights of the poor and marginalised are enumerated. The 
constitution also enshrines citizen participation and accountability as core 
national values. As a result, the space for participation and accountability has 
significantly increased. But the formation of the second republic was not just 
about constitutional reforms. For the first time poverty reduction occupied a 
central space in government institutional reforms. 
 
Even with such phenomenal achievements and transformation in the 
institutional framework, much is in flux, and remains to be operationalised for 
urban planning for poverty reduction to shift from a notional practice to an 
actual and genuine practice that secures the empowerment of the poor and 
marginalised. The above limitations notwithstanding, it is reasonable to 
conclude that because the 2010 Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor 
and marginalised, and protects accountability and citizen participation, urban 
planning for poverty reduction, Kenya has its most supportive institutional 
framework yet. 
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This chapter is presented in six parts, including this introduction. The second 
part discusses the factors that motivated constitutional change and 
revitalisation of institutions from the 1990s when the protracted civil society 
and citizens-led reform process climaxed in the unprecedented promulgation 
of the Constitution of Kenya (2010). The third and fourth parts discuss the 
legislative and policy developments relevant to urban planning for poverty 
reduction and the impact on power, participation, and accountability. Analysis 
of the current institutional framework for urban planning for poverty reduction 
is presented in the fifth part. This is followed by an assessment of 
interventions for poverty reduction in the sixth part. Finally, the conclusion 
considers the implications of the institutional changes for poverty reduction. 
 
4.2 The Second Wind of Change 
 
Unlike the constitutional conferences of the 1960s where the colonial 
government invited and controlled participation, in the 1990s, citizen 
participation was sacrosanct. In addition to the 1991 amendment, the 1997 
Constitution of Kenya Review Act, the 2008 Constitution of Kenya Review Act 
and the 2008 National Accord and Reconciliation Act were important 
institutional changes that ensured the successful birth of the second republic. 
This significantly increased the space for participation and accountability. 
Additionally, two hard-earned plebiscites were conducted in five years (in 
2005 and in 2010) to establish accountability and citizen participation as 
critical national values (Constitution of Kenya, 2010: Chapter Two and 
Chapter Six). 
 
Like the struggle for independence, the achievement of the second republic in 
2010 was a liberation struggle against oppression, unequal power, abuse of 
power and abuse of human rights amongst other violations. Unsurprisingly, 
changing the constitution was an integral part of this resistance. The 
protagonists were invariably the state personified by the imperial presidency 
of Kenyatta and Moi respectively on one hand, and the citizens, political 
activists and social movements on the other. Again, just as the constitution 
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was the expression, and contention of power relations (Mboya, 1963; Odinga, 
1967), the constitution was at the heart of the contentions for the rebirth of the 
Kenya Republic. Although most actors had changed, the contentions had not. 
The power of the president and the presidency were invariably the aggressor. 
Ghai and Ghai (undated) capture the debilitating nature of these powers thus: 
 
The current constitution established an extremely powerful office of the 
presidency, with relatively little accountability. The cabinet is advisory. 
The president has various immunities. There is an aura about the 
president’s office (and his powers to reward or punish) that places its 
holder essentially above the law. A great deal of corruption has been 
associated with wide executive powers, minus accountability. All other 
office holders, not excluding the judiciary, obey his instructions without 
question and regardless of its mediocrity and lawlessness. Creating 
such a powerful office, with the ability to favour one’s tribe and exclude 
some or all others, has greatly politicised ethnicity (Ghai and Ghai, 
undated: 5).  
 
Although Ghai and Ghai’s (undated) comments were made almost four 
decades after the fateful 1964 amendment of the constitution, theirs is an 
indisputable reflection of the consequences of the negative transformation of 
power from the Governor of the colonial government to the Prime Minister and 
later President of the Kenya republic. With such powers in the President, the 
pursuit of democracy, participation, accountability, and good governance were 
the enduring, key facets of the political strife in making the second republic. 
 
The Mau Mau uprising of the 1950s and the state of emergency characterised 
the context in which Kenya’s political institutions were established. The 
government-instigated tribal clashes of 1991-1993, 1997-1998, 2002, and 
2007-2008 (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), 2008) 
typified the state’s recalcitrance to building institutions that supported 
participation and accountability and democracy in general. In the early 1990s 
the state continued to interfere with and abuse elections. Gerrymandering was 
also used as an important device for subverting effective representation. 
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Moreover, the state invariably controlled electoral processes and deliberately 
weakened political parties (Oyugi, Wanyande and Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003; 
Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007). Undaunted, Jaramoji Oginga Odinga 
announced the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) in 1991, a 
pressure group that became the vehicle for contending for democracy 
(Schmidt and Kibara, 2002; Bujra, 2005; Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007). 
 
The local pressure was complemented by pressure from the U.S. and Europe. 
For instance, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone openly 
supported the nascent opposition efforts. The 1992 Human Rights Watch 
World report relates some of the Ambassador’s abrasive remarks on the need 
for reform and democracy in Kenya as follows: 
 
If that guy [President Moi] doesn’t stop telling lies about me, I’m going 
to start telling truths about him […] I don’t now if Kenya is at the head 
of the class when it comes to corruption but they’re a contender. The 
state of the economy is extremely fragile, and corruption has a 
deleterious effect (Human Rights Watch, 1992:68). 
 
From a post-structuralist conceptualisation of power as immanent (Foucault, 
1991), power was enacted in several ways, sometimes simultaneously and at 
other times in contradictory ways during the arduous growth, demise, and 
revitalisation of political institutions. With such an institutional framework, the 
rights of the poor and other marginalised persons were easily shunned. 
Therefore, urban planning for poverty reduction was only notionally possible. 
 
Although it was expected to be a quick return to democracy, it took thrice the 
time that changes from Lyttelton to the Lennox Boyd constitution in 1958 to 
the realisation of independence and the 1963 constitution. From the 1991 
constitutional amendment that repealed Section 2A that restored multiparty 
politics and signalled the rebirth of institutions, it was not until two decades 
later in August 2010, that a constitution espousing the struggle aspirations of 
the powerless and oppressed was promulgated. 
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The creation of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) and 
other parties similarly spelt a new democratic era in 1991. Assassinations 
were another area of similarity. Some of the notable murders included Pio 
Gama Pinto and Tom Mboya in 1965 and 1969 respectively. Correspondingly, 
the murder of Karimi Nduthu in 1996 and the renowned intellectual 
Odhiambo-Mbai in 2003 amongst several others characterised the return to 
democracy in Kenya (Adar and Munyae, 2002; KNCHR, 2008; Alston, 2009). 
 
Thus, the successful resistance that led to independence and the struggles for 
the second republic clearly show that even the colonial government and 
imperial presidents did not always have absolute power. The implication was 
that power was indeed spread throughout the entire nation and institutional 
framework. Because power was not always held by the powerful, as Cahill 
(2008:297) observes, “In the often discouraging and frustrating world of 
development, simply acknowledging this may open up new spaces for hope 
and creative engagement.” This partly explains why the colonial government 
and imperial presidents Kenyatta and Moi acquiesced to constitutional 
changes that significantly altered the relations of power between the 
government and its citizens. 
4.3 Legislative and Policy Developments in the 1990s 
 
The decades of the 1990s and 2000s saw the enactment and adaption of 
several laws and policies with important ramifications for power relations and 
urban planning for poverty reduction. The main avenue for citizens to 
participate in decision-making and hold the government accountable was by 
way of voting in general elections. Four such elections were held every five 
years in 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007. To address the question of president 
and state with imperial powers, in 2005 and 2010 two plebiscites were held to 
provide a constitution that protected powerless citizens from a powerful state 
and ensured their participation in decision-making and accountability of public 
officers to the citizens. I shall begin with the legislative and policy 
developments in the 1990s. 
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Current literature (Hornsby, 2012; Odinga, 2013) shows that except for Nobel 
Laureate Professor Wangari Maathai’s resistance to President Moi’s project to 
build Africa’s tallest building in Nairobi’s central park, the 1992 general 
elections and enactment of the Physical Planning Act of 1996, the period 
1991 to 1997 was uneventful in terms of legislative and policy change. 
Following from the 1991 constitutional amendment removing the infamous 
section 2A, the February 1992 government of Kenya’s abandonment of its 
prestige 60 storeys Times Tower project (Maathai, 2007:182-222), and the 
1992 multi-party elections were a critical watershed in the shift to revitalising 
political institutions. This was Kenya’s first multiparty election since 
independence 29 years earlier. Yet, because President Moi and his 
government continued to mock reforms, the 1992 elections were also a major 
anti-climax as the long expected reforms were aborted with a widely 
acknowledged rigged election. Morever government’s adoption of violence 
against the citizens and opposition politicians (Maathai, 2007; Murunga and 
Nasong’o, 2007; Badejo, 2006) underlined its reluctance to reform. 
 
In the early 1990s, although the idea of an imperial president was threatened, 
President Moi’s grip on power, like the Emperor Aurdias Marcus of the Roman 
Empire, was “…absolute, capricious, and tyrannical” (George, 2012:27). 
Although the institutions had virtually collapsed and the participation of 
citizens notional, the resistance of Professor Wangari and support from the 
Kenyan citizens and international community to stop Moi’s prestige project at 
Uhuru park shows that even in times of extreme oppression the citizens are 
not without power. Neither is such power restricted to the powerful alone. 
From this experience we notice that relations of power can change and 
participation take different forms. 
 
4.3.1 The Physical Planning Act, 1996 
 
This was the first attempt to provide a specific framework for urban planning. 
The law was enacted in 1996 but commenced on 29 October 1998. The Act 
gives the Director of Physical Planning power to regulate planning in Kenya. 
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According to section 4 (2), the Director is the chief Government adviser on all 
matters relating to physical planning. In Section 5, the functions of the Director 
include; formulating national, regional, and local physical development 
policies, guidelines and strategies, conducting studies and research into 
matters concerning physical planning, advising the Commissioner of Lands, 
and ensuring local authorities properly execute physical development control 
and preservation orders. 
 
Furthermore, the Act, under the First Schedule, mandates the development of 
Regional Development Plans that include strategies for human settlements in 
the area, including development of service centres, growth centres, transport 
and communication network and rural development. Other matters include a 
sectoral approach to development and measures for implementation and 
coordination in these sectors, namely industrial development, housing, 
transportation, health services, education, water supply, sewerage and 
electricity supply. 
 
This Act also provides the mandates for the development of urban master 
plans. However, the Act does not recognise informal or irregular settlements; 
thus making service provision and physical improvement in slums and 
squatter settlements difficult and legally untenable. Together with virtually 
obsolete land laws that do not provide any tenure rights to the poor, squatters 
and other groups of the urban poor, responding to poverty in the slums within 
the framework of this Act, is extremely difficult. 
 
Since section 5 of the Act clearly places the entire planning responsibility in 
the purview of the Director of Physical Planning, it therefore follows that 
citizen participation within this Act is much constricted. President Moi still 
remained extremely powerful and public servants served at the pleasure of 
the president. An important function such as Director of Physical Planning, 
while clearly more powerful than the citizens, was as powerless as the same 
citizens in relation to the president. There were numerous occasions where 
President Moi imposed his will on the Director even when planned decisions 
had been made (Kloop, 2000; Maathai, 2007). A popular example was the 
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illegal sale in 1997 of large sections of the Karura forest in Nairobi to private 
developers with the police deployed to harass any protesting citizens 
(Maathai, 2007:262-272). However the Act provides the opportunities for 
citizen to participate in the approval of plans prepared by the Director. 
 
The Act in section 19 outlines the circumstances when such citizen 
participation is envisaged. First, participation is invited upon completion of the 
plans. The mode of participation is by inspection of plans at specified places 
and specified times. The Act also requires such citizens who may have a 
contribution to make to the plan to write to the Director. The Act clearly states 
the role of Director in this citizen participation as: 
 
The Director may in his discretion accommodate or decline to 
accommodate such representations or objections to the plan, and in 
either case, shall within thirty days of decision, notify the petitioner in 
writing accordingly, and shall give reasons in the case of decline (The 
Physical Planning Act, 1996 section 19 (3)). 
 
Within this Act, citizens’ participation is at the discretion of an evidently very 
powerful Director of Physical Planning. In section 19 (4) and (5) the petitioner 
is provided an appeal structure through the Physical Planning Liaison 
Committees and the Courts of law. But scrutiny of the structures proposed 
shows that any scope for participation in planning is notional. Part 11 provides 
representation in the Physical Planning Liaison Committees. These liaison 
committees are comprised of a four-tier hierarchy. This starts with the 
Municipal, then the District, to the Nairobi Physical Planning Liaison 
Committee, and finally the National Physical Planning Liaison Committee. 
These committees are comprised of virtually government officials. For 
instance of the 16 members of the National Physical Planning Committee, one 
member is drawn from the private sector. This member, according to the Act, 
should be a registered Physical Planner in private practice; and is appointed 
by the Minister responsible for planning. The same criterion applies for the 
other liaison committees. 
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Although the Act does not outlaw direct citizen participation in the preparation 
of plans, it is unlikely that planners acting on behalf of the Director in 
preparing plans would allow such participation. The main space provided for 
accountability between the state and citizens is through the plan approval 
process. My analysis revealed the spaces for accountability provided by the 
Act are so constricted that it remains contested. 
 
Section 10 of the Act sets out the functions of the National Physical Planning 
Liaison Committee: (a) to hear and determine appeals; (b) to determine and 
resolve physical planning matters referred to it; (c) advise the Minister on 
broad physical planning policies, standards and viability; (d) to study and give 
guidance and recommendations on issues relating to physical planning 
transcending more than one local authority; and the other liaison committees 
as (a) to inquire and determine complaints made against the Director in 
exercise of his functions; (b) to enquire into and determine conflicting claims 
made in respect of applications for development permission; (c) to determine 
development applications for change of user or subdivision of land which may 
have a significant impact on contiguous land; (d) to determine development 
applications relating to industrial location; and (e) to hear appeals by persons 
aggrieved by decisions made by the Director or local authorities. 
 
Thus, pursuant of the above functions, the liaison committees under the Act 
provide space for citizens to demand some form of accountability. According 
to section 11, the committees are supposed to meet at least once every 
month (section 11 (2)). In section 12 the committees are obliged to keep and 
file proceedings of the liaison committees with the secretary. However, the 
citizens may inspect these records at a prescribed fee, at specified times and 
places. 
 
However, it is not clear what happens when the secretary does not allow the 
public to inspect these records. Without clearly specified sanctions and 
mechanisms that would ensure answerability, the spaces provided by the Act 
for accountability are too narrow to support any significant accountability. 
Moreover, with the immense power given to the Director and liaison 
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committees, the framework for urban planning in the Act is clearly not 
supportive of citizen participation, does not enable accountability and 
ultimately stymies opportunities for citizens to air their priorities and 
preferences in the urban planning processes. 
 
The Physical Planning Act of 1996 creates the planner as subservient in a 
complex power arrangement. Whilst the Director is given considerable powers 
over planning, these do not mean much in the light of an extremely powerful 
president. Since the Act commenced, the Director has been overruled and in 
other cases simply ignored by the Office of the President. The sale of the 
Karura forest in Nairobi and other public places in Nairobi is just one example 
of the powerlessness (Maathai, 2007: 261) of a powerful Director of Physical 
Planning. For poverty reduction, the ramifications are dire. Because the poor 
are without a voice in decision-making it is unlikely that in a system of 
competing interests and priorities the interests of the poor would be promoted 
and secured by the Director of Physical Planning.  
 
Even though the 1992 general elections were an apparent anti-climax for 
reforms and institutional change, an invaluable lesson on the dark side of 
power in institutions for the expectant citizens and politicians and others 
crusading the powerless citizens was learned. The mere amendment of the 
constitution and holding of multi-party elections does not necessarily equate 
to change in institutions, power relations and participation. The lesson was 
particularly well learnt to the extent that the opposition was not willing to 
participate in the 1997 general elections without meaningful reforms. The 
political elite remained powerful. Because there had not been any significant 
change in power when the elections were held, the institutions through which 
power is exercised remained intact, as citizens could not participate in 
decision-making. To change, a method that would increase participation was 
necessary. In mobilising the citizens, the mantra “No reforms, No elections” 
signified the resolve of the citizens and forced the government to seriously 
consider the calls of the hitherto powerless citizens and progressive 
opposition politicians (Odinga, 2013). 
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Therefore, to counter an increasingly restive population, a group of 
progressive and pragmatic politicians with the support of diplomats such as 
German Ambassador Bernd Mutzelburg crafted a bipartisan initiative, the 
Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) to facilitate consultations with the 
public and politicians. The original IPPG comprised Dr. Joseph Misoi from the 
government and opposition politicians Anyang Nyong, Paul Muite, Martha 
Karua, Kiriatu Murungi, Ooko Ombaka, Saulo Busolo, and Mukhisa Kituyi 
(Badejo, 2006; Maathai, 2007; Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007). 
 
As the IPPG formed and consulted so did civil society initiatives under the 
auspices of the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), the Citizens 
Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs), the National Council of Churches of 
Kenya (NCCK), the Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Bishops, and the 
Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) (Badejo, 2006; Maathai, 
2007; Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007). The exchange of and gradual change in 
power relations bore useful results. Chief of these was an agreement in 1997 
of a threshold of legal and administrative reforms that needed to be 
implemented and a confirmation that President Moi would, for the last time, 
compete for the presidency in the 1997 elections. 
 
President Moi went on to win the elections though with a mandate of 40 
percent of the total vote cast. Although results showed an improvement for the 
president from 36 percent in the 1992 elections, his party had suffered losses 
in Parliament from 55 percent of the seats to 51 percent (Throup and 
Hornsby, 1998). With the president’s ruling party KANU with 107 of the 220 
seats in parliament, it was even much more difficult for President Moi to 
impose his will on parliament. Surprisingly, Raila Odinga a leading opposition 
leader, then of the National Democratic Party (NDP), formally cooperated with 
President Moi’s KANU to assure Moi and the country the much needed 
stability to govern (Badejo, 2006; Maathai, 2007). Unsurprisingly, Raila 
Odinga’s contemporaries in the opposition were angered and considered 
Odinga’s cooperation the height of political betrayal and insurbodination 
because he strengthened a vulnerable and seemingly weaker and 
increasingly less powerful president. With Raila Odinga’s cooperation with 
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President Moi and a more vocal and courageous opposition under the 
leadership of Mwai Kibaki, a more supportive environment for institutional 
reform was realised (Badejo, 2006). 
 
Moi’s cooperation with Odinga is recognition by the latter of the former’s 
power even though Odinga was relatively powerless compared to Moi. A 
reduced majority meant that the institutional framework was weakened and 
Moi was vulnerable. Citizens’ participation in the election contributed to the 
weakening of Moi’s oppressive institutional infrastructure. Moi’s act to 
cooperate with Odinga’s NDP signifies the usefulness of compensatory power 
(Galbriath, 1983). While Odinga was a political opponent of Moi, Moi was able 
to include Odinga’s NDP in government. The inclusion of the NDP and offer 
share in Ministries resulted in the adjustment of the institutional framework. 
Therefore, the NDP was more empowered than before the cooption, and Moi 
still remained powerful in the context of a new institutional setup. With the new 
framework, it was therefore possible to include new priorities such as poverty 
reduction. 
 
Therefore, from early 1998 to the beginning of the millennium, important 
legislation and policy germane to urban planning for poverty reduction were 
enacted and implemented. These included the 1997 Constitution of Kenya 
Review Act, the Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) of 1998, the formal 
consultation and move to encourage citizen participation in constitution reform 
and, the Environmental Management and Coordination Act of 1999. I shall 
discuss each of these developments presently. 
 
4.3.2 The Local Authorities Transfer Fund, 1998 
 
The Local Authority Transfer Fund Act (LATF) was enacted in 1998 following 
the launch of the Kenya Local Government Reform Program within the 
Ministry of Local Government in 1996, as part of the fiscal reform package for 
local government. This Act establishes the fund and provides the framework 
for the disbursement of a share of revenue from central government to the 
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local authorities (5 per cent of income tax collected nationally). The Act also 
provides for the setting up of an Advisory Committee to advise the minister on 
the operation of the fund. In addition to specified government officials from the 
ministries of finance and local government, the minister appoints some people 
who are not public officers to serve on the Advisory Committee. 
 
The private sector members of the current Advisory Committee represent the 
Association of Kenya Insurers, Institute of Chartered Public Accountants of 
Kenya, and the Federation of Kenya Employers. Councillors are represented 
through the co-opted membership of the Executive Secretary of the 
Association of Local Governments of Kenya. There is no representation from 
residents’ associations and other citizens’ groups that have been active in 
local government affairs. 
 
The Local Authorities Transfer Fund Regulations enacted in the same year 
contain detailed regulations for implementing the fund. These regulations 
provide guidelines for the running of the Advisory Committee and criteria for 
the disbursement of funds. The 2004 amendment to the regulations, the 
stated objective of disbursements under the LATF is ‘to improve service 
delivery to the public, to improve financial management and accountability…’ 
(Local Authorities Transfer Fund Act, 1998, Regulation No.11). The 
regulations divide the allocation into two components (Regulation No.13):  
 
-   a service delivery component (60%) which is released upon 
approval of the local authority’s budget, provided the following 
conditions are also met: that at least 50% of this service delivery 
amount must be allocated to capital expenditure, and that no more than 
60% of the total budget is allocated to personnel (including councillors’ 
allowances). 
-  a performance component (40%) which is released upon 
submission of a statement of accounts with an abstract submitted for 
audit to the Controller and Auditor-General, statement of debtors and 
creditors, revenue enhancement plan and a Local Authority Service 
Delivery Plan (LASDAP). 
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The regulations do not specify how the councils or the management of the 
fund at the ministerial level shall account to the public, or receive any input or 
feedback from the public concerning the fund’s operation. This is left to the 
administrative guidelines issued by the ministry of local government, the Local 
Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) guidelines issued to 
accompany the fund. 
 
And so, since the Act does not alter the powers of the Ministers of Finance 
and Local Government, the usefulness of this law is to specify additional 
resources available for local authorities. If the current institutional setup does 
not provide any pathway for empowerment and focus on poverty reduction, 
the LATF only strengthens the status quo. It is also unreasonable to expect 
that poverty reduction would be meaningfully addressed without sanctions 
provided in the Act or changes in the power relations and institutional 
framework. 
 
4.3.3 Environmental Management and Coordination Act, 1999 (EMCA) 
 
This law was enacted in 1999. It aims to create an appropriate legal and 
institutional framework for the management of the environment. The Act 
provides for NEMA in consultation with the relevant lead agencies to 
undertake or commission other persons to undertake national studies and 
give due recognition to developments in scientific knowledge relating to 
substances, activities and practices that deplete the ozone layer to the 
detriment of public health and the environment. In this Act are provisions that 
are potentially supportive of citizen participation and likely to enhance citizen-
state accountability in urban planning. Some examples of such provisions are 
discussed here, namely: 
 
- The creation of provincial and district-level Environment Committees; 
- Allowing for public input into the Environmental Impact Assessment 
process; 
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- Opening up to the public the proceedings of the National Environment 
Tribunal; 
- Generous locus standi rules that make it easier for citizens and citizen-
groups to initiate actions in the public interest in defence of the 
environment. 
 
From the above, it is clear that spaces for participation are further opened up. 
However, the EMCA creates an additional institutional layer that may not 
necessarily improve urban planning for poverty reduction. Moreover, opening 
space for participation and empowering citizens to participate are different yet 
important to improve citizen participation in urban planning. As Arnstein 
(1969:216) would say, “participation is the redistribution of power that enables 
the have-not to be deliberately included.” In addition to the space, measures 
that ensure deliberate inclusion should have been incorporated in the EMCA. 
In contexts of oppression by the state, the provisions in the EMCA can be 
used to undermine participation when the powerful state argues that because 
there are such provisions citizens should be participating. 
 
The provincial and district Environment Committees are created in order to 
delegate the functions of the National Environment Management Authority to 
the local level (section 29). At the provincial level, in addition to the Provincial 
Commissioner, ministry representatives, local authority representatives, and 
representatives of regional development authorities in the area, the Act 
provides for the representation of the following on the committees: 
 
- Two representatives of farmers or pastoralists within the province; 
- Two representatives of the business community operating within the 
province; 
- Two representatives of NGOs engaged in environmental management 
programs within the province. 
 
Except for the NGO representatives whom the minister appoints in 
consultation with the National Council of Non-Governmental Organisations, 
exclusively the minister responsible for the environment appoints all the 
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committee members. At the district level, in addition to the relevant 
government officials (central and local), the following are included on the 
District Environment Committee: 
 
- Four representatives of farmers, women, youth and pastoralists within 
the district; 
- Two representatives of the business community in the district; 
- Two representatives of NGOs engaged in environmental management 
programs in the district; 
- Two representatives of community-based organisations engaged in 
environmental programs operating in the district. 
 
Although, similar to the provincial committees, except for the NGO 
representatives whom the minister appoints in consultation with the NGO 
Council, the minister makes all these appointments to the committees. This 
provision arguably enables a high degree of citizen participation in urban 
planning, particularly in environment related issues, because these bodies are 
not just consultative. As committees of NEMA they are actually empowered to 
take substantive decisions concerning environmental management in the 
areas over which they are appointed (section 30). Moreover, these 
committees are also charged with preparing five-yearly District Environment 
Action Plan (DEAP) (sections 39 and 40). The DEAP is a significant input into 
environmental policy at the District and province. 
 
Progressive as the EMCA may be, the environmental committees are not 
without weaknesses. The main ones are inherent in the stakeholder model 
that informs the creation of these structures: it cannot claim to be broadly 
inclusive. While the use of the stakeholder model may be inevitable for the 
representation of so many diverse interests, there are still obvious 
weaknesses that undermine the effectiveness of the EMCA in how it 
operationalises the stakeholder model. First, even with consultations, it is 
doubtful there are community or city level processes that inform ministerial 
appointments to the committees. Moreover, it is not clear what informs the 
minister’s appointments. It is not clear whether such appointments consider 
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representativeness, special interest and others. Because the Act is silent on 
these details, the degree of citizen representation and participation via this 
model can only be ascertained through empirical evaluation. 
 
In the EMCA framework, anyone proposing to undertake a project must 
undertake an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) before embarking on 
the project (section 58) and submit an EIA study report to NEMA. Section 59 
then requires that upon receiving the report, NEMA must publish a notice in 
the Gazette and in a newspaper circulating in the area in which the project is 
proposed to be undertaken for a period of two successive weeks. The public 
notice must contain a summarized description of the project, identify the place 
where the project is to be carried out and inform the public where they may go 
to inspect the full EIA report, and also specify a time limit of 60 days within 
which any interested member of the public may submit oral or written 
comments on such EIA report. Interested persons are given the option of 
applying for extension of the 60-day time limit in order to secure a reasonable 
opportunity for submission of comments. 
 
These provisions afford reasonable opportunity for public input into NEMA’s 
decisions and participation in the granting of EIA licenses. Nonetheless, it is 
not clear whether NEMA is under obligation to take this public input into 
account, and what recourse, if any, a citizen or citizen-group would have 
should NEMA disregard their input and proceed to issue a licence. Because 
NEMA is not required to publish justification to the public for its decision to 
grant or to refuse a licence to an applicant, it seems that upon making a 
decision the citizens have no further role. The matter thus becomes an issue 
between NEMA and the applicant. The applicant may file an appeal to the 
National Environment Tribunal to challenge NEMA’s refusal to grant a licence, 
or to challenge the imposition of a condition or restriction on the licence, the 
suspension or varying of a licence, or the amount of fees imposed (section 
129). EMCA does not provide for an appeal to the tribunal by a member of the 
public or an interested party or group who may object to the granting or 
refusal of a licence. On this point, therefore, the degree of citizen participation 
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appears to be limited to consultation, without much impact on actual decision-
making. 
 
Section 126 of EMCA enjoins that all proceedings before the National 
Environment Tribunal shall be open to the public, except where the tribunal 
‘for good cause’ directs otherwise. This shows a clear intention to involve 
citizens and citizen groups in the work of the tribunal as it adjudicates conflicts 
of an environmental nature. The requirement placed on the tribunal to show 
‘good cause’ for decisions taken in particular cases to bar the public from 
proceedings leaves open the possibility of challenging the reasonableness of 
such a decision before a court of law. This is unlike the unchecked discretion 
given to the liaison committees and the Director of Physical Planning in the 
Physical Planning Act or the local authorities under the Local Government Act 
to bar the public and media for the mundane reason of lack of space. This 
provision potentially enables citizen participation in the process. However, this 
is qualified participation as the scope of the tribunal is limited to disputes 
between project proponents and NEMA, with the public being reduced to 
observers rather than active participants. 
 
The EMCA seems to be informed by a rationalistic view of participation – 
where citizens’ participation is motivated by the need to receive maximum 
benefits at the least cost. Although it is a positive opportunity, participation is 
unlikely to be engendered, because citizens, especially the poor, are not 
given a direct role to participate in decision-making. Moreover, they still lack 
resources, are not well motivated, and their social capital is sometimes 
eroded. 
 
The Locus standi rules - in legal parlance, meaning legal capacity to initiate 
proceedings in a court of law, in the EMCA are progressive for having 
revolutionalised the locus standi law in Kenya. Prior to EMCA, the only 
authority recognised as having capacity to initiate legal proceedings to defend 
the public interest not only with respect to environment but also in all matters 
involving the public interest was the Attorney General. But following EMCA, 
any member of the public, whether or not directly affected by an incidence of 
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environmental degradation, is entitled to bring a case before the courts 
(Section 3(3) and 3(4)). This provision clearly and in an important way opens 
up space to challenge the unequal power relations. However, access to 
justice in Kenya remains limited because of the prohibitive fees claimants 
need to pay before the courts can hear their complaints. 
 
Furthermore, this provision enables a significant degree of citizen participation 
because it puts decision-making in the hands of citizens. Citizens no longer 
have to wait for the Attorney General to exercise his discretion and decide 
whether to prosecute, unlike in the case of criminal prosecution of corruption 
cases or cases involving violation of human rights. But the effectiveness of the 
locus standi is yet to be a subject of public interest litigation that promotes 
urban planning.  
 
Obviously, the EMCA created several institutions and decision-making 
processes, and the degree of answerability varies amongst them. The Public 
Complaints Committees created under section 31 secures a great degree of 
answerability on behalf of the public. This is because the committee is given a 
wide-ranging investigative power with respect to any allegation or complaint 
from any person, against any person, including against NEMA itself, relating 
to the condition of the environment anywhere in Kenya (section 32). The 
committee may also undertake investigation at its own initiative on any 
suspicion of environmental degradation. There is also a strong requirement as 
to record keeping. The requirement that the National Environment Tribunal’s 
proceedings be made public, for instance, creates an obligation to make the 
forum publicly accessible and enables public keen scrutiny of the quality of its 
decision-making.  
 
Section 139 (a) makes it an offence for anyone to fail to keep records required 
under EMCA. This provision would apply to the officials of NEMA and the 
other institutions created under the Act, just as much as it does to the entities 
whose conduct NEMA regulates. This ensures that there is a record for public 
inspection and scrutiny when necessary. These are strong provisions in 
support of institutionalising answerability. However, there are other provisions 
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that point to a lower degree of answerability. For instance, while there are 
provisions requiring financial accountability in NEMA and its management of 
the funds created under EMCA (sections 23-27), there is no direct 
requirement on the part of NEMA to give an account of its activities when it 
files the annual ‘state of the environment’ report (section 9(3), in the same 
way that the Kenya Anti Corruption Commission (KACC), for instance, is 
required to report on its activities to parliament. 
 
The EMCA creates various institutions with significant power to effectively 
exercise their mandate so as to sanction other governmental and non-
governmental actors. EMCA makes it a criminal offence for anyone to fail to 
comply. Stiff penalties are imposed for non-compliance. For example, anyone 
who obstructs an environmental inspector or fails to grant access for such 
inspection or gives false or misleading information to such inspector is liable 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 24 months or to a fine of a 
maximum of half a million shillings, or both imprisonment and fine. Anyone 
who fails to submit an EIA or gives false information in an EIA is liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 24 months or to a fine of no more than 
two million shillings or both imprisonment and fine. 
 
The EMCA also makes it an offence for anyone summoned who fails to attend 
the National Environment Tribunal or refuse to take an oath or to give false 
evidence or disrupt the proceedings or fails to comply with an order of the 
tribunal. In all these cases with criminal penalties, NEMA’s powers are not 
merely of referral to the Attorney General. EMCA does not mention referral to 
the Attorney General at all. NEMA has power to bring charges under the 
environmental offences created under EMCA, and is not held hostage to the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the Attorney General.  
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4.4 Legal and Policy Changes in the new Millennium 
 
The first decade of the new millennium is arguably one of the dynamic in 
terms of legal and policy changes that had profound impacts on the relations 
of power, the participation of citizens, especially the poor in governance, 
political institutions, and on the institutional framework for poverty reduction. 
By 2000, Raila Odinga’s NDP was quickly acceding to demands to transform 
from a mere cooperating partner to becoming an integral part of what would 
be a reconstituted KANU – new KANU. Raila Odinga and three other 
colleagues in June 2001 joined the cabinet with Raila Odinga as Minister of 
Energy (Badejo, 2006:196). Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the founding president 
also joined the cabinet as Minister of Local Government and a nominated 
Member of Parliament. 
 
The cooption of political rivals such as Odinga into Moi’s government and the 
inclusion of Uhuru Kenyatta, point to changing power relations and 
transformation in the institutions. By co-opting Odinga, Moi confirmed that 
even though he was an imperial president, his powers were diminishing. 
Correspondingly, I contend that Odinga’s acceptance was both an indication 
of his increasing power and further confirmation that even though relatively 
powerless, he still was powerful enough to bolster Moi’s presidency.  
 
Shortly after Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga’s entry into cabinet, the 
country experienced one of the fastest changing political environments. One 
of the most significant developments at this time was the merger of the NCEC 
and Parliamentary Committee (Raila Odinga-led) on constitution review 
processes to create a widely accepted national constitutional review process 
popularly known as the Professor Ghai Commission (Badejo, 2006; Bannon, 
2007). With the certainty that President Moi would be leaving office for good 
after twenty-four years, and the uncertainty about the future of reforms, 
especially the constitutional reforms, the contention for retention of the status 
quo characterised much of the institutional changes within the political 
institutions. Together with Raila Odinga as a pivotal and influential politician in 
the New KANU and a high likelihood of him succeeding Moi as president, the 
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opposition quickly coalesced and Moi then tried to impose Uhuru Kenyatta, 
then a political novice, as his preferred successor.  
 
As accounts of this period (Badejo, 2006; Maathai, 2007; Murunga and 
Nasong’o, 2007) show, Moi was not successful as his actions triggered 
internal dissent in KANU that led to an implosion of unprecedented levels. 
Raila Odinga led a revolt in KANU, moving out with a significant number of 
Ministers to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Later the LDP merged 
with the Simeon Nyachae Ford People Party to form the Rainbow Alliance. 
The Rainbow coalition then merged with another budding coalition of 
opposition parties, the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) led by 
opposition luminaries such as Mwai Kibaki, Charity Ngilu, and Kijana 
Wamalwa. The merger between the Rainbow Alliance and the NAK resulted 
in Kenya’s first serious coalition of opposition parties that gave rise to the 
super alliance, the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) where a 
dozen opposition leaders worked collaboratively to ensure KANU did not win 
the elections (Odinga, 2013). 
 
Invariably, Raila Odinga was credited with successfully mobilising resistance 
against KANU and President Moi’s stranglehold over Kenya’s social, political, 
and economic development. After forty years in power KANU’s dominance 
was successfully altered. President Moi’s twenty-four year reign as an 
imperial president was also brought to an inevitable end. Moi’s decision to 
disband on-going discussions on constitutional reform at the National 
Delegates Conference was one of his last efforts at scuttling the reform 
momentum. 
 
The NARC contested and prevailed in the successful and peaceful 2002 
general elections. Mwai Kibaki as leader of NARC won an extraordinary 
mandate of 61 per cent of the vote, whilst Uhuru Kenyatta, Moi’s successor, 
garnered an unprecedented low of 30 per cent. KANU’s parliamentary 
majority dwindled from 51 percent in 1997 to 29 percent in 2002. One of the 
major campaign issues was NARC’s message and promise for fundamental 
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change and reforms within the first 100 days. These changes included a new 
people-driven constitution. 
 
In view of the above, an important development that resulted from the 
elections was the rise of Raila Odinga as Kenya’s most pre-eminent political 
strategist. Although NARC was the dominant party in parliament, in this 
alliance the LDP had the highest number of seats. The results of the elections 
easily demonstrated Raila Odinga’s rise:  In 1997, whilst KANU won 111 of 
the 222 seats in parliament, NDP managed only 22 seats (Institute for 
Education in Democracy, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, and 
National Council of Churches, 1998). But in 2002 Raila’s NDP won 62 of the 
224 seats in parliament whilst Moi and Kenyatta’s KANU managed 68 seats. 
Raila Odinga’s rise had serious implications on power and institutional 
development in the post-Moi era or Kibaki presidency. I shall return to this 
discussion and objectively state the legislative and policy developments of this 
epoch. I shall commence with the Water Act of 2003. 
 
4.4.1 The Water Act 2003 
 
The Water Act was enacted in 2003 to provide a legal and institutional 
framework for the management of water resources and regulation of the 
provision of water services. This Act sets up various bodies. To realise the 
objective of management of water resources the Act establishes the Water 
Resources Management Authority, consisting of a chair appointed by the 
President, and ten other members appointed by the minister (section 7). 
Under the Authority are regional offices in catchment areas, and a network of 
Catchment Area Advisory Committees. 
 
For the objective of the regulation of the provision of water services the Act 
sets up the Water Services Regulatory Board (section 46). This consists of a 
chair appointed by the President, and ten other members appointed by the 
minister. Water Services Boards are then licensed by the Regulatory Board to 
provide water services, and they in turn may enter into agreements with Water 
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Service Providers to act as their agents in the actual delivery of water 
services. The Act also establishes a Water Services Trust Fund, a mechanism 
for financing access to water services in areas that are inadequately served 
(section 83). Finally, the Act sets up a Water Appeal Board to hear appeals 
from decisions of any of the institutions under the Act, including those of the 
minister (section 84). 
 
The Water Act provides several spaces for public consultation. For instance, 
under section 11(1) the minister is required to conduct a public consultation in 
order to formulate a national water resource management strategy, and for 
the periodic review of such strategy. The same requirement is made in section 
49 with regards to the formulation of a national water services strategy. The 
same phrasing – “public consultation” is used in section 15, which requires the 
Authority to carry out such consultation in formulating a strategy for 
management, use, development, conservation, protection and control of 
catchment areas, and to publish such strategy and periodic reviews of it in the 
Gazette (Water Act, 2003, section 15). 
 
But the Act does not provide details, neither in the statute nor under the 
Schedules and Subsidiary Legislation, on how public consultation is to be 
conducted. The only specification is that the strategies and any periodic 
reviews of them must be published in the official Gazette. The Gazette is an 
obscure government publication little known beyond the narrow circles of 
lawyers, researchers and parliamentarians. Moreover, the perception of the 
subject as being technical is likely to deter citizen participation. 
 
The provisions for consultation do not go far enough. As an example, section 
15(3) (e) gives the initial impression that the Authority will take the additional 
step of facilitating citizen organising, presumably for a strengthened role in 
governance. Section 15(3) (e) requires the Authority to ‘provide mechanisms 
and facilities for enabling the public and communities to participate in 
managing the water resources within each catchment area.’ In addition, this 
section requires that the catchment management strategy ‘shall encourage 
and facilitate the establishment and operation of water resources users 
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associations …for conflict resolution and co-operative management of water 
resources in catchment areas’. The facilitative role envisaged for the Authority 
is ambiguous. 
 
Moreover, the exact nature of input that is expected of the water resources 
users associations into the process of decision-making is unclear. For 
instance, how important is their input in decisions as to water allocation plans, 
or revisions to the water catchment management strategy? Are they simply 
consulted, or are only disputes referred to them, or do their views actually 
count in shaping the decisions of the Authority? Is the Authority under 
obligation to involve the water resources users associations in making 
decisions concerning the catchment area? What recourse do they have if their 
views are not taken into account in decision-making? 
 
Also, another channel for citizen participation under the Water Act is through 
the Catchment Area Advisory Committees (CAAC), consisting of a maximum 
of 15 members who are appointed by the Authority in consultation with the 
minister (section 16). These committees advise the authority’s regional offices 
on water resources conservation, use, and apportionment of water, and the 
issuing, variation and cancellation of permits. The composition of the 
committee follows a stakeholder model very similar to the one used under 
EMCA in constituting the district-level Environment Management Committees. 
Apart from representatives of relevant ministries, regional development bodies 
and local authorities, representation is brought in from farmers or pastoralists 
in the catchment area, business community, non-governmental organisations 
involved in water resources management programs in the area, and any other 
persons with demonstrated competence in matters relating to water resource 
management.  
 
The work of the advisory committees is thus enhanced by the secretariat of 
the Authority. This secretariat provides secretariat services, logistical and 
administrative support. Because of the closeness in the mechanisms for 
participation and accountability provided by the Water Act and EMCA, similar 
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questions to those related to the EMCA’s district-level committees arise here 
as well. 
 
The Water Act is therefore an example of a ‘pocket’ of guaranteed public 
access to records despite the absence of a national law on freedom of 
information. Both the Water Resources Management Authority and the Water 
Services Regulatory Board are required to prepare annual reports of their 
work and activities (Sections 18 (5) and 50(5) respectively). Under sections 
18(6) and 50(6) any member of the public, on payment of the prescribed fee, 
shall have access to information contained in any national information system 
and shall be supplied with a copy of the annual report. In this respect, the 
Water Act is strong on answerability to the public. However, weakness arises 
from the public consultation requirement discussed earlier. It is vague, yet 
grants the Authority the powers to flout it altogether in some instances. 
Section 29(4) requires public consultation in the process of application for a 
permit, and also where applicable, an EIA under EMCA. 
 
Provision is also made for any person opposed to the issuing of a water 
extraction permit to object in writing to the Authority (section 29(5). Section 33 
allows the Authority to issue a permit without subjecting the application to 
public consultation ‘if in its opinion exceptional circumstances warrant such 
action’. The only consideration the Authority is required to take into 
consideration in exercising this power is the extent to which the grant would 
be likely to interfere with the domestic requirements of other users (section 
33(2)). Such a permit granted without public consultation can only be valid for 
a maximum period of one year. 
 
The discretion given to the Authority is much too wide to secure citizen 
participation or even enhance accountability. There should be a process for 
any water user aggrieved by this exercise of discretion to question it. There 
ought also, at least, to be a requirement that the Authority reports periodically 
on the number and nature of such applications it has approved of and its 
reasons for exempting those applications from the requirement of public 
consultation. 
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The sanctions also show strengths and weaknesses. An important strength is 
that both the Authority and the Regulatory Board are put under strict time 
deadlines to respond to applications for water permits and water service 
provision licences respectively. If they have not determined the application 
within 6 months of it being lodged, they must refund to the applicant any fee 
charged for the service (sections 57(10) and section 29(8)). It is, however, 
doubtful that applicants are informed of this sanction against the institutions. 
 
Another strength is that all decisions made by the statutory bodies and their 
various committees, as well as decisions made by the minister, are 
appealable to the Water Appeal Board by any person who is affected directly 
by such decision. The appeals must be lodged within 30 days of the date the 
person was notified of the decision or such other period specified in the 
relevant provision of the Act, unless the Appeal Board is convinced that 
he/she has shown good cause for filing the appeal late. Section 87(4) 
provides that the judgement of the Appeal Board is final, except that a matter 
of law may be appealed to the High Court. 
 
The weakness in the sanctions relate to prosecution of the Authority and 
Water Regulatory Board. The Authority and the Regulatory Board can only 
prosecute offences arising under the Act with the consent of the Attorney 
General (sections 8(2) and 47(2) respectively). This reliance on the Attorney 
General’s discretion is obvious in terms of curtailing accountability. The other 
weakness is the absence of details on an accountability structure to govern 
the Water Services Trust Fund. The Act appears to leave details of the 
accountability structure to the Minister’s discretion as he prepares the trust 
deed. 
4.4.2 Constituencies Development Fund Act of 2003 
 
This Act was enacted in 2003 to transfer 2.5 per cent of all government 
ordinary revenue collected in each financial year into development spending 
at the constituency level, under the stewardship of the Member of Parliament 
(MP). The Act establishes a National Management Committee (NMC) (section 
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5) which has oversight over management of the fund. The process of 
identifying projects is supposed to originate from the level of the location, 
through to a Constituency Development Committee. All constituency 
proposals for development are then discussed by a District Projects 
Committee, which plays a co-ordination and harmonising role over all project 
proposals presented by the various constituencies. 
 
Thereafter, each MP submits his/her constituency proposals to the Clerk of 
the National Assembly who tables them before the Constituencies Fund 
Committee (sections 39-43), a committee of parliament drawing its 
membership from backbenchers. The Constituencies Fund Committee vets 
the proposals and advices the Clerk who then forwards the proposals with any 
amendments to the National Management Committee which is responsible for 
making the necessary disbursements based on allocations to each 
constituency already approved by parliament for the financial year in question.  
 
The stakeholder’s model is used to constitute the NMC. The Permanent 
Secretaries in the relevant ministries (finance, planning, regional 
development, agriculture) and the clerk of national assembly, by virtue of their 
positions are obvious members of the NMC. There are another 8 persons 
(who must be qualified in finance, accounting, engineering, economics, rural 
development or law) who are appointed by the minister, from a list of 16 
nominations submitted to the minister by stakeholder groups. The stakeholder 
groups entitled to nominate are: Kenya Farmers Union, Institute of Engineers 
of Kenya, Kenya National Chamber of Commerce Catholic Church, Kenya 
National Union of Teachers, NGO Council of Kenya, the National Council of 
Churches of Kenya, and the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims. Unlike the 
other laws, for example the Water Act and LATF Act, at least an effort is made 
to include the non-formal sector through an inclusion of the farmers’ union. 
 
The Constituencies Development Fund (CDF) Act sets up the Constituency 
Development Committee, popularly referred to as the CDF Committee at the 
local level. The CDF committee comprises the Member of Parliament (MP), 
two councillors from the local authorities represented in the area, one District 
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Officer (DO), two persons representing religious organisations in the 
constituency, two male representatives from the constituency, two female 
representatives from the constituency, one person representing the youth, 
and one nominee from amongst NGOs active in the area. Although the Act 
specifies the social groups to be represented in the area it does not make 
explicit the process to be followed in selecting them. Hence, the practice of 
constituting the committees has invariably varied, from nominations based on 
consultations in local leaders’ forums to opaque unilateral appointments by 
the MP, to location-level elections.8 
 
The assessment of the degree of citizen participation in this committee model, 
therefore, can only be made based on assessment of practice in each 
constituency, since the Act gives the MP absolute discretion as to process. 
With respect to actual participation in projects, community members (usually 
organised into groups) may request funding from CDF by submitting a 
proposal. If they secure funding, then they must set up an elected project 
committee to manage the project. For projects not initiated through a 
community proposal the local community may request to be allowed to 
nominate representatives to represent the community’s interests on any 
project being undertaken in their area (section 38). 
 
In addition to the direct participation which can only be accessed by some 
(given funding limitations), there is a broad-based citizen role but this only 
goes as far as the identification of priority projects at the location level. 
Section 23(3) requires the MP to hold meetings in every location in the first 
year of parliament and in every two years subsequently, for the purpose of 
identifying project priorities. There is, however, no further requirement to hold 
broad-based consultation. Therefore, consultations are only held at the start 
of the project cycle. No provision is made for citizen input into the CDF 
committee’s work, in implementation or in monitoring of standards and probity 
as the work goes on, or in evaluating it at the end. There is no requirement on 
                                            
8 
This is based on anecdotes from some men, residents of Viwandani ward, during a focus 
group discussion. 
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the committee or MP to come back to the location level and explain its 
decisions. Citizen participation under the CDF Act is therefore limited. 
 
Submission of returns is to the National Management Committee (section 6(1) 
(c) and (d). There is no constituency-level or location-level feedback 
mechanism. The Constituency Development Committee is not required to 
publish accounts or give reports at constituency level. It is much easier to 
obtain information on CDF projects in your constituency from the NMC’s 
website than it is to obtain it by walking into your local CDF office. From the 
above, it is clear that all the mechanisms for answerability under the CDF Act 
are directed upwards to the national level. Yet at the national level there are 
structural limitations on how much answerability citizens can expect. 
 
The NMC submits reports and monthly returns on the movement of funds to 
parliament (section 6(1) (e). The NMC is essentially reporting to the same 
MPs who have given the NMC an account of how they have managed the 
funds at the constituency level. The only answerability that could come out of 
this exercise is peer answerability; having an MP’s record scrutinised by 
fellow MPs. The MPs have since the enactment of the CDF Act exhibited a 
surprising interest in lax scrutiny, thus issues of such a nature are unlikely to 
be major. In Figure 4.1, a press report of April 1, 2010 highlights the 
accountability challenges citizens face in planning through the CDF. It 
showws an independent audit report on the use of some of the CDFs. The flip 
side of this is that there are no sanction mechanisms. For instance, if the 
NMC’s report to parliament on matters similar to what is covered in Figure 4.1 
faces such challenge, there are no sanctions to deal with such an eventuality. 
 
Section 51 makes it an offence for anyone to misappropriate or to cause any 
person to misappropriate CDF funds or to apply them in a manner that 
contravenes the Act. The offence attracts imprisonment for a maximum period 
of five years or a fine of 200,000 shillings, or both. This is laudable. However, 
since there is no specially designated prosecutorial authority, it must be 
presumed that this is left to the general system of prosecution in the country 
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and therefore the matter will be referred to the Attorney General for 
prosecution. But the sanction under section 51 is limited in other ways. 
 
Figure 4.1: Typical Accountability discourses on the CDF 
 
Source: Daily Nation, April 1, 2010. 
 
Regulation 6 of the CDF Act’s Subsidiary Legislation, for example, requires 
that members of any committee created under the Act must disclose any 
direct or indirect personal interest in a matter before the committee. Such 
disclosure of personal interest must be recorded in the minutes, and the 
member concerned should not take part in the deliberations, nor influence 
another member in the committee’s decision-making process. Yet no 
sanctions or consequences are specified should a committee member fail to 
disclose such personal interest, or exercise undue influence on another 
committee member, or indeed for the committee’s failure to observe these 
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rules of procedure. Such misconduct is not listed among the grounds on 
which a committee member should vacate office under Regulation 8. 
 
There is no sanction provided for against an MP’s failure to exercise, or 
wrongful exercise of power. Even if one needed to verify the extent to which 
an MP convened location-level meetings as required by section 23(2) in the 
first year of a new parliament and every two years subsequently, such a task 
would not only be arduous but also contentious as the CDF Act fails to 
provide such measures. Similarly, there are no provisions to address cases 
where an MP simply flouts all the requirements of the constitution, the 
committees and in implementing CDF projects. There are also no channels 
provided for citizens to identify their priorities, preferences, or even raise their 
objections. Therefore, on the sanction measure of accountability the CDF Act 
fails miserably as no sanction is attached at all. 
 
On the whole, the accountability structure under the CDF Act is defective. As 
is widely expressed in the CDF debates in Kenya, the CDF flouts the most 
basic of rules about separation of powers in a democracy. MPs are at one and 
the same time the approving, spending and scrutinising authority. Given this 
flaw in the architecture of the fund, the accountability gaps identified are 
justifiable. These obviate the need for independent citizen initiatives in 
monitoring and implementation. The sanction that is available to citizens in 
this milieu is to withhold their vote from MPs who fail to manage the fund in an 
efficient and non-discriminatory manner. 
 
Although positive changes were being implemented in terms of policy and 
legislation, negative changes were also taking place at the institutional level. 
Perhaps because of the painful experiences of a powerful imperial president 
during the previous 40 years, Raila Odinga’s contemporaries in NARC were 
resentful of his fortunes and growing power and influence. His erstwhile 
partners in resistance sequestered him and set out to contain his power 
(Horowitz, 2008; Amutabi, 2009). This crusade against Raila Odinga 
unavoidably led to a shift in NARC’s priorities. President Kibaki and his close 
allies were no longer interested in changing the constitution. An institutional 
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framework that favoured an imperial president with unfettered power was no 
longer a problem for President Kibaki and his supporters. A memorandum of 
understanding signed by members of NARC before the 2002 elections were 
disregarded and Raila Odinga was increasingly isolated and demonised 
(Badejo, 2006; Amutabi, 2009). For instance, the first parliamentary business 
for the NARC government was to ensure that Raila Odinga did not continue 
as chair of the influential committee of parliament responsible of legal and 
administrative affairs. His LDP received fewer positions in cabinet compared 
to its parliamentary strength. 
 
An analysis of how power was shared reveals a deliberate strategy to contain 
Raila Odinga and his party, the LDP’s influence and power. For instance, of 
the twenty-six cabinet positions in March 2003, Raila’s LDP had the same 
number of positions as Mwai Kibaki’s Democratic Party Yet in parliament LDP 
had twice as many members as the DP. Moreover, of the so-called eleven 
powerful ministries, of Mwai Kibaki’s DP colleagues were appointed to seven 
of these whilst the LDP were assigned to three and the one to another of the 
constituent parties of NARC. The ministries that Kibaki allies controlled 
included: Finance, Defence, Office of the President – Internal Security and 
Provincial Administration, Local Government, Lands and Settlement, Justice 
and Constitutional Affairs, and Education. The LDP controlled Roads, Housing 
and Public Works; Energy; and Foreign Affairs. To further contain the rise of 
Raila Odinga, Kibaki reverted to the colonial tactics of the colonial, Kenyatta, 
and Moi governments.  
 
Surprisingly, even though his colleagues had humiliated him, Odinga shifted 
his attention to the constitutional review process. The constitutional review 
process that had stalled in the twilight of the Moi presidency was revived but 
not without intrigue (Bannon, 2007; Kidinki, 2007). There were endless 
contentions on the mode the review was to take, who was to participate, and 
the distribution of power and access, control and the use of national 
resources, as well as addressing historical injustices and the wide spread of 
inequalities, including poverty (Hornsby, 2012:722-724; 738-742). The 
struggle for power and control of the constitutional review process was very 
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intense but when President Kibaki’s allies sensed that they could not prevail, 
they abandoned the Bomas conference, arguing that Raila Odinga had 
influenced the outcomes (Bannon, 2007). 
 
Major contentions on the system of government, distribution of power, 
inequality, persisted. The Professor Ghai-led conference completed a review 
of process and the national conference adapted a draft, and although it 
expressed the majority views of the population, these views were at variance 
with those of the powerful coterie of allies of President Kibaki. 
Recommendations from Bomas were subject to further reviews by the 
president’s trusted allies ensured that parliament changed the people’s draft 
to what came to be known as the Nyachae recommendations and later Wako 
draft (ibid.). With this victory, President Kibaki felt strengthened to hold the 
national referendum in 2005 but this was to be proved to be his undoing. 
 
In my view, holding the 2005 plebiscite can be considered as one of Kibaki’s 
iil-advised political decisions and inelegant use of power. His poor treatment 
of Raila Odinga and the LDP, the blatant promotion of corruption and 
tribalism, predilection for the status quo (a president with imperial power) 
easily served as effective mobilising tools for the wider public that felt 
marginalised by a few elite and members of a single tribe – the Kikuyu 
(Hornsby, 2012:710-721; 725-727). Raila Odinga, the LDP and other political 
parties such as KANU and the others who felt marginalised easily 
campaigned against the draft constitution and overwhelmingly prevailed at the 
referendum. 
 
President Kibaki’s response to the outcome of the referendum further 
inflamed the already tense relationship between the Kikuyu and the other 
tribes. He sacked Raila Odinga and his LDP counterparts from government 
and, instead, formed a government with parties and individuals who competed 
against NARC and specifically the LDP. Whilst Kibaki remained president, his 
legitimacy was sorely eroded. Two years after the referendum Uhuru 
Kenyatta, who was leader of opposition in parliament, quit this position and 
joined Kibaki’s presidential campaign team in a move that, in the public 
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domain, was largely interpreted as motivated more by tribal considerations to 
ensure Kikuyu hegemony of Kenya’s socio-political and economic affairs 
(ibid.:750). The reform process again stalled and the promise for addressing 
poverty became bleak. The aggrieved politicians who had been excluded from 
government started preparing for the next elections to be held in 2007. 
 
Following the humiliation Kibaki suffered at the 2005 referendum and the 
subsequent severance of relations with Odinga’s LDP, it was clear the Kibaki-
Odinga political union was severed. Without a new constitution and faced with 
a threat of stifling democracy, the 2007 election was the logical forum for 
contesting power between Kibaki and Odinga and their respective allies; the 
citizens and the government; and between the Kikuyu and the other Kenyans. 
The 2005 referendum had set the battle lines and established the main 
protagonists – Kibaki and Odinga. When the elections were finally held in 
December 2007, Raila Odinga presented a credible challenge. 
 
The run-up to the 2007 elections was relatively peaceful. Opinion polls 
throughout the campaign periods indicated a growing popularity for Odinga. 
According to Cheeseman (2008), the final public opinion poll by the respected 
Steadman Group whilst declaring the presidential race too close to call, also 
showed Odinga leading with 45 per cent to Kibaki’s with 43 per cent. Once 
again, Raila Odinga presented both a credible threat to the status quo 
represented by Kibaki and his party – the Party on National Unity. But more 
importantly, Odinga was perceived as representing reform, a new constitution 
that would devolve power to the citizens, and focus on poverty reduction and 
inequality (Hornsby, 2012:754-755). 
 
Voting on Election Day, 27 December 2007 proceeded peacefully. With 9.8 
million voters participating and 70 per cent voter turnout, this was clearly 
Kenya’s biggest and most credible poll. But that was as far as the credibility 
went. When the head of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) 
announced the ‘official’ results, all credibility had petered out. Disputes 
between Odinga’s ODM and Kibaki’s PNU agents at the national voting 
tallying centre had been relayed on live television broadcasts, and there was 
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a consensus even within the ECK that the voting counting exercise had been 
grossly tampered with, the ECK head at one time publicly remarked, 
“Returning Officers are cooking results” (ECK press briefing on Saturday 29 
December 2007). 
 
These contestations notwithstanding, the ECK head, sequestered and under 
heavy military and police protection, on national television, announced Kibaki 
as winner of the presidential election with 46 per cent and Odinga as runner-
up with 44 per cent of the vote (Electoral Commission of Kenya, 2007). These 
election results generated further controversy. It was baffling that Kibaki won 
as president but his party, PNU only managed to win 43 seats out of the 207 
seats competed for, whilst Odinga’s ODM won convincingly with 99 seats. 
Invariably the pattern of the results lends credence to the analyses that shows 
that the results of the presidential elections were grossly flawed (Gibson and 
Long, 2009; Kanyinga et al., 2010). 
 
In less than two hours, the ECK head presented the certificate of the results 
and Kibaki was sworn in at dusk at a hurriedly arranged inauguration at the 
State House under extremely heavy security presence. This turn of events 
was in total contrast to Kibaki’s inauguration five years earlier that was done 
in broad daylight at the famous public square, the Uhuru Park, in the presence 
of at least half a million citizens (Hornsby, 2012:696). As expected, Raila 
Odinga and ODM rejected the results and violence broke out in no small 
measure.  
 
The controversial announcement of widely discredited results (Cheeseman, 
2008, Gibson and Long, 2009; Kanyinga et al., 2010) and hasty inauguration 
of Kibaki as president, I argue, are the critical events that tipped an already 
tense situation into what became Kenya’s unprecedented post election 
violence. Whilst the developments that led to a new constitution are 
significant, these are not covered in this thesis. But I consider the new 
constitution promulgated by the coalition government of Kibaki and Odinga in 
August 2010 important. I turn to the implications of the new constitution for 
power, institutions, and poverty reduction. 
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4.4.3 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 
 
Although Kenya now has a new constitution, it is not fully operational. The 
oppressive laws and policies remain operational and constitute the body of 
the institutional framework for poverty reduction. The laws and policies of an 
old constitutional order in participation and accountability are untenable within 
the institutional framework for planning for poverty reduction. Nonetheless, it 
is noteworthy that Kenya’s current Constitution (2010) makes a clear 
reference in valuing active involvement of citizens in endeavours such as 
urban planning for poverty reduction. This value is listed amongst the National 
values and principles of governance: “patriotism, national unity, sharing and 
devolution of power, the rule of law, democracy and participation of the 
people” (Constitution of Kenya, 2010 section 10).  
 
The constitution also lists: “good governance, integrity, transparency and 
accountability” of state officers, public officers, state organs and public 
authorities (Article 10). The previous constitution did not embody such ethos 
of participation. The current constitution is significant in providing rights-based 
interventions such as planning for poverty reduction owing to progressive 
inclusions such as the Bill of Rights in Chapter Four, land and environment in 
Chapter Five; these provide for the recognition of marginalised groups and the 
poor in informal settlements and devolved government in Chapter Eleven. At 
present, Kenya is finalising preparations for managing the transition from the 
old constitution. Formulating institutional frameworks supportive of citizen 
participation is one the challenges of the transition. 
 
In Chapter Four, there are several articles relevant to urban development, 
especially in the informal settlements. In Article 25 (a), every person is entitled 
to freedom from torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment. This article provides a progressive space to reconceptualise the 
conditions in the informal settlements as degrading treatment and 
opportunities for seeking redress. Article 27 which is dedicated to freedom 
against discrimination, provides remedies for addressing such discrimination 
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in ways that are very likely to significantly improve the conditions in the poor 
urban areas: 
 
(4) The State shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against any 
person on any ground, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth. 
(5) A person shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against another 
person on any of those grounds specified or contemplated in clause 
(4). 
The measures provided to remedy discrimination highlight new spaces for 
urban development targeting the marginalised. These include:  
 
(6) To give full effect to the realisation of the rights guaranteed under 
this Article, the State shall take legislative and other measures, 
including affirmative action programmes and policies designed to 
redress any disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups because of 
past discrimination. 
(7) Any measure taken under clause (6) shall adequately provide for 
any benefits to be on the basis of genuine need. 
 
In Article 39 (3) every citizen has the right to enter into, remain and reside 
anywhere in Kenya, while in Article 43 1 (b) the right to housing is articulated 
as “every person has the right to accessible and adequate housing and to 
reasonable standards of sanitation. Article 43 1 (d) on water provides that all 
and sundry have a right to potable water in adequate quantities. Clearly, the 
new constitution provides a progressive framework for addressing urban 
development in the poor communities. Indeed, the entire Article 43 on 
economic and social rights establishes important normative principles that can 
be tested in court when the plight of the poor is ignored. 
 
From the analysis above, it is clear Kenya’s new constitution is emblematic of 
the paradigmatic shift in the values and philosophy that should guide the 
governance and development of the people of Kenya. However, the struggles 
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that led to the realisation of that constitution from the days of colonialism to 
the present indicate that the fulfilment of the aspirations stated in the 
constitution by the Kenyans is unlikely to be a straightforward or easy 
endeavour. Dealing with the complex power relations in the institutions of the 
old constitutional, legal, and policy orientation and with the same actors, 
undoubtedly impacts urban planning for poverty reduction. Moreover, the 
transition from the way urban planning for poverty reduction is currently 
carried out to fit the conditions and aspirations laid out in the new constitution 
remain important questions but are beyond the scope of this study because 
the empirical work is on the period preceding the 2010 Constitution. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
The successful resistance that led to independence and the struggles for the 
second republic clearly show that even the colonial government and imperial 
presidents did not always have absolute power. Kenya’s new constitution is 
emblematic of the paradigmatic shift in the values and philosophy that should 
guide the governance and development of the people of Kenya. However, the 
struggles that led to the realisation of that constitution from the days of 
colonialism to the present indicate that the fulfilment of the aspirations stated 
in the constitution by the Kenyans is unlikely to be a straightforward or easy 
endeavour. Power was indeed spread throughout the entire nation and 
institutional framework. Because power was not always held by the powerful, 
the colonial government and imperial presidents Kenyatta and Moi 
acquiesced to constitutional changes that significantly altered the relations of 
power between the government and its citizens. 
 
This Chapter has shown that dealing with the complex power relations in the 
institutions of the old constitutional, legal, and policy orientation and with the 
same actors undoubtedly impacts urban planning for poverty reduction. In the 
next Chapter, I explore the effectiveness of the institutional framework for 
urban planning for poverty reduction in the period leading to the promulgation 
of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR URBAN PLANNING FOR POVERTY REDUCTION, 
2005-2007 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter argues that the institutional framework for urban planning for 
poverty reduction in the period 2005-2007 was inimical to participation, and 
thus not effective for poverty reduction. The absence of sanction is the 
weakest element in the institutional framework. With the exception of the 
EMCA, answerability is also limited in these frameworks. While the 
institutional responses to poverty are diverse and growing, the analysis shows 
that these are generally notional. The stakeholder involvement is extensively 
applied as a tool for citizen participation. This stakeholder model has 
limitations, - built-in exclusions, so that overall the frameworks are by design 
not aimed at delivering full accountability to citizens. 
 
The rest of this Chapter is organised in five parts. The next section examines 
the institutional framework at a national level and is followed by a discussion 
of the frameworks at the City of Nairobi level. The effectiveness of national 
institutional measures for poverty reduction such as the National Poverty Plan 
(1999) is presented in the fourth section. The Chapter then turns to the 
institutional framework of implementing the LASDAP in Viwandani, and closes 
with a conclusion in the last section. 
 
5.2 The National Level Framework 
 
There are different legal and planning instruments that guide planning in 
Kenya. At the national level, planning is a hybrid of both cooperative (between 
government ministries or departments) and hierarchical systems. Most of the 
government departments have a planning responsibility set out in the legal 
instruments establishing the central government ministries. Whilst there are 
central government departments, much of the planning mandate is carried out 
at the local level in the districts through the District Development Plans. The 
 154 
Office of the President, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Planning 
and Ministry of Finance are ‘super’ departments in an otherwise cooperative 
planning system as they operate elaborate network of branches throughout 
the country. 
 
There are several central government departments with clearly defined 
mandates for development: the Office of the President (OP), particularly the 
Provincial Administration, represents an unusual control of planning and 
development, and related decision-making in Kenya. The Provincial 
Administration has an elaborate link between the President and the citizens 
that typifies the relations between the state/President and citizens. The top-
down relation between the citizen and the OP and the hierarchical nature of 
these relations are important features of this framework. This meticulous 
system of Provincial Administration has a two-fold mandate: implementing 
central government policies and decisions at the lowest level and to ensure 
internal security of the country (Akatch, 1992). 
 
In many respects, the OP, through a detailed Provincial Administration system 
whose network stretches from the location in the villages to the Minister in the 
Office of the President, determines much of the planning direction in the 
country. Literature (for example Odhiambo-Mbai, 1996; Wanyande, 1996; 
2005) shows that the Provincial Administration system has its origins in the 
Colonial government and provides an efficient system for ensuring law and 
order; but have also made law and order the raison d’être of planning, and 
allocation of land in the informal settlements. Other central government 
departments represented at the District level are not only responsible and 
accountable to the District Commissioner(s) but also to Officers of the 
Provincial Administration. Several legal frameworks provide the mandate for 
these departments to provide basic services critical in urban planning. Table 
5.1 outlines these in some detail. 
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Table 5.1 The Institutional Framework for Planning at the National Level, 2005-
2007  
Ministry/Department Mandate/objective Planning Tools 
 
Ministry of Planning 
and National 
Development 
 Coordination of government 
economic policies including 
regional and international 
cooperation policies 
 Coordination and preparation 
of the planning components 
of the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF); the Fiscal Strategy 
Paper and the requisite 
budget documents 
 Provision of leadership and 
coordination in the 
preparation of the national 
development plans, district 
development plans and 
specific economic 
programmes and plans 
 Coordination and 
management of population, 
economic and national 
statistical services within 
government  
 Coordination and provision 
of leadership in the national 
monitoring and evaluation 
framework 
 Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper 2001 – 
2004 
 Economic Recovery 
Strategy 2002/3 – 
2008/9 
 Economic Recovery 
Strategy for Wealth 
and Employment 
Creation 2003 – 2007 
 Bureau of Statistics 
Strategic Plan 2003 – 
2008 
 Industrialisation Policy 
Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Housing  Urban housing (Kenya Slum 
upgrading programme, rental 
housing, tenant purchase, 
mortgage housing 
programme, civil servants 
housing scheme) 
 Rural housing 
 Research 
 Building materials and 
technology 
 Financial resources 
 National Housing 
Development 
Programme 2003 – 
2007 
 Sessional Paper No.3 
on national housing 
policy for Kenya 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Lands and 
Settlement 
 Ensure human settlements 
are well planned by providing 
an appropriate spatial 
 The Physical Planning 
Act 1996 
 The National Land 
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framework within which 
environmental and socio-
economic development 
activities can harmoniously 
take place. 
 Prepare national, regional 
physical development plans 
and policies (strategic, 
structure and zoning plans) 
Policy 
Ministry of Regional 
Development 
 Planning economically on 
how to utilise the following 
regional developments: 
Coast Development 
Authority (CDA); Ewaso 
Ng’iro North Development 
Authority (ENNDA); Ewaso 
Ng’iro South Development 
Authority (ENSDA); Lake 
Basin Development Authority 
(LBDA); Kerio Valley 
Development Authority 
(KVDA); Tana and Athi 
Rivers Development 
Authority (TARDA) 
 Various Acts of 
Parliament 
 Ministry of Regional 
Development Strategic 
Plan 2004 – 2009 
 National Policy for 
Regional Development 
Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation 
 Accelerating the 
implementation of water 
sector reforms: sustainable 
management of water 
resources; provision of water 
and sewerage services, 
utilisation of land through 
irrigation and land 
reclamation; mobilising and 
promoting efficiency; 
management and access to 
water resource information 
 National Water Policy 
 Services Charter 
 Water Act 
 Irrigation Policy 
 Ministry of Water 
Strategic Plan 
Ministry of Local 
Government 
 Supporting service delivery, 
planning and development, 
local government reform, 
provision of physical and 
financial management and 
regulatory framework for 
local authorities 
 Local Authorities Policy 
 Local Government Act 
 Physical Planning Act 
 Local Authorities 
Transfer Fund Act 
 By-laws of Local 
Authorities 
Source: Compiled by author 
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After the Office of the President and Treasury, the Ministry of Local 
Government is the third super ministry with direct connections with local level 
development. At the national level, the planning mandates require each of the 
departments to plan and implement activities at the local level. The main 
connection between the national level (i.e., Ministries) and the local level is 
through the Districts. Districts prepare District Development Plans and receive 
funding from the National Treasury to implement plans of different line 
ministries at the district. 
 
The Ministry of Planning and National Development has overall supervision of 
the District Development Plans and the District Planning Officers. Moreover, 
the District Commissioner (DC) who is technically a representative of Central 
government and more so the President, is the head of the District responsible 
for all development and security in the district. In this role, the DC coordinates 
all development activities within the district with the support of District Officers 
and Chiefs. 
 
Although there are several institutions that have been established to address 
various aspects of urban planning; the great number of these institutions is 
the main weakness. A close scrutiny of the institutions at the national level 
shows that these are fragmented and makes urban planning impossible. 
Moreover, the power and influence of the OP and ministries of finance and 
local government mean that citizens do not have any influence on how 
decisions affecting them are made or even where resources are expended. 
 
5.3 The City of Nairobi Level 
 
The institutional framework for poverty reduction at the City of Nairobi level is 
unwieldy and rather complicated. In terms of politics, the city of Nairobi 
comprises eight constituencies and 56 wards (a constituency is a geopolitical 
area that is represented in parliament by an elected representative, i.e., a 
Member of Parliament (MP), whilst a ward is a geopolitical area represented 
in the City Council by an elected representative known as a Councillor) as 
shown in Table 5.2. At present, Nairobi is also one of the eight provinces in 
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Kenya, namely: Central, Coast, Eastern, Rift Valley, North Eastern, Nyanza, 
Western and Nairobi provinces. However, with the promulgation of the current 
Constitution, Nairobi now also becomes one of the forty-seven counties in 
Kenya’s new devolved structure of government. But Nairobi is also the capital 
of Kenya and the headquarters of two United Nations agencies – the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and UN Habitat. 
 
Table 5.2 Constituencies and Wards of Nairobi 
Constituency Wards 
Dagoretti Waithaka; Mutuini; Riruta; Kawangware; 
Uthiru/Ruthimitu; Woodley/Kenyatta/Golf Course 
Embakasi Kariobangi South; Komarock; Mukuru; Savannah; 
Kayole; Umoja; Dandora A; Dandora B; Ruai; Njiru; 
Embakasi/Mihango 
Kamukunji Pumwani/Majengo; Eastleigh North; Eastleigh South; 
Shauri Moyo/Muthurwa; Kimathi; Uhuru 
Kasarani Kahawa West; Kariobangi North; Kasarani; 
Korogocho; Roysambu; Githurai; Mathare 4 A; Baba 
Dogo/Utalii 
Langata Mugumoini; Karen/Langata; Nairobi West; Laini Saba; 
Serangombe; Kibera 
Makadara Viwandani; Harambee; Hamza; Kaloleni/Makongeni; 
Ofafa/Maringo; Nairobi South; Mbotela 
Starehe Ngara East; City Square/Central; Ziwani/Kariokor; 
Huruma; Mathare 
Westlands Kitisuru/Loresho; Kileleshwa; Kilimani; Kangemi; 
Highridge; Parklands 
Source: Nairobi City Council (2002) 
 
The Ministry of Local Government through its Urban Development department 
is mandated to coordinate urban development, including poverty reduction, by 
facilitating effective strategic development and sustainable delivery of 
infrastructure and social services by local authorities The Ministry of Nairobi 
Metropolitan Development is also mandated to ensure integrated Nairobi 
Metropolitan Areas Growth and Development Strategy through its Vision 
2030.The ministry also aims at improving governance via the system of 
creating an environment of certainty for private investment. Although 
measures are put in place to ensure that the institutional framework promotes 
active collaboration between different parties, including neighbouring areas, 
government spheres, private sector, and other stakeholders, the effect has 
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been a complicated maze. Table 5.3 below identifies other actors, particularly 
at national level, in the framework at the City level. 
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Table 5.3: Institutional Framework for Local Development and Poverty Reduction in Nairobi 
Central 
Government 
through Line 
Ministries 
Poverty Eradication 
Fund (Ministry of 
Planning and 
National 
Development) 
Office of the President 
through Provincial 
Administration 
LATF / LASDAP
9
 Devolved Funds 
controlled by Member 
of Parliament 
National Treasury PS
10
 in the Ministry Office of the President MLG
11
 Member of Parliament 
PS in line ministries  Provincial 
commissioner 
PS  
District heads DPU/DDP
12
 District Commissioner KLGRP
13
  
Departmental 
projects 
Divisional 
Development 
Committee 
District Officer UDD
14
  
 Location 
Development 
Committee 
Chiefs City of Nairobi Constituency 
Development 
Committee 
  Assistant Chiefs Councillors  
  Village Head men Chief Officers  
   Ward Managers  
                                            
9
 Local Authorities Transfer Fund / Local Authorities Service Delivery Action Plan(s) 
10
 Permanent Secretary (the equivalent of the Director General in Republic of South Africa Government). 
11
 Ministry of Local Government 
12
 District Planning Unit / District Development Plan 
13
 Kenya Local Government Reform Programme 
14
 Urban Development Department in the Ministry of Local Government. 
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As mentioned earlier, the City of Nairobi is also the capital of Kenya. Because 
of its political and economic significance, important political institutions of 
local/city, national and international scope are operational in Nairobi. This 
further complicates the institutional framework for poverty reduction. Of 
course there is the City Council of Nairobi that is mandated to develop and 
manage the city. However, operationally, there are significant complications 
when the institutional framework for poverty reduction is unravelled. Figure 
5.1 shows the complex framework within which the City of Nairobi operates 
and responds to poverty. Although prepared 14 years ago, there have not 
been changes to the governance structure of Nairobi; such changes will only 
take effect after commencement of the County Government Act (2013). 
Figure 5.1 Governance Structure for Nairobi 
 
Source: Aligula (1999: 91). 
 
In a nutshell, apart from the interface between national frameworks and city 
level frameworks, the City of Nairobi also has an elaborate institutional 
framework. There are 16 departments in the City Council of Nairobi (CCN). Of 
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these, the City Planning Department, the Environment Department, the City 
Engineering Department, the Housing Department, Education, the Social 
Services and Housing Department, and the Public Health Department are 
critical in poverty reduction. According to the Local Government Act (Cap. 265 
of the laws of Kenya), a local authority such as the City of Nairobi is 
responsible for provision and management of services within its jurisdiction. 
 
The City Nairobi is faced by numerous challenges such as poor economic 
conditions, rapid population growth, and strict control by the Ministry of Local 
Government, political interference and poor management services. As a 
result, not only are the living conditions of the population deteriorating further 
but economic production is also being constrained. Lack of municipal services 
leaves the poor with no alternative except to buy water and electricity from 
private sources, ultimately leaving them to pay far more than the rich do for 
these services. 
 
As Figure 5.2 shows, from a political perspective, the highest unit of 
governance in the City of Nairobi is the Mayor. The Mayor, although a 
councillor, is elected by other councillors. Therefore, the Mayor also continues 
as councillor for a specific ward. Except for nominated councillors, all the 
others are elected via a general election. Although voters registered in various 
wards of City of Nairobi elect councillors, councillors elect the mayor, deputy 
mayor and chairmen of departments during special elections of the City 
Council of Nairobi. However, the Minister of local Government appoints the 
Town Clerk, the substantive chief executive of the City of Nairobi. The Town 
Clerk is a civil servant and essentially the most powerful individual in the city.  
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Figure 5.2: Organisational Chart for the City Council of Nairobi 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Local Government, 2009. 
 
There is an overlap of frameworks on the one hand and the institutions that 
were created under those frameworks on the other hand, all of which are 
relevant for citizen participation in urban planning for poverty reduction. For 
example, there is an overlap of institutions created under the system of local 
government, institutions created under the structure of provincial 
administration, notably chiefs and assistant chiefs, and institutions created 
with the constituency (the electoral district) as the unit of reference. 
Nonetheless, even when Local Authorities (LA) are theoretically autonomous, 
the existence of an ubiquitous parallel structure of government in the Office of 
the President (OP)/Provincial Administration confirms the “super-ministry” 
label of the OP, and lends credence to the view that LAs’ interventions are 
invariably sanctioned by the OP. 
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After the departure of President Moi in 2002, the incoming parliament argued 
strongly for increased control of development spending by members of 
parliament at constituency level, resulting in a proliferation of funds managed 
at constituency level and multiple structures managing these funds. This trend 
of directing development funding through MPs has done a lot to further 
weaken local governments (civic authorities) as relevant units of local 
planning. Before 2002 the role of local government was eclipsed by that of the 
provincial administration due to the dominance of the presidency, which 
meant by-passing local government and relying instead on the provincial 
administration structure under the Office of the President as the main channel 
for state interaction with citizens at the local level.15 The Kenya Local 
Government Reform Programme (KLGRP), set up in 1996, has been working 
toward implementing reforms that restore the relevance and credibility of the 
local government system. 
 
5.4 Assessing Interventions for Poverty Reduction 
 
The 1999 National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) and the PRSPs prepared 
with significant involvement of non-state actors like NGOs are key features of 
the attention poverty received in the 1990s. Moreover, the first poverty maps 
based on the 1999 National Population and Housing Census, showing the 
incidence of poverty, were collaboratively prepared by the government, the 
World Bank, the Society for International Development and the International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). This 
also triggered a sequence of equally influential studies on poverty and 
inequality in Kenya. 
 
The most notable of these studies was the Kenya Human Development 
Report of 2001 (UNDP, 2001) and the Society for International Development’s 
                                            
15
 With the imminent changes and overhaul of the policy, legal and institutional frameworks 
for planning to fit the new constitution, all this is going to change significantly upon the full 
implementation of the Constitution (2010). All the same, at present, chiefs and assistant 
chiefs (and village headmen under them) remain an important part of provincial administration 
and are in cases the only manifestation of government. 
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Pulling Apart SID, 2004) study on poverty and inequality. With such 
unprecedented attention to poverty at the national level, inequality and to 
some extent poverty reduction, momentum gathered to dominate the national 
political, perhaps even academic discourses and debates. With these 
developments, then, it would no doubt be agreed that poverty reduction was 
finally ‘mainstreamed’ in the national plans of Kenya. 
 
5.4.1 The National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) 1999 - 2015 
 
The accounts on the growth and development of the political institutions 
above show that condign power and immanence were critical in both creating 
an imperial presidency and in dismantling the same. While the powerful 
succeeded for at least 40 years in creating and sustaining an all-powerful 
imperial presidency, it may also be justifiable to argue that through power, the 
less powerful endured and after 40 years succeeded in pulling the imperial 
presidency apart. Although various forms of power impacted the institutional 
framework, three are conspicuous: power in things, power through 
mobilisation, and power as immanent (Cahill, 2008). But the birth of the 
second republic also ensured the re-birth of institutions that significantly 
reconfigured the institutional framework for poverty reduction. 
 
The National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) not only attempted to 
understand the poverty problem but it also outlined suggestions for its 
eradication. Right from President Moi’s foreword to the plan, it was clear that 
the government acknowledged the problem of poverty ravaging the people of 
Kenya. 
 
The National Poverty Eradication Plan presents a framework on how 
we are going to tackle poverty that afflicts a large percentage of our 
people.  My Government has been committed to poverty reduction as a 
key ingredient to building an economically strong and prosperous 
nation, with a cohesive society in which all have an opportunity to 
realise their full potential. It is out of this strong commitment that we 
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have been able to make significant progress in the social sectors 
notably in education and health despite some recent slight setbacks 
arising from the implementation of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (Moi, 1999). 
 
The NPEP was also significant as a trailblazer for national planning that was 
specifically targeted at poverty eradication. In a significant departure from 
national development planning circumspection, the Plan admitted that poverty 
was a national crisis: 
 
Poverty reduction is a national challenge. Initially, Kenya hoped to 
eradicate it through economic growth. It was seen as a short-term 
hardship which would disappear as the nation developed and grew in 
economic terms. Poverty is now recognised as a major threat to a very 
significant section of Kenyan households; worrying follow-on 
consequences for the security and economic well-being of those with 
surplus income and good services. It is also increasingly recognised 
that economic growth alone will not be sufficient to reduce poverty 
(Republic of Kenya, 1999: 2). 
 
In terms of national planning, the NPEP was also innovative in several ways. 
First, it attempted a reflective evaluation of past interventions for development 
(ibid.: 4–11). The evaluation provided a sound basis for shifting intervention 
beyond simple economic growth objectives. Second, the government in this 
plan made another important admission: that National plans did not provide 
room to focus exclusively on poverty (ibid.: 5). In this plan the government 
also acknowledged the importance of civil society in any poverty reduction 
interventions. Hitherto, the private sector and the state were the only 
recognised actors in development and, to some extent, in poverty reduction. 
Third, even when the government emphasised the need for economic growth, 
it also made another critical observation: 
 
While economic efficiency arguments may have dictated these actions, 
the benefits were not equitably shared. The introduction of cost-sharing 
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and cost recovery arrangements in basic social services has worked 
against a great majority of poor groups. The quality of the services 
deteriorated and the resources were extremely limited (ibid.: 27). 
 
The above observation not only highlighted the policy effects of interventions 
that were based on the notion of absolute poverty. Economic efficiency was 
the dominant perspective, even perceived as a panacea for poverty reduction. 
Despite its negative effects and limitations, economic growth was nonetheless 
the path recommended. This suggests that it was a case of the lesser evil and 
there must be growth in the economy to be shared amongst the rich and the 
poor. In identifying the poor, the plan also made a distinction between rural 
and urban poverty, noting: “the incidence of poverty in Kenya was 47 per cent 
in the rural areas and 29 per cent in the urban areas” (ibid.). 
 
The main objective of the plan, however, was: “to achieve pro-poor growth 
and service delivery” (Republic of Kenya, 1999: xi). Box 4.2 shows the 
specific goals and targets of this plan. 
 
Box 5.1 Goals and Targets of the NPEP 
 Reduction of the poor in the total population by 20 per cent by 2004 and by 
a further 30 per cent by 2010 
 15 per cent increase in [school] enrolment rates over the first six years of 
the Plan 
 19 per cent increase in [schooling] completion rates, especially for girls in 
the six year period 
 Universal access to Primary Health care to within 5 kilometres of all rural 
households or within one hour of local transport by 2010 
 Increase by 8 per cent each year until 2004 access to safe drinking water 
by poor households 
 By 2010, create universal access to safe water 
 Reduce time spent by women on fuel, wood and water collection 
 Publish ‘best practice’ guidelines for rural and urban social development 
by 2000 
 20 per cent of communities to draw up action plans by 2004 
 40 per cent of all extension messages to be relevant to very poor farmers 
 
Source:  Republic of Kenya, 1999, p xiv. 
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For the first time, the government also introduced hitherto unorthodox terms in 
planning. The plan included the Charter for Social Integration (CSI), produced 
by civil society, including social movements, outlining a range of basic rights 
that the government expressed a commitment to ensure all citizens enjoyed. 
These rights included literacy and numeracy, health, adequate food and clean 
water to maintain life, well-being and enthusiasm, and education (ibid.: 32). 
Evidently, the NPEP was comprehensive in its analysis of poverty and the 
strategies it proposed for its reduction. Unlike the other plans it was perceived 
as the interface between the National Development Plans and the needs of 
the poor. The CSI, the deliberate commitment to improve basic services to the 
poor and a pro-poor economic growth strategy underscored the NPEP’s 
relevance and breadth in terms of poverty reduction. 
 
The NPEP was to be implemented in three 5-year phases:  1999–2004; 
2005–2010; and 2011–2015. Doubtless, the NPEP held much promise in the 
fight against poverty. In 2000, the Commission for Poverty Eradication (CPE) 
was established in the Office of the President. This was to be assisted by 
another body, the Poverty Eradication Unit (PEU). The CPE was expected to 
revive the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) approach and 
network. Community participation was a catch-phrase in government-speak 
during this time. 
 
Various funds, commonly known as decentralised/devolved funds, were 
established by the central government to improve interventions for poverty 
reduction. Table 5.4 presents a detailed analysis of the devolved funds in 
Kenya. These funds were an evident attempt to decentralise public 
expenditure and address poverty. Together, all the interventions mentioned 
above formed the broad institutional framework for planning for poverty 
reduction. 
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Table 5.4: Overview of the Devolved / Decentralised Funds 
Devolved Fund Important Features 
Local Authorities Transfer 
Fund (LATF) 
 
 
 LATF allocation is 5 percent of the national 
income tax.  Transferred from the Ministry of 
Local Government under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Finance to Local Authorities 
 7.5 Billion shillings disbursed to local authorities 
in Financial Year 2006/2007 
Secondary School Education 
Bursary (SSEB) 
 Established by Presidential decrees in 1993/4 
 Supposed to provide a subsidy to the country’s 
poor and vulnerable groups 
 Allocations are dependent on the Ministry of 
Education’s annual provisions 
 From 2003/2004 Constituency Bursary 
Committees coordinate identification of 
beneficiaries 
 1.4 Billion shillings released to the SSEB in the 
2005/2006 Financial Year 
Roads Maintenance Levy 
Fund (RMLF) 
 Established in 1993 through the Roads 
Maintenance Levy Fund Act 
 Managed by the Kenya Roads Board  (KRB) 
(1999)  
 16 per cent of these funds are applied on rural 
roads managed by the district roads committees 
and shared equally among constituencies in a 
district 
 14 Billion shillings were disbursed to the KRB in 
the 2006/2007 Financial Year 
Rural Electrification 
Programme Levy Fund 
(REPLF) 
 Established in 1998 through sections 129 and 
130 of the Electric Power Act (1997) 
 The fund is finance electricity in rural areas and 
other poorly served areas of the country 
Constituency Aids Control 
Fund (CACF) 
 Established by Presidential decree of 1999 
contained in legal notice No. 170 
 At least 80 per cent of this fund is dependent on 
donor funding 
 Fund is managed by the National AIDS Control 
Council (NACC) 
 The fund received 14 Billion shillings in the 
2006/2007 Financial Year 
Constituency Development 
Fund (CDF) 
 Established in 2003 under the CDF Act 2003. 
 Administered by the National Management 
Committee 
 CDF comprises 2.5 percent of ordinary 
government revenue 
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 The CDF received 10 Billion shillings in the 
2006/2007 Financial Year 
Free Primary Education 
(FPE) 
 Established in January 2003 by a Presidential 
Order 
 It is managed under various regulations and 
provisions under the Ministry of Education and 
paid directly to schools 
 Each child is allocated 1,020 shillings per year 
 7.8 Billion shillings disbursed in the 2005/2006 
Financial Year 
Poverty Eradication Fund 
(PEF) 
 Established under the Ministry of Planning and 
National Development in 1999 
 The Fund is administered at the district level 
under the Poverty Eradication Commission 
 Loans are provided to individuals and small 
groups for income generation 
Youth Enterprise Fund  Established by Presidential Order in 2006 
 To be administered by the Ministry of Youth 
Affairs 
 Fund is aimed at supporting small to medium 
scale enterprise 
 1 Billion shillings allocated in the 2006/2007 
Financial Year 
Women’s Fund  Established by Presidential Order in 2007 
 1 Billion shillings allocated in the 2007/2008 
Financial Year 
Community Development 
Trust Fund (CDTF) 
 Wholly funded by the European Union 
 Established in 1996 
 Aimed at poverty reduction through provision of 
grants to community based projects that address 
social, economic and environmental priorities 
 A community contribution is mandatory and is set 
at a minimum of 10 per cent – this may be in 
cash, labour or materials. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Hanns Seidel Foundation (2006) p.8-11 and 
author’s Fieldwork in 2007 
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Beyond providing analysis of the numerous funds availed by the state for 
poverty reduction, Table 4.4 also shows the broad institutional response to 
poverty. However, the effectiveness of the above responses in reducing 
poverty is not known. For instance, as Table 4.5 shows, the Poverty 
Eradication Fund had received a paltry 161 million shillings since its inception. 
From the funds that the government allocated to the Poverty Eradication 
Fund, the government was evidently reluctant to engage with and/or promote 
planning for poverty reduction. 
 
Table 5.5: Poverty Eradication Fund since 1999 
Financial Year Kenya Shillings (Millions) 
1999/2000 22.0 
2000/2001 11.4 
2001/2002 57.0 
2002/2003 36.0 
2003/2004 35.0 
2004/2005 0.0 
2005/2006 0.0 
TOTAL 161.4 
Source:  National Council of Churches of Kenya (2005: 41) 
 
The ways in which the presidency was created and how it exercised extra-
constitutional powers to stifle the independence of other institutions of 
government demonstrate the fact that power “…is not found in the resources, 
but in the use of those resources” (ibid.). Until 2010, the presidency was the 
most powerful institution in Kenya. As shown above, the power of the 
presidency was vested both in the resources it controlled and the manner in 
which these resources were deployed. In the use of these resources as Ghai 
and Ghai (undated:8) show, “…corruption drained away billions of shillings 
which belonged to the state…” resulting in more poverty. Thus, the use of this 
power shows the creation of relative powerfulness of the presidency and the 
relative powerlessness of the poor. 
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5.5 The Institutional Framework for Implementing the LASDAP 
 
The range of actors and their relationships to one another shows the 
complexity of the institutional framework within which the LASDAP was 
implemented. These actors include the citizens, officials of the City of Nairobi, 
and officials of the central government, particularly those from the Ministry of 
Local Government (MLG), professionals; others are drawn from the private 
sector and various civil society organisations. Although implemented at the 
city and sub-city levels, the rules for implementing the LASDAP, as seen in 
the discussion of the LASDAP guidelines in Chapter Four (section 4.4) were 
largely established by the MLG and central government in general. Figure 5.3 
shows how the MLG envisioned the LASDAP. 
Figure 5.3: Summarised LASDAP Process. 
 
Source: Republic of Kenya, 2005:4 
 
While the central government set out what the LASDAP entails operationally, 
it was the City of Nairobi that dominated the relations among the various 
actors involved in the LASDAP. Table 5.6 gives one dimension of these 
relations. My discussions with various actors show that with the exception of 
the consultation phase that had a token presence of citizens and civil society 
organisations, the City of Nairobi has dominated and virtually excluded the 
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citizens in the rest of the phases. The City was able to dominate the LASDAP 
through a combination of condign and compensatory power (Galbriath, 1983). 
Hence, as Putnam (1993) would argue, the above is an illustrative case of 
how institutions shape the behaviour of actors. Since the City retained all 
decision-making power, and the poor and other citizens relied upon invitations 
to participate, it is understandable that actors in the City were invariably 
inclined to exclude citizens whilst tinkering at the edges of the status quo. 
 
Table 5.6: Key Actors in the Main Phases of the LASDAP in Nairobi 
Main Phases Time Key Actors 
Preparation August LASDAP Desk Officer, 
City Treasurer, LASDAP 
Technical Committee, 
LASDAP Committee  
Consultation / Consensus September / October Citizens from wards, 
Councillors, LASDAP 
Desk Officer, LASDAP 
Technical Committee, 
CBOs, NGOs, Religious 
organisations 
Finalisation / Submission November LASDAP Desk Officer, 
City Treasurer, LASDAP 
Technical Committee, 
LASDAP Committee, Full 
Council, Town Clerk 
Implementation / Monitoring Continuous LASDAP Desk Officer, 
City Treasurer, LASDAP 
Technical Committee, 
LASDAP Committee, 
Councillors, Contractor, 
Procurement, Town 
Clerk, Tender Committee, 
Internal Audit 
Source: Field Studies (2005–2007). 
 
For instance, from the accounts I received during the field studies the 
LASDAP Technical Committee was essentially comprised of chief officers (or 
heads of department of the City of Nairobi). From the analysis of the key 
actors who were involved in the LASDAP at each stage as shown in Table 5.6 
above, it was unlikely that with a dominant City that crowded out citizens, the 
same supported participation and accountability. Even though the City 
seemed to dominate, it was indeed a few actors such as the Town Clerk, 
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heads of departments and powerful politicians who dominated these relations 
and the institutional framework at the city and sub-city level. 
Figure 5.4: Organisational Structure for Planning and Implementation of 
the LASDAP 
 
Source:  LASDAP Desk, 2007 
 
Figure 5.4 above shows the details of the organisational structure, which was 
supposed to guide the planning and implementation of the LASDAP. From the 
organisational structure presented in Figure 5.4, it is apparent that the City 
had a hierarchical top-down structure to plan and implement the LASDAP. 
But, again, it was not always clear whether the structure guided 
implementation and the City significantly complied with the same. But as the 
discussions show in Chapter Six  (section 6.4), defining roles and showing 
hierarchical relationships in an organisational structure are quite apart from 
the actors carrying out these roles in accordance with the structure. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the institutional framework for urban planning for poverty 
reduction in this chapter yields a mixed picture. The last 90 years of 
resistance against oppression by the government and struggle for change 
demonstrate the usefulness of power through mobilisation in changing 
unequal power relations and empowering previously powerless citizens. 
Regarding the ways in which the institutional framework affects citizen 
participation, it is clear that the stakeholder involvement is extensively applied 
as a tool for citizen participation. This stakeholder model has limitations; its in-
built exclusions have been discussed. Secondly, concerning the mechanisms 
for accountability it is fair to say that overall the frameworks are by design not 
aimed at delivering full accountability to citizens. 
 
The absence of sanction is the weakest element in the institutional framework. 
With the exception of the EMCA, answerability is also limited in these 
frameworks. While the institutional responses to poverty are diverse and 
growing, the analysis shows that these are generally notional. Finally, 
regarding the way power impacts participation and accountability in the 
institutional frameworks, the analysis shows the institutional framework for 
urban planning for poverty reduction is not supportive of citizen participation 
and does not enhance accountability. 
 
Having established that the institutional framework for poverty reduction is 
inimical to participation and accountability, I turn to specifically consider the 
experience of implementing the LASDAP in Viwandani ward in the City of 
Nairobi. This is the subject of the next three chapters. In the next chapter I 
start with how participation is operationalised. 
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CHAPTER SIX: MANIPULATION TO FACIPULATION: THE ILLUSION 
OF PARTICIPATION IN THE LASDAP 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter argues that by applying facipulation, the officials of the City of 
Nairobi were successful in presenting a persuading case for implementation of 
the LASDAP in a participatory way - in conformity with the stringent LASDAP 
guidelines. The officials argued that since they followed the LASDAP 
guidelines and involved citizens the correct priorities were identified. The 
institutions for implementing the LASDAP were too weak to support 
accountability and answerability and were largely dependent on the discretion 
of public officers. 
 
The Chapter first provides an overview of the study area – Viwandani ward, 
especially the two very poor sections of Viwandani, Mukuru Kayaba and 
Lunga Lunga. The Chapter then turns to the actors’ sentiments on 
participation in the implementation of the LASDAP in Viwandani. These 
sentiments are based on in-depth interviews and are also used to discuss the 
quality of participation in the different stages of the LASDAP discussed in the 
rest of the Chapter. This spans decisions and involvement in the preparation 
and consultation, design, agreement and finalising the LASDAP, and the 
implementation stages respectively. Section 6.6 then concludes. 
 
6.2 An Overview of Viwandani Ward 
 
Viwandani in the Kiswahili language literally means the area of huge industrial 
concerns, or commonly referred to as industrial area in the English language. 
This ward derived its name from the fact that it is home to much of Nairobi’s 
and Kenya’s industries. With at least 60 per cent of Nairobi’s population living 
in slums that account for about 9 per cent of all residential land (Clark and 
Deng, 2007:74) Viwandani ward in Makadara is one of Nairobi’s eight 
constituencies and a home to a significant proportion of Nairobi’s poor. 
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Viwandani is the poorest of the seven wards that form the Makadara 
constituency. The cradle of poverty in Makadara is arguably in the broader 
Mukuru slum settlements in Viwandani ward. This ward therefore hosts one of 
the highest concentrations of poor people in the City of Nairobi (City Council 
of Nairobi, undated). 
 
Viwandani is also home to some very rich citizens. Taking industries as a 
corporate body and large taxpayers, then in a very general sense, Viwandani 
earns the dubious distinction of being home to both the wealthy citizens 
(industry) and the poor who reside in informal settlements literally at the 
margins of these industrial concerns. Thus, Viwandani has one of the greatest 
income inequalities. 
 
Viwandani received some funding from LASDAP. From the LASDAP records 
and my fieldwork during 2005-2007 it emerged that the money was spent on 
various small projects. These included: construction of a foot bridge across 
the River Kongo, renovation of the Lunga Lunga dispensary, primary school 
bursaries and the maintenance of key community roads in Lunga Lunga and 
Mukuru Kayaba slum villages. 
6.2.1 Mukuru Kayaba 
 
Mukuru Kayaba is located along the Nairobi River. From the East it borders 
the Mater hospital and Mariakani Estate. As Map 6.1 shows, it is bounded in 
the south, by the up-market residential estates of Goldengate, River Bank, 
Plainsview and Hazina. These estates are home to Nairobi’s middle-income 
population group. To the north and east of Mukuru Kayaba is Nairobi’s 
industrial area. 
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Map 6.1 Map showing Mukuru Kayaba 
 
Source: Ministry of Lands, Nairobi, 2008. 
 
Although the majority of the population would be classified as poor, some 
residents work in the neighbouring industrial area and estates as security 
guards, domestic workers, teachers, taxi drivers and artisans in the building, 
black smith and motor repair industries. There is also a considerable section 
of the population involved in petty trading, selling wares ranging from produce 
such as sugar, salt, food, paraffin, foodstuffs, as well as second hand clothing. 
 
An estimated 40 per cent of the population is considered to be youths (15–35 
years) (Republic of Kenya, 2009; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2009; 
Republic of Kenya and UNDP, 2009). Most of the youth in Mukuru and Lunga 
Lunga are unemployed. There is also a considerable population of elderly, 
unemployed and orphaned and vulnerable children whose parents died as a 
result of HIV/AIDS (personal communication). 
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6.2.2 Lunga Lunga 
 
Lunga Lunga is located on the fringes of the River Kongo and at the back end 
of major industrial concerns. Lunga Lunga settlement is an informal settlement 
of approximately 0.5 square kilometres. According to the chief, Lunga Lunga 
in 2006 was home to an estimated 15,000 people (D. Muchiri, personal 
communication, December 29, 2006). Most of the adult population in this 
settlement were unemployed. Tugi and Weru (personal communication, 
December 23, 2006) are some of the research participants I interacted with 
and belonged to a leading youth group, the Lunga Lunga Self-Help Youth 
Group. When discussing life in Lunga Lunga with them, they lamented that: 
 
Only about 20 per cent of the total population earn an honest living 
through hard, gruesome and dehumanising work, working as unskilled 
labourers in the adjacent industrial centre of Nairobi city, house helps 
[domestic workers] in the middle class estates, odd jobs with the City 
Council such as sweeping, running errands in offices, selling 
vegetables, collecting garbage for a living and all forms of odd and 
indecent jobs […]. More than half of the community survives justly or 
unjustly on petty crime. That is, they have to steal, shop-lift, con or beg 
to survive, others are habitual criminals not by choice but by the virtue 
of the hard life they lead and the need to put something in their 
stomachs and on their families’ table. Crime is the order of the day. 
Security is an alien concept here and peace a misnomer. Hunger and 
disease form the fabric of the community. Precocious commercial sex 
and the resultant scourge of HIV/AIDS threaten to tear the community 
down. Drug and substance abuse are of an inexplicable magnitude. 
Life for all is grim (personal communication, December 23, 2006). 
 
The pain and angst expressed above was emblematic of the powerlessness 
and even hopelessness of the youth. As Map 6.2 shows, Lunga Lunga, 
Mukuru Kayaba, is a congested and complex settlement. The factories are 
neatly laid out in generous pieces of land while the poor are crammed into tiny 
spaces. 
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Map 6.2 Map showing Lunga Lunga 
 
Source: Ministry of Lands, 2008. 
 
Before 2002, settlements such as Lunga Lunga and Mukuru Kayaba were not 
recognised by the City’s Planning department. Unsurprisingly, the residents of 
these settlements provided crucial services to City of Nairobi’s economy and 
non-poor residents and others worked for the City of Nairobi. Like the other 
informal settlements in Nairobi, because these settlements were not 
recognised, they implicitly were not considered a part of the legal and formal 
city. Hence these settlements were neither planned nor received any of the 
city’s services. 
 
Although ignored by the City’s planning department, these settlements were 
and are still important sites for political contest. Councillors and Members of 
Parliament cannot afford to ignore the residents of Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga 
Lunga. Therefore, from a political perspective, the residents of Lunga Lunga 
and Mukuru Kayaba are not necessarily powerless. But after elections, the 
politicians, City of Nairobi officials, planners and other professionals, and 
private business are clearly more powerful. They are able to contain the poor 
in squalid run of the mill, squeezed-in spaces while living in relatively well-
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planned and well-serviced neighbourhoods such as plainsview and 
Goldengate (see Map 6.1 above).  
 
6.3 The Preparations and Consultations in the LASDAP 
 
The LASDAP Guidelines were issued through a Ministerial Circular from the 
Ministry of Local Government in 2001 to accompany the Local Authorities 
Transfer Fund (LATF) Act of 1999. According to the LASDAP guidelines, in 
order for local authorities to receive the conditional performance-based 
component of their LATF allocation they must prepare a Local Authority 
Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP). The LASDAP must be prepared 
through a participatory process that involves community organisations in 
identifying needs and service delivery priorities for the locality.16 
 
The consultation process under LASDAP yields a very limited degree of 
citizen participation. In generating the LASDAP a council only needs to show 
that it has consulted with community groups. Councils are urged to identify 
ways of reaching the poor who may not be represented by community groups, 
but consultation, when it happens at all, invariably stops with groups. Again, 
the stakeholder model is what is at work here. An obvious problem with this 
approach is that it will not reach those who are not in organised and visible 
groups. The poor are often pointed out as an excluded category, but the 
model also excludes many in the salaried or professional classes whose time 
and energy for involvement in associational life are restricted. Since the 
consultative process invests no effort in finding a way to target them their 
input is totally absent. 
 
In contrast with the participatory budgeting process in the city of Porto Allegre, 
Brazil, which has more citizen involvement in decision-making for the 
LASDAP, the Council has the final say in decision-making. In Brazil, the 
participatory budgeting process was initially only organised around 
                                            
16
 The Ministry of Local Government Circular MLG No. 11/2001, Nairobi 19 July 2001 
provides a good account of the details. 
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neighbourhood associations or groups. It was subsequently realised that there 
was a significant segment of the population whose input was absent because 
they could not (or did not want to) participate in the rodandas (deliberation 
rounds), which were neighbourhood and association-based. The municipal 
government then decided to have thematic rodandas, whereby the teachers’ 
union, for instance, would play a crucial role in shaping the city’s education 
budget (Navarro 2004). These tematicas have been integrated into the 
process and each theme group gets to elect two representatives to the 
participatory budgeting Council that has the final word on the city’s budget. 
 
Citizen participation in the LASDAP process is limited once citizens have been 
consulted on the priority projects they would like to see implemented in their 
ward, they have no way of ensuring that the priorities that they have 
articulated are actually the ones that end up in the LASDAP document. The 
only role citizens seem to have in the LASDAP is the identification of priorities. 
Once the process of procurement and project implementation begins, citizens 
do not play any role at all in monitoring to ensure that there is no corruption. 
The LASDAP merely provides room for citizen input, without establishing a 
process or system by which this input is reflected in the output. Nonetheless, 
the LASDAP stands out as an unlikely site of citizen participation in local 
government that has not been facilitative of citizen involvement. 
 
The LASDAP guidelines require that at the start of the LASDAP meeting with 
residents the Council must report on the income and expenditure statement 
for the previous year and also present the council’s resource envelope for the 
current year. This is not discretionary; the council is obligated to give this 
account to residents, and so on paper there is answerability. But a critical 
weakness, as pointed out above, is that there is no requirement on the 
Council to justify its eventual choice of projects to residents at the ward level. 
As a result, if a ward’s priority projects get dropped or changed there is no 
mechanism for feeding back this information to the residents. 
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There have been reports of stand-offs at LASDAP meetings, with ward 
residents insisting on an explanation from council officials as to why their 
proposed projects for the previous financial year were not taken up by the 
council, and council officials insisting that the residents should just proceed 
with identifying priorities for the current year or there would be no projects 
budgeted for the ward in the current year. There have also been reports of 
councils that have, for successive years, routinely re-allocated project funding 
to the payment of salaries to avert workers’ strikes over delayed salaries. No 
explanation is given to ward residents for the lack of project funds, and the 
officials do not see themselves as under any obligation to give such 
explanation, as long as the Ministry of Local Government approves the 
reallocation (Lubaale, Ngari and Agevi, 2007). On the whole, answerability is 
weak under LASDAP. 
 
In addition, there are sanctions for a council’s failure to submit or late 
submission of the documents required under the LATF Regulations, which 
includes the council’s statement of accounts and the LASDAP document. This 
sanction is a forfeiture of a proportion (depending on the length of delay), or 
the entire performance-based component of the council’s LATF allocation, 
which amounts to 40 per cent of the allocation. This has two implications: The 
first is that it only penalises non-submission or late submission; it does not 
relate to assessing the quality of the LASDAP process. A council could skip 
the consultation altogether and submit documents nonetheless, but there is no 
mechanism for verifying this. There is no scrutiny as to the actual existence, 
let alone authenticity and representativeness, of the groups that the council 
claims to have consulted. 
 
The sanctions are superfluous since the local government officials responsible 
for the non-submission or late submission cannot be apprehended. The 
sanctions instead harm the citizens. When a council forfeits 40 per cent of its 
LATF allocation it invariably means that it cannot undertake any development 
projects for that year, but the council will still access LATF to cover its running 
costs, including the officials’ salaries and allowances. It is the citizens who will 
have to do without investment in improvement of services and their 
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participation in the exercise of identifying project priorities will have counted 
for nothing. Sanctions under LASDAP are therefore not appropriately targeted 
and do little to deliver accountability to citizens. Since these guidelines can 
only promote notional participation and are too weak to ensure accountability, 
urban planning for poverty reduction in these conditions is impossible. 
 
The circular from the Permanent Secretary (MLG No.11/2001) of July 19 2001 
spelt out the processes and procedures to be followed to prepare the 
LASDAP. To facilitate citizen participation during the preparation and 
facilitation stage, the City Council of Nairobi, was expected to implement 
several things according to the following “participatory forms”: 
 
Form 8-A List of organisations/groups operating within NCC’s [Nairobi 
City Council] jurisdiction. These are arranged according to the 
constituency within which they fall 
Form 8-B Notice sheet publicising LASDAP preparation, indicating how 
proposals could be made and indicating where the notice was 
displayed. 
Form 8-C Copy of sample letter inviting the organisations listed in 8-A 
to a consultative meeting 
Form 8-D Record of consultative meeting and attendance sheet 
(Nairobi City Council, 2002:2). 
 
According to these guidelines, preparation and consultation was to start in 
August and should be completed by November in 2002, and for each year 
subsequently. The records I reviewed showed that forty organisations were 
identified as active in Makadara constituency. These included both formal and 
informal organisations (see appendix for the complete list). Of the forty 
organisations, twelve were based in the study area, Mukuru Kayaba and 
Lunga Lunga, in Viwandani ward. 
 
Although the objective to include the citizens in planning, particularly the poor, 
was noble, the fact that only forty organisations were identified highlighted the 
difficulty of relying on an oppressive system to voluntarily identify 
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organisations. The choice of organisations that were to participate in the 
LASDAP suggests that the City officials were either oblivious of the complexity 
of Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga and the organisations of the poor, or 
they relied on an established system of patronage to selectively include only 
some organisations. The latter seems a plausible explanation given the 
historical development of institutions in Kenya. Participation and participatory 
development literature shows (for instance Chambers, 2005:85-117) it is not 
easy for people with power such as government and City officials, 
professionals, private business, and others to effortlessly transfer their power 
and benefits to previously powerless people such as the poor in Viwandani’s 
Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga. 
 
Furthermore, there were also questions of agency that arose in the 
arrangement adopted to facilitate participation in the LASDAP. Although 
participation appeared in different forms, the essential question with respect to 
agency was: To what extent do organisations that appear to have been 
arbitrarily identified represent the interests of the poor and other excluded 
citizens in a process such as the LASDAP? These concerns as the literature 
shows are not new or limited to the LASDAP, but are typical of participation 
(for example Chambers, 2005; Brock, Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001; Crook 
and Sverrisson, 2001). Arnstein (1969) identified these concerns related to 
agency when she discussed the difficulty of participation in the first ranks of 
the ladder of participation – manipulation and therapy that the LASDAP 
process neatly corresponded to during the period of study. 
 
Like Arnstein (1969), the methods employed to identify organisations and also 
to ensure participation of the poor and others confirms a pattern of non-
participation. Furthermore, because of poorly kept records at the City it was 
not possible to confirm whether or not the organisations identified at the 
beginning were the same that participated throughout the study period; and 
whether it was also the same persons who participated in the consultations. 
But even before I consider the actual participation in the meetings, I shall state 
candidly how individuals from the organisations that were identified were 
informed of the meetings and consultations. 
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Although the guidelines set out the requirements for identifying who 
participates, the actual process of implementing these guidelines was 
different. The planners, professionals, politicians, and the Town Clerk 
eventually determined who was important and also who was not important to 
participate. The other critical aspects the City and its professionals and 
politicians decided on included where the participation was to be done, for 
how long, and even where the invitation to participate was done. Discussions 
with the Director of Planning confirmed that because it was a new initiative, 
there was scepticism by some, optimism by others, and outright rejection. The 
reservations notwithstanding, citizens were invited in accordance with the 
guidelines. 
 
 Figure 6.1: Form 8-B, 2002. 
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The public was invited to participate using Form 8-B. The Director of Planning 
told me notices were prepared and posted in selected spaces in Makadara 
constituency (personal communication, 15 January 2007). Figure 6.1 above, 
as an example, shows the notice prepared in 2002 to get views from the 
public. The need to participate offered a new pathway to reach the 
‘grassroots’ as the communities of the poor were known in the City. 
Figure 6.2: Certificate to confirm notification of public in Makadara, 2002 
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The notices produced in Form 8-B were prepared in English and Kiswahili. In 
Viwandani, the notices were placed along the Enterprise road, particularly at 
the junction of the footpath leading to the industrial area. The City officials 
ascertained that this was done by way of certificates as shown above. 
 
From the interviews I conducted with both City officials and residents of Lunga 
Lunga and Mukuru Kayaba, it was apparent that no notices were posted in 
these settlements in 2002 or any other year. While the City officials were 
convinced that these notices were posted in strategic places, convenience for 
the City officials seemed to be the major motivation and not because these 
were strategic places. For a City that had, over the past five decades, grown 
accustomed to serving mainly the powerful it is not surprising that the most 
important consideration on where notices were to be posted notices was more 
their (the City) convenience than the convenience of citizens who needed to 
know about the LASDAP. 
 
For Lunga Lunga and Mukuru Kayaba residences to rely on one strategic 
place obviously undermined the intention of inviting the public. Besides, the A-
4 and sometimes A-3 black-and-white formats used to publicise these notices 
were invariably too bland to attract the attention of often very busy and mobile 
people who move in and out of these settlements in search of a daily 
livelihood. Although it was not possible to confirm if the format for the notices 
was intentional or simply in adherence to requirements from the MLG for 
preparing the Form 8-B, the overall effect was that virtually most of the 
residents were not aware of these notices. For instance, Mary Gina of the 
Wamusyee Women’s group when asked if she was aware of the LASDAP, 
like all the other women, responded “…hapana [Never]!” (M. Gina, personal 
communication, December 28, 2006). The youth were similarly unaware of the 
LASDAP; “…hapana kusikia [never heard of it!]…” (J. Guna, personal 
communication, December 29, 2006). 
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Reviewing the LASDAPs submitted to the Ministry of Local Government 
showed that the City of Nairobi, prepared a LASDAP each financial year from 
2002 to 2005, including Viwandani. Surprisingly, however, very few people, 
including groups listed in these LASDAPs, were aware of the LASDAP. In 
Makadara Constituency, consultations were always held at the Jericho Social 
Hall. The consultations included representatives from the seven wards; 
namely: Viwandani, Harambee, Hamza, Kaloleni/Makongeni, Ofafa/Maringo, 
Nairobi South and Mbotela. According to the Ward Manager of Nairobi South, 
from his ward not more than ten people attended these consultations each 
year (S. Ngori, personal communication, January 24, 2007). The consultation 
meetings were woefully truncated because discussions were held for an 
average of four hours (C. Gut, personal communication, January 15, 2007; S. 
Ngori, personal communication, January 24, 2007). 
 
The four-hour consultations that were held show that they make a mockery of 
participation. For instance, with at least ten representatives attending for each 
of the seven wards in attendance and another ten officials from the City 
makes for at least eighty persons. If forty-five minutes were removed from the 
four hours for the meeting, then eighty people would realistically have 195 
minutes to participate. If the 195 minutes were used equally for each 
participant, they would have two and a half minutes. Although hypothetical, 
from the outset there was enough time for participation but not the least 
consultation that the LASDAP guidelines set out to achieve at this stage. 
 
The above practice, confirms an important consideration Moser and 
McIIwaine (1999:208) have with respect to the perception that safety 
researchers have in participatory urban appraisals; “…It should not be 
assumed that researchers feel comfortable in low-income communities with 
high levels of violence. Depending on their experiences, fear may be an issue 
amongst researchers.” It would not be far-fetched to argue that City officials, 
because of fear, combined the consultation meetings to be held at a safe 
venue with the shortest time possible. 
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While the public was informed through notices, the participants in these 
consultations were invited via letters to their organisations. Because the 
organisations in Viwandani did not have copies of the correspondence inviting 
participants to the consultations, it was not possible to confirm if the said 
participants were indeed invited. The method adopted by the City to elicit 
participation in the consultations was problematic. For a ward with a 
population of close to 100 thousand (Government of Kenya, 2010) to rely on a 
single notice and invitation to organisations meant that attendance was not 
always assured. The defiant practice by the City demonstrates Galbriath’s 
(1983) conditioned power. This level of awareness was consistent with 
findings of a later study on the LASDAP in Korogocho, where only 1 per cent 
of the respondents said they were made aware of the LASDAP through public 
notices (Cifuentes et al., 2007). 
 
Compared with equally difficult participatory processes such as the 
participatory budgeting in Brazil (for example Coelho, 2004; Acharya, Lavalle 
and Houtzager, 2004), the participation referred to during the consultation 
phase in Viwandani was simply a sophisticated form of manipulation of 
citizens. However, the use of conditioned power in this case shows how 
power affects participation. While the City may argue that because they 
compiled with LASDAP guidelines they indeed carried out a participatory 
process, adherence to these guidelines on the LASDAP merely serves to 
build a façade of participation. 
 
From the accounts of officials of the City of Nairobi and the Councillors, 
representatives from the wards always determined the priorities for each 
ward. Priorities and projects for the LASDAP were identified through 
consensus. These projects and priorities, “…the prioritisation was arrived at 
by voting” (J. Ganjo, personal communication, January 25, 2007; C. Gut, 
personal communication, January 15, 2007; S. Ngori, personal 
communication, January 24, 2007). At the consultation meetings, a facilitator 
drawn from the LASDAP Technical Committee (LTC) collated the needs and 
projects identified. The reports from the consultations meetings were then 
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submitted to the city-wide consensus meeting for consideration a few days 
after the consultations. After the consultation meetings; 
 
Then a technical committee meets here [at City Hall] and comes up 
with a budget, compile all the projects and activities, which we then 
take to the consensus meeting. Two representatives attend the 
consensus meetings from each ward and the Councillors (J. Ganjo, 
personal communication, January 25, 2007). 
 
The consensus meetings, like the consultations meetings, normally covered 
four hours and the facilitator of these meetings was drawn from the LASDAP 
Technical Committee. These meetings also had an average of a hundred 
participants. In these circumstances, the only way real consensus could have 
been arrived at was through what Lukes (1974; 2005) in his radical view of 
power avers: through a conspiracy of the powerful where the truth is hidden 
from the powerless. 
 
The purpose of the consensus meetings was often to confirm decisions, 
priorities and projects identified by the consultation meetings. At the 
consensus meetings, the budgets prepared by the LTC were also ratified 
before any submissions to the Full Council were made. Nonetheless, 
accounts from people who attended these meetings noted that these were 
often acrimonious as councillors often sought to overturn decisions made by 
the consultation meetings (for instance E. Geva, personal communication, 
December 20, 2006). After the consensus meetings, the LASDAP Desk 
Officer together with the LTC then prepared a preliminary report to the 
LASDAP Committee of the City of Nairobi. The LASDAP Committee would 
then work with the LTC and LASDAP Desk Officer to prepare a report for 
approval at the full council meeting. At the full council, the report from the 
LASDAP committee would normally be approved, although with some minor 
changes and in other cases with major alterations before the LASDAP Desk 
Officer and Town Clerk would authorise to prepare the LASDAP. 
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Even though it was meant to be a participatory and inclusive process, from the 
accounts given it was obvious that the consultation/consensus phase of the 
LASDAP was largely a technocratic affair where a few technocrats with the 
support of powerful politicians prevailed. Officials of the City of Nairobi tightly 
controlled the process by determining who attended, what was prioritised and 
what was approved in the full council meeting. Because throughout this 
process the powerful actors invariably co-opted other willing actors in their 
schemes, it is reasonable to conclude that the LASDAP was operationally 
aimed at promoting rational choice participation – a rational activity with actors 
seeking maximum benefits at the least cost. 
 
Although some would argue that such a process was necessary to achieve 
participation within such tight delimitations as outlined in the Ministry of Local 
Government guidelines for preparing the LASDAP, this only undermined the 
expected participation and ensured that any participation was notional. The 
experience of participation during the preparation and consultations of the 
LASDAP in Viwandani support Chambers’s (2005) thoughts on power and 
participation: 
 
Participation is about power relations. It is about much else, as well; but 
power relations are pervasive: they are always there, and they affect 
the quality of process and experience (Chambers, 2005:113) 
 
6.4 Design, Agreement and Finalising the LASDAP 
 
From the above, it is abundantly clear that any pretence of citizen participation 
terminated at the consultation stage. The City of Nairobi officials and 
politicians then took over the process often in total disregard of any decisions 
that involved citizens. A former Director of City Planning noted: 
 
Like during those forums people were talking about priority areas and 
everybody worked on something from their own local levels from their 
estates, neighbourhoods and got them to the forum and priorities were 
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worked [out] on the basis of what presentations people made. So it was 
a bit tricky, although of course councillors sometimes tried to force 
things they think would give them political mileage. So the challenges 
were quite often between politicians and the residents. For us as 
officials the most difficult thing would be instances where having done 
transparent priority ranking in public instances, where councillors try 
and overturn the publicly done priority rankings. That’s what I would 
say constitute as the biggest challenge we faced because the law 
would forbid anyone of us changing the rankings as long as they are 
done publicly (P.S. Oluwa, personal communication, December 18, 
2006). 
 
A consultant who facilitated most of the initial consultations and who was also 
very closely associated with the implementation of the LASDAP in the city was 
more emphatic. He believed that citizen participation was dead in the water 
much earlier. He poignantly related a specific account that was typical of the 
consultations and the threats they faced in this way: 
 
And my personal regret in these processes and which made me almost 
to disengage was during one of those validation workshops and after 
three members of communities had been selected from each ward and 
told to come. At the end of the day, and I will never forget this 
statement. A councillor stood and confronted his own members who 
were articulating the three items that they preferred to see happen and 
the reasons for that; he came and told them “who do you think you are? 
These things are going to come to the full council. At that point I will 
have my way.” I felt as a professional seriously compromised that I was 
actually getting involved in a process that was not what I thought it was. 
That all these other processes that you are doing but the final decision 
lies in the council. And this is the reality that I began to see (E. Geva, 
personal communication, December 20, 2006). 
 
Although Wagle (2004:7) argues that it is not possible to attain full citizen 
participation on every policy problem with every actor, Oluwa (personal 
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communication) and Geva’s (personal communication) views above confirm 
that the processes of securing agreement in the LASDAP were not at all 
democratic. The small numbers of politicians and technocrats realise such 
undemocratic decisions through condign power. They prevail and win 
submission of the marginalised majority in the meetings because they have 
more resources and instruments and an institution that favours the powerful 
and excludes the poor. Thus confirming Putnam (1993) and Lane’s (2005) 
views of institutions shaping the behaviour of the actors.  
 
While there was clearly limited scope for citizen participation both in the first 
and second phase of the LASDAP, the powerful officials and politicians gave 
undermined participation in the full council meetings. Even in the full council, 
the division between the rich and powerful officials and politicians on one 
hand, and their powerless counterparts was much more pronounced. The City 
officials were more careful and tended to allude to interference by councillors 
(N. Linge, personal communication, December 15, 2006; C. Gut, personal 
communication, January 15, 2007; J. Ganjo, personal communication, 
January 25, 2007). The politicians, however, saw and understood the 
decision-making and absence of participation in the design and finalisation of 
the LASDAP as, “…simply as politics at play…” (K. Maina, personal 
communication, February 6, 2007; J. Mwai, personal communication, January 
22, 2007). Another councillor, during decision-making in full council, said: 
 
We are careful. The meetings have to be smooth because as a 
councillor representing poor people in the slums I can even lose out 
completely. While I’d have loved to get, e.g., 20 million [Kenya 
Shillings] for the needs in my ward, the councillors from the rich 
suburbs such as Karen must get more money. We have learnt that if 
these councillors [from richer wards] decide that the poor wards get 
only 1 or 5 million that is fine. If you are troublesome, you will never get 
anything. Moreover, we are threatened that the money can always be 
returned to the Ministry of Local Government. If you are a fool, you’ll 
say, “Yes let the money be returned.” So to get something for your 
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residents and voters, you take whatever you are given (O. Retep, 
personal communication, January 6, 2007). 
 
Upon approval by the full council, the LASDAP Desk Officer and Town Clerk 
would compile the LASDAP and other supporting documents for submission 
to the KLGRP/MLG in November of each year. These submissions were 
normally filed in the third week of November (P. Mau, personal 
communication, January 9, 2007; J. Ganjo, personal communication, January 
25, 2007). The guidelines (Republic of Kenya, 2005: 22). In addition to the 
above-mentioned processes, stipulated additional documents that were to be 
filed together with the LASDAP are as follows: forwarding letter signed by the 
Clerk; description of the process; an explanation of any deviation from the 
guidelines; a copy of the status report used in the consultations and 
consensus meetings; extract of full council minutes approving the LASDAP; 
and other relevant forms. These guidelines also outlined penalties for late 
submission of LASDAP to the KLGRP/MLG as follows. 
 
Table 6.1: Sanctions for Late Submissions of the LASDAP 
 
Date of Submission Penalty  
On due date None 
Up to 30 days after due date Local Authority receives 85 pe rcent of 
LATF/LASDAP allocation 
Between 30 and 60 days after due 
date 
Local Authority receives 60 per cent of 
LATF/LASDAP allocation 
More than 60 days after due date Local Authority is denied 
LATF/LASDAP allocation 
Source: Republic of Kenya, 2005: 22. 
 
Notwithstanding the above requirements, the City of Nairobi was also required 
to submit copies of the material submitted to the KLGRP/MLG to: the 
Permanent Secretary (PS), MLG; Coordinator of the KLGRP; PS, Ministry of 
Finance; Provincial Local Government Officer, Nairobi; the Provincial 
Commissioner, Nairobi Province; the Secretary General, Association of Local 
Government Authorities of Kenya (ALGAK); Members of Parliament; the Chief 
Executive of the National Council of NGOs; and any other person the PS of 
MLG directs. The LASDAP Desk Officer noted that after successfully 
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submitting the LASDAP to the KLGRP, the first disbursement of funds from 
the LATF was received only a year later, in October of the following year (J. 
Ganjo, personal communication, January 25, 2007). The above process of 
sending copies to various actors in local and central government was of 
superficial value to participation or even accountability. My finding was that 
the most important actors, the poor, were systematically excluded and their 
views disregarded throughout the preparation of the LASDAP.  
 
The stringent requirements for preparing the LASDAP notwithstanding, c265 
of the Laws of Kenya that governs the operation of the City of Nairobi often 
conflicted with the LATF Act (1999) and the LASDAP Guidelines. Cap 265 
empowered the City of Nairobi to enact subsidiary legislation or by-laws. An 
example that was often cited by the MLG was that whilst the LASDAP 
Guidelines required the plans to be approved by the full council of the City, 
virtually all plans prepared and submitted by the City of Nairobi to the Ministry 
of Local Government, though approved, did not always reflect what had been 
agreed in consultations prior to the Full Council approvals (C. Gut, personal 
communication, January 15, 2007). Indeed the Full Council approvals were 
not a confirmation that the views of the poor were secured in the plans or that 
the process of arriving at the final plan was participatory, but instead that there 
were Full Council meetings held. 
 
Further, as mentioned by the Deputy City Engineer (ibid.) there were also 
cases, where LATF/LASDAP allocations to the City of Nairobi had been 
diverted to fund other purposes than the LASDAP for which they were 
released. The LASDAP Desk Officer confirmed such instances existed.  
 
I cannot say that it has contributed a lot because from my own personal 
experience like now this Council owes the LASDAP Desk about 500 
million shillings but even if that money was to be brought toady in one 
disbursement, you find that there are other problems that are there 
including what I have told you that this Council has a shortage of 
technical staff it has not been able to attract good people. It has 
become like a training ground. People come here and then they leave 
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because of the poor remuneration and delay in their salary and of 
course other things but the situation now is improving but those are 
internal problems that we are addressing and they are infact [in] 
progress [of] being addressed. If you look at the projects we 
implemented in the last financial year now you would find that even the 
numbers of project being implemented are continuously rising. Why 
has this one happened? We have been able now to facilitate our 
officers more properly (J. Ganjo, personal communication, January 25, 
2007). 
 
Although not directly referred to during the field studies, since diversion of 
LASDAP funds from the Ministry of Local Government was possible, even 
diversion of funds for projects in the wards also seemed entirely possible. For 
instance, whilst the two-year delays in completing the foot bridge in Viwandani 
was blamed on disbursement and other logistical requirements imposed on 
the process because of the need to satisfy compliance to the LASDAP 
guidelines, it was also plausible that such delays were occasioned by mere 
diversion of funds. The difficulty to confirm the veracity of claims by officials of 
the City of Nairobi, and the overt disdain by these officials to nurture citizen 
participation in the LASDAP processes provided justifiable grounds to 
conclude like Flyvbjerg (1998) argued in the ciy of Aolberg, that the City, an 
institution which represents public interest, was embedded in covert power 
relations that brutally protect and promote the self interest of a few powerful 
individuals. 
 
Like the Norwegian parliamentarians’ behaviour on the transport committees 
in Norway (Sager and Ravlum, 2005), the Nairobi experience with the 
LASDAP discussed above lends credence to the usefulness of institutionalism 
in discerning certain behaviour - the institutional context affects the action of 
actors. Confronted with questions such as: why do politicians not always take 
into consideration expert inputs in their decisions? Why do elected politicians 
demand more analytic planning models only to ignore them? And why do 
planners and other City officials produce policy-making inputs but politicians 
do not find these useful? The evidence from the LASDAP in Nairobi shows 
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that institutions, like in Sager and Ravlum’s (2005), provide a useful and 
convincing way to understanding why politicians may not implement planning 
proposals for poverty reduction. 
 
6.5 Reducing Poverty through the LASDAP: Implementation, 
 Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
The Deputy City Engineer, one of the key officials who was involved in the 
LASDAP from its inception, described the implementation phase as follows: 
 
As council we are not able to give the evidence and quality for the 
money for the LASDAP projects we implement within the contract 
period and also being transparent and also accountable…. And we 
found out that one of our key problems was the disbursement of the 
funds; you find that LATF disbursement comes to the council in three 
instalments; the first one comes around September then the next one 
comes in around January or February and the final will be disbanded 
from the council from I think around the end of April or early May. So 
you find you may have started a project and we are not able to actually 
pay the contractor on time because the Council does not have that 
money in the account. The other issue you find is that maybe the funds 
were there but they were used in other projects. Now when this comes 
out during the consultative meeting the residents don’t know that you 
do not have the power as a professional to actually assign money or 
funds to the project that was agreed during the consultations.  You are 
only able to consider projects for which you are allocated funds [by the 
City Treasurer and Town Clerk]. So you find the challenge is that yes 
they have identified a project in each ward but it is not implemented (C. 
Gut, personal communication, January 15, 2007). 
 
In a discussion on how the LASDAP had been implemented in the Viwandani 
ward during a focus group discussion, one of the participants’ (a community 
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member) views that was unanimously supported by the others in the group 
was as follows: 
 
I thought I understood a lot of things in this settlement, but it is clear 
only a select few participated in the LASDAP meetings. These 
meetings were held in secret yet they were supposed to discuss 
matters affecting everyone. These meetings should have involved all 
stakeholders who would have definitely identified the key priorities 
ensuring that everyone is held accountable but this never happened (T. 
Kiozi, personal communication, December 31, 2006). 
 
The willingness to discuss belied the apparent helplessness and resignation 
of a lot of residents to exclude the LASDAP. In an attempt to justify some of 
these actions, the LASDAP Desk Officer shared an experience from the wider 
Makadara Constituency as follows. 
 
I have always recommended that we bring to a stop the public forum 
and then we have a lot of consultation with stakeholders; why am I 
saying this? This is because sometimes the consultation meetings 
have also been abused. Remember that there are also development 
projects and it is the councillors who want to be associated with a 
certain development project. If it is an MP and he wasn’t to be 
associated with a certain development project at such times you find 
that there is a lot of lobbying so that councillors will come with [their] 
group, the opponent will also come with their groups and sometimes 
there is no harmony. I have to give an example. I don’t know whether 
you have come to the Jericho Social Hall meeting? You should have 
come to the meeting at the Jericho Social Hall because it was one of 
the meetings that was very chaotic, the most chaotic meeting and we 
have had problems with that area in Makadara Constituency, 
sometimes you find that this meetings are attended by idlers, people 
who are drunk. I will give you an example and maybe you can borrow 
some of the video tape that we took because we video-taped some of 
these proceedings I give you an example Makadara Constituency 
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Jericho Social Hall (J. Ganjo, personal communication, January 25, 
2007). 
 
Despite the challenges of implementation and the requirement to address the 
needs of the poor, the emphasis in the LASDAP was on provision of basic 
services. In Viwandani, these services include the footbridge, providing 
murram17 for the main access road in the Lunga Lunga settlement and in the 
odd cases, school fees subsidy - a bursary for children at some primary 
schools. Emphasising the identification of the communities’ priorities, whilst 
much desired and seemingly innocuous, further disadvantaged the needy, 
especially the most needy of the poorest of the poor in the Viwandani. For 
instance, despite the enormity of the needs in the community, only a 
footbridge was constructed over a period of two years. 
 
Whilst it was justifiably argued by the community that they needed the bridge 
as evident in the improved safety for children who use it to go to school at the 
Catholic mission across the river (N.N. Athoni, personal communication, 
December 23, 2006; M. Ngari, personal communication, December 23, 2006; 
L. Hera, personal communication, December 22, 2006; S. Njira, personal 
communication, December 28, 2006), it could similarly be argued that by 
concentrating on this bridge, the LASDAP further marginalised the neediest 
since their needs were not really provided for over the period of this study. But 
how did the LASDAP succeed in doing so little for the poor whilst at the same 
time claiming it was addressing poverty? I address this next. 
 
I identify the strategies that sustained the detraction from the poverty 
reduction agenda in the LASDAP in Viwandani ward, and by extension in the 
City of Nairobi. Trying to show that provision of basic community infrastructure 
was the same as poverty reduction was the first strategy. The second strategy 
was achieved through configuring the LASDAP as a participatory process 
through which citizens identify their priorities, thus implementing the LASDAP 
and addressing poverty. The final strategy was the attempt to show that the 
                                            
17
 In common usage means earth material used in building roads. 
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City of Nairobi is helping the poor despite her financial constrains. These 
discursive strategies have constituted a ‘poverty reduction’ as the population 
of Viwandani accepted puny provision of basic services. 
 
6.5.1 Conflating Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction 
 
For the City of Nairobi Provincial Administration, the Central government and 
other professionals, the poor were generally perceived as those who earn low 
incomes, live in informal settlements, and have limited access to basic 
services. Yet, in claiming to address poverty, there was a seemingly 
unanimous view among these local and central government officials and even 
politicians that through the LASDAP and in providing services, poverty was 
finally being addressed. For instance, one of the Ward Managers in Makadara 
Constituency claimed: 
 
What I understand with City Council ama katika zile njia [or from the 
ways] City Council nimepata wakijaribu kusaidia watu kama hawa [I 
have found the Council trying to address the poor] through tuseme 
hospitali [for example health services], clinic like here in Nairobi south, I 
have one clinic which is based next to Plains view Estate, so huko 
wamapata [so on that side they have received] free clinic pande ya 
mama na watoto so hiyo ni moja ambayo naona [with respect to 
women and children, it is not a case of one or so that the] City Council 
inawasaidia sana hata wao wenyewe [is helping them a lot – the 
women and children] whenever maybe unapatia [the Council is to 
provide] services pande ya [like the] clinic zile [where] side pande ya 
[like the] environment unapata wao wenyewe wanasema in-fact 
wanafaidika pande hiyo [the citizens will tell you that they indeed 
benefit a lot from these services] (S. Ngori, personal communication, 
January 24, 2007). 
 
There was a unanimous view among the key City of Nairobi officials that by 
providing services, one was addressing poverty. But there was also disquiet 
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whenever I sought to know if the City of Nairobi was addressing poverty. On 
this subject, some were ambivalent, and others preferred not to plainly share 
their views. For most city and central government officials the City was not 
responding to poverty (for example C. Gut, personal communication, January 
15, 2007; K. Roge, personal communication, January 3, 2007; T. Norot, 
personal communication, January 11, 2007; P. Aviti, personal communication, 
December 20, 2006). 
 
In Lunga Lunga and Mukuru Kayaba, even though the residents appreciated 
the need for provision of basic services, they also expressed considerable 
clarity on the distinction between service delivery and poverty reduction. For 
the residents, providing services was mandatory to address the shida18 but 
poverty reduction meant above all else treating the poor in these settlements 
as human beings. 
 
At a conceptual level, poverty can be described as lack of basic services: the 
provision of such services is not the same as poverty reduction and does not 
necessarily result in poverty reduction. Thus, even if the services provision in 
Viwandani was improved beyond the current pitiful levels of one footbridge 
every five years to radically higher levels where virtually all infrastructure in 
the settlements was provided, it was improbable that poverty would be 
reduced. In Chapter Two (section 2.3) it was evident that if poverty were to be 
reduced, it required moving beyond the current conceptions of poverty and 
poverty reduction. The services delivery idea espoused by the proponents of 
the LASDAP in the City of Nairobi was not an exception. 
 
Finally, there was no credible information on poverty. Lack of clarity in the 
conception of poverty reduction in the LASDAP for the City of Nairobi, at the 
time of the study and absence of credible information on the scale of the 
demand for services in Lunga Lunga and Mukuru Kayaba shows the paucity 
of information acquired and interest in poverty reduction. For instance, the 
Nairobi Water Company (NWC) in the City had, at the time of this study, only 
                                            
18
 Literally meaning intractable problems, but in the context of the interviews meant denial of 
services and living in squalor. 
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completed its strategic plan; but in the plan, the NWC only catered for water 
and sewerage services for the formal settlements. The effectiveness of the 
NWC, particularly from civil society, indicated that the company had not 
properly accounted for the needs of population in the informal settlements like 
Lunga Lunga and Mukuru Kayaba in Viwandani ward (P. Iuki, personal 
communication, January 14, 2007; J. Jomo, personal communication, January 
3, 2007). 
 
There were still other officials who argued, “… as long as the Council is 
putting in infrastructure it is responding to poverty” (K. Roge, personal 
communication, January 3, 2007). Yet, during the field studies I found that 
water suppy along the reticulation lines near these settlements where the 
population drew water had been terminated because of disputes over 
proposed water tariffs. Even if we were to accept that provision of services 
addresses poverty, in the absence of a credible plan for the provision of these 
services and evidence on how this addresses poverty, such views are 
misleading as they conflate service delivery with poverty reduction. 
 
6.5.2 Constituting the Well-Served Citizen 
 
The basic argument made by government was simply that since the 
allocations for the LASDAP and other devolved funds had increased, Local 
Authorities had been able to provide more services than before, thus the 
citizens were well-served. Whilst persuasive, this argument was not supported 
by any evidence. On the contrary, a recent study (Lubaale, Agevi and Ngari, 
2007) reviewing the LASDAP approach in the whole country (Kenya) found 
that there was no evidence to support such claims. Instead, the study (ibid.) 
found that whilst there had been increments in the LASDAP allocation to the 
Local Authorities, including the City of Nairobi, the pervasive trends of 
fragmenting funds by equally sharing these among wards the puny amounts19 
                                            
19
 From the LASDAP records at the City of Nairobi and the Kenya Local Government Reform 
Programme, Viwandani ward has since 2002 received an average of Kenya Shillings 3.5 
million or U.S.$39,000 each year to provide services and reduce poverty, in addition to other 
priorities. 
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finally allocated to the wards delayed disbursement of funds by the Ministry of 
Local Government, poor implementation and the lack of prioritisation in 
planning for the LASDAPs greatly undermined any anticipated improvements 
in the service provision. As shown earlier, service provision was not equal to 
poverty reduction, thus the argument would not be tenable even if the services 
were provided. 
 
Discursively, the language and tone employed by officials in articulating the 
position of a well-served citizen is cautious. For instance, in the following 
excerpts of interviews from the officer-in-charge of the LASDAP KLGRP at the 
Ministry of Local Government and the LASDAP Desk Officer at the City of 
Nairobi, the typical responses from government officials are evident. When 
asked to describe the City of Nairobi’s response to poverty, the official from 
KLGRP responded as follows: 
 
The City of Nairobi as the Council, that is a difficult one, I think that 
should come from the Council, but, they are trying, of late, in the recent 
years, from last year there has been tremendous improvement, 
especially in the services they are providing, you know they have also 
to give services for people to be able to get access to it, and that helps 
in trying to meet some of the basic needs they require but, I don’t know 
really how to respond to that one, especially from City Council, have 
not seen any opportunities that they have created apart from 
beautification [that] is what has been taking place, they have tried  to 
beautify this city, the planting of trees the cleaning of the streets. Now 
with the privatisation getting into [the] Water Company at least those 
services of water are improving. (E. Wanga, personal communication, 
January 19, 2007). 
 
When asked about the outcome of the LASDAP in Viwandani, the official from 
the City Council responded: 
 
I think those projects that have been implemented have had impact. I 
will give an example; we have been able to do about four bridges some 
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of them are travel bridges others footbridges in Langata-Kibera area 
and people used to be swept away by flood[s]. People used to be 
swept away by water but now it is no longer happening because now 
they can be able to access or cross the valley using those bridges. We 
are also now doing security lighting. Like now we are to restore security 
in Huruma, public lighting in Huruma. We are about to install more than 
30 high masts under LASDAP, in fact the tender has already been 
given and most of those places, most of them they are in the informal 
settlement. Some several ones in wider Karen, several in Kangemi, 
one or two in Viwandani, so we have been able to do quite a lot in the 
informal settlements really, I can say they have had a lot of impact and 
let me tell you, if I was to preach the gospel I would preach the 
LASDAP because they are very small projects that have a lot of impact 
if they are properly implemented. But there are also projects that are 
very sensitive because if they are not implemented on time or you keep 
on going back to residents on identification of their need and you are 
not doing what they have done they can also have a lot of 
repercussions but we have seen a lot of progress on the same (J. 
Ganjo, personal communication, January 25, 2007). 
 
The circumspections notwithstanding, in the above excerpt the allusion is to 
the provision of services that was without mistake. Many of cases, the 
evidence for provision of services were often the payments made by the City 
of Nairobi. The difficulty to ascertain the implementation of projects was 
openly acknowledged by officials both at the KLGRP and the City of Nairobi 
(for example C. Gut, personal communication, January 15, 2007; P. Ogon, 
personal communication, November 9, 2005; February 5, 2007; R. Ameu, 
personal communication, November 7, 2005; E. Wanga, personal 
communication, January 19, 2007). However, the belief that those services 
were provided because money was spent by the City Council, even though 
widely held, was not substantiated. There was a remarkable scepticism 
evident among the politicians and officials from the Provincial Administration. 
For instance, the Chief of South B when asked about services provided by 
City of Nairobi through the LASDAP, was less enthusiastic:  
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Well, of late we have not seen much that has been done by the City 
Council because they have the structure, but the problem is 
implementation of those structures within a given area. Ndio inaleta 
shida [that is what is problematic] because like when we say the City 
Council has decentralised services to the ward level and you find at the 
ward level we have the ward manager, we have the division manager 
at division level who reports to the Town Clerk, the requirement, the 
services that these people should offer to wananchi [common citizens] 
are many but there is, if you can allow me to mention, none. (L. 
Anguyum, personal communication, January 10, 2007). 
 
The councillors felt that staff of the City of Nairobi were mischievous because 
they delayed the contracting process and in some cases were outright corrupt, 
“They eat all the time” (O. Retep, personal communication, January 6, 2007; 
K. Maina, personal communication, February 6, 2007; J. Wai, personal 
communication, January 22, 2007). Whilst the residents shared the 
councillors’ sentiments, they did not completely absolve their councillors from 
malpractices in the LASDAP process. Most felt that the costs of the projects 
implemented were often inflated. However, since the City of Nairobi did not 
have any credible monitoring and evaluation process for LASDAP projects, 
the allegations by the councillors and residents, even though plausible, could 
not be confirmed. 
 
My observation of the physical conditions in these settlements confirmed the 
views of the residents that they were denied basic services and even the 
footbridge constructed was derelict and not entirely safe for the users. With 
the exception of the pit latrines at the primary school and at the Chief’s Camp, 
in Lunga Lunga much of the settlement did not have toilets. A total of 15,000 
people had less than fifteen pit latrines. Moreover, the residents who could 
afford it paid a user-fee of five shillings for each visit to these facilities. Given 
the low incomes of most families, it was unlikely that the people could afford 
such critical services. As in Nairobi’s other informal settlements, human 
faeces were visible along paths and alleys. 
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6.5.3 Charitable yet Constrained 
 
The third discursive strategy deployed by the City of Nairobi was to portray the 
City of Nairobi as benevolent, with limited finances yet doing its best to 
provide services to the poor. This could justifiably be interpreted as a process 
of normalisation, where the City of Nairobi, the residents of Viwandani and 
any other that may be critical of Nairobi’s poverty reduction interventions were 
contrasted against a “desired” norm. The City of Nairobi was clearly portrayed 
as sensitive to the plight of the poor and needy, whilst anyone with a contrary 
position was portrayed as hostile and ungrateful of the work done by the City 
of Nairobi. Furthermore, officials in the City of Nairobi argued that since the 
guidelines for preparing the LASDAP requiring citizens’ participation were 
always enforced, the priorities of the citizen were invariably identified and thus 
formed the core of the projects implemented through the LASDAP. 
 
With respect to how the City of Nairobi responded to poverty, the officials of 
the City of Nairobi and Councillors invariably use the term “help” to describe 
service provision. This was unusual for a public organisation like the City of 
Nairobi. Although outside the province of this study, the relations of the City of 
Nairobi with the residents or citizens challenges the ideals of public institutions 
in modern democratic societies whose mandate is public service. Moreover, 
according the Local Government Act of 1977 govern the City of Nairobi and 
other local authorities in Kenya, one of their mandates was to provide 
services, not to “help” citizens with services. 
 
On one hand, the view of “helping” held by the councillors and officials of the 
City of Nairobi may be justified especially following on decades in which the 
City never provided any services, especially in the informal settlements. Even 
then, such justification would have been tenuous. Reflecting on the causes of 
poverty and how the City of Nairobi had addressed poverty through the 
LASDAP, one of the officials who were instrumental in implementing these 
processes in the last six years argued; 
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The causes of urban poverty in this city are mainly corruption, unequal 
distribution of resources and unemployment. Why do I start with 
corruption? This is a very rich corruption which comes in when we are 
providing services at inflated prices where an individual puts their 
interest first and hence the people down there never get value for 
money. Unequal distribution of resources or the basic services - we 
don’t plan for the informal settlement. […] The rich don’t want to come. 
When they come, they are coming to do unequal distribution like the 
roads. If you look at the fuel levy it is specifically for maintaining roads. 
What roads is it maintaining? It’s maintaining roads to tarmac 
standards. If you go to the informal settlements there are no tarmac 
roads, the infrastructure has collapsed, buildings have been put up 
haphazardly, so really until we address the needs of the urban poor this 
City is not going to change, and remember, more than 60 per cent of 
Nairobi residents live in the informal settlements (C. Gut, personal 
communication, January 15, 2007). 
 
The City of Nairobi was contrasting this local authority in two distinct periods – 
before and during the LASDAP. Before the LASDAP the City was insensitive, 
perhaps callous, particularly to the poor, but with the LASDAP it responded to 
poverty. By making this subtle contrast, the City of Nairobi was not only being 
constituted as benevolent but also as responding to poverty since the 
LASDAP caters “…exclusively for the poor….” (P. Dida, personal 
communication, January 15, 2007; J. Ganjo, personal communication, 
January 25, 2007; K. Aina, personal communication, February 6, 2007). 
Furthermore, related to the above, since the City claimed it was addressing 
poverty, the City of Nairobi was also being constituted as truthful and any 
other position as unreliable and ungrateful. As discussed earlier, there was no 
evidence to support the claims that the City of Nairobi was addressing 
poverty. 
 
Arguing that the City suffered from limited finances was the second element of 
the discursive strategy employed to constitute the City of Nairobi as 
benevolent yet constrained. On face value, there is merit in this position 
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considering that the City was still bedevilled by enormous debt according to 
the Director of Planning. However, as discussed earlier, even with the 
LASDAP, poverty reduction was clearly not a priority of the City of Nairobi.  
 
The constitution of the City of Nairobi as charitable yet constrained was clearly 
persuasive but also evidently bereft of credible evidence. Nevertheless, it 
revealed a sophisticated role of power relations in constructing the façade that 
the City of Nairobi was addressing poverty through the LASDAP. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
 
There was no convincing evidence to support the claim of citizen participation 
in the LASDAP that should have ensured communities’ priorities were 
identified and addressed, thereby leading to poverty reduction. The officials 
argued that since they followed the LASDAP guidelines and involved citizens 
the correct priorities were identified. However, when the entire city held only 
eight consultative meetings for each year that involved an average of three 
people per ward (J. Ganjo, personal communication, January 25, 2007), it was 
doubtful that this process was participatory and was only possible because of 
facipulation. 
 
Participation was obviously an important challenge but it was also an equally 
important requirement in satisfying the LASDAP guidelines. Furthermore, 
even with the questionable consultations at the constituencies, the 
consolidation meetings that brought together representatives from all the 
wards for ratification of the identified priorities, facipulation is the hallmark of 
the intensity and sophistication of power relations as councillors overruled 
priorities, replacing these with their own priorities. Evidently, the change of 
priorities by councillors even during full Council meetings of the City of 
Nairobi, whilst legally permissible according to the City by-laws, was utterly 
inimical of participation. This confirmed that the institutions for implementing 
the LASDAP were too weak to support accountability and answerability and 
were largely dependent on the discretion of public officers. 
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To be sure, the provincial administration, politicians and officials of the City of 
Nairobi admitted that there were some challenges in the formulation and 
implementation of the LASDAP. However, in some cases they argued that 
intervention of the councillors and officials of the City of Nairobi was justified 
to rectify cases of abuse of this participation process. Paradoxically, the City 
barely addressed poverty in the LASDAP, yet succeeded, by cleverly 
deploying discursive strategies, to present a façade of poverty reduction. The 
tenor of the language used in this endeavour rang of a patronising attitude. 
The language also revealed that officials and Councillors of the City of Nairobi 
eschewed participation in the LASDAP, especially if it ruffled the status quo. 
Furthermore, the officials and Councillors of the City of Nairobi also used 
immanence and condign power to show that the City was responsive. The 
next Chapter turns to the struggle for accountability for the LASDAP in the 
same constraining institutional context. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RETRENCHING ACCOUNTABILITY, 
DISEMPOWERING THE POOR AND POWERLESS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I argue that because dispositional forms of power and 
discourses sustain the institutional framework, these institutions have 
supported a serious lack of accountability. In urban planning for poverty 
reduction through the LASDAP, only a weak form of responsiveness is 
possible. By relying on the goodwill and morality of public officers, including 
planners, to accommodate preferences of citizens, particularly the poor, just 
the poorest form of accountability could be delivered by the LASDAP in 
Viwandani. 
 
As shown in the discussion in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, the critical 
framework that should have guaranteed answerability, namely the Local 
Government Act, the Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) Act, and the 
LASDAP guidelines, woefully failed to do so. Whatever prospects there could 
have been for ensuring answerability in the LASDAP, these were 
unsurprisingly dependent upon the expansive discretionary powers of public 
officers. With such a wide remit for indiscretion and virtual absence of 
sanctions to address public officers’ failure to account, the analysis that 
follows in this section is limited to how in/discretion was exercised in the 
LASDAP in Viwandani from 2002 to 2005. 
 
This Chapter is divided into six sections including this introduction. The next 
section outlines the sentiments of key actors on the usefulness of the 
framework for implementing the LASDAP. This is followed by an analysis of 
the first dimension of accountability – answerability. In the fourth section, I 
explore the failure of sanctions which is the second dimension of 
accountability in urban planning for poverty reduction. The fifth section shows 
how reliance on the morality of public officials only serves to aggravate the 
poverty and powerlessness of the poor in Viwandani. Finally, the Chapter 
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ends with conclusions that justify the correlation between accountability, 
empowerment and poverty reduction. 
7.2 Perceptions of Effectiveness of the Institutional Framework 
 
Beginning with the sentiments of the politicians on the LASDAP, it was clear 
that the institutional framework did not necessarily support citizen participation 
and accountability. For instance, when I sought the views of the Member of 
the Parliament (MP) for Makadara on the LASDAP in Viwandani, he said: 
 
We have agreed not to interfere with the work of our Councillors. The 
LASDAP is for the Councillor and the CDF [Constituency Development 
Fund] for the MP. I don’t think I can tell you more on this matter. You 
will have to talk to the Councillor on this one… (R. Yolo, personal 
communication, January 22, 2007) 
 
The Councillor, on the other hand, has emphasised his role and his “success” 
in the LASDAP. But he was less cautious about his involvement with the MP. 
 
Yes, we are doing a lot of good work for the people of Viwandani and 
with little money from the LASDAP. You know our money is not a lot 
like the CDF. I don’t want to talk politics, but we could do a lot if we had 
the kind of money available to the MP in the CDF. We don’t know what 
the CDF is doing here in Viwandani where we have a lot of poor people 
and helpless people. May be you should talk to Mheshimiwa [the 
Honourable MP] about this (K. Aina, personal communication, February 
6, 2007). 
 
The other councillors I interviewed were more direct and felt strongly that the 
central government was “everywhere” in the decisions of the City. They felt 
the central government suffocated the City (O. Opete, personal 
communication, January 6, 2007; J. Wai, personal communication, January 
22, 2007). One of them was categorical: 
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No, no, this is government because the Ministry [of Local Government] 
I don’t know how always directs the City Council! I understand when 
the city council is there I think we are working under a Ministry, there is 
nothing we can propose or we can decide to do without approval of the 
Ministry although in the City Council is supposed to be independent. 
For instance, even now, if I have to travel out of the country, I must get 
clearance from the Ministry. This City Council is just a name! (O. 
Retep, personal communication, January 6, 2007). 
 
The staff and other officials of the City seemed more sympathetic to the 
Ministry of the Local Government. The Deputy City Engineer for instance 
observed: 
 
The Ministry of Local Government is supposed to monitor whatever 
projects we are implementing. We have an officer at the Provincial 
headquarters [of the] Ministry of Local Government, the officer now in 
charge of let’s say like Nairobi, he’s supposed to receive all these 
reports on LASDAP projects on monthly basis. But as a ministry, they 
have never audited what we are doing on the ground (C. Gut, personal 
communication, January 15, 2007). 
 
Most of the staff argued that the organisational structure in place was 
sufficient as it outlined roles of the different actors in the LASDAP and other 
City business.  
 
While some staff felt that the organisational structure was indeed supportive of 
participation and accountability in the LASDAP, others felt there were serious 
problems with the operational aspects. A ward manager for Nairobi South, 
one of the wards bordering Viwandani, was emphatic: 
 
We are told we should be involved in each and everything in the 
LASDAP. Well, up to date, we [have] not been involved in anything, so 
we are waiting, maybe when they [heads of departments and the 
councillors] finally come, they will involve us. My boss is the divisional 
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manager and the chairman of the ward is the councillor. We have never 
had any meeting in the ward concerning the LASDAP. What I hear from 
the people is that the people who are concerned plan and do 
everything in City Hall. Let me say; this is the main problem we are 
complaining about. We do not know what is happening with the 
LASDAP money. The people also do not know. Even when we call, and 
when they hear us, they tell us they are very busy; promise to call back, 
but they never call! (S. Ngori, personal communication, January 24, 
2007) 
 
I find the remarks by Ngori above particularly illuminating on the dynamics of 
power even among the relatively powerful actors in the City. To the citizens, 
Ngori and his colleagues in the City is perceived to be powerful. That is 
indeed true, but it is just one facet of the power relations. Yet from Ngori’s own 
account, he is not as powerful, at least as far as decisions related to the 
LASDAP in his ward, as the divisional manager or councillor. But as Mbembe 
(1992) shows in his examination of the banality of power, and Foucault (1991; 
2001) and Allen (2003) on the immanence of power, through sophisticated 
webs of discourses, practices, and relationships, Kingori remains an equally 
powerful actor in the City. 
 
To address this poverty, during 2002 to 2005, it can be noted for instance that 
Viwandani ward received some funding from the LASDAP as shown in Table 
7.1. Because of a clever use of condign power for the most part and in some 
cases of compensatory power, the poorest parts of the poorest ward received 
the least amount of financial resources. Again, through the control of 
resources and the use of these resources on puny services such as a 
footbridge, toilets and bursaries for a few children, the non-poor who do not 
reside in Lunga Lunga and Mukuru Kayaba appeared to benefit more than the 
poor. 
  
 215 
Table 7.1: Distribution of LASDAP Financial Resources in Makadara 
Constituency, 2002-2005 
Wards Allocation (Kshs) Actual Expenditure (Kshs) 
Viwandani 12,784,423.00 1,396,745.50 
Harambee 12,071,147.50 5,771,147.50 
Hamza 12,924,900.00 3,025,723.40 
Kaloleni/Makongeni 15,465,000.00 2,546,450.00 
Ofafa/Maringo 13,314,135.00 2,025,071.36 
Nairobi South 12,943,346.60 Data not available 
Mbotela 10,300,000.00 Data not available 
Source: Kenya Local Government Reform Programme (KLGRP) (2007) 
 
The 1.397 million shillings spent in Viwandani, three hundred thousand 
shillings were spent in 2004 and the other in 2002. From the tables, several 
questions, such as “why the sparse distribution?” and “why the least amount 
spent into the poorest ward?” arise. It is these questions mentioned above 
that this Chapter attempts to unravel. 
 
The Ministry of Local Government and the Town Clerk are the most powerful 
in the sense that their decisions are incontestable. The specific project 
committees at the bottom of the structure are also the least powerful. Although 
it is possible that Dahl’s (1957; 1961) notion of power as decision-making 
could be applied – where the Town Clerk or Minister and his Permanent 
Secretary could influence members of project committees, this would be 
unorthodox. The norm was that actors at the top of the structure decide what 
is important and suitable for them and impose this on the actors at the bottom 
who acquiesce without any protestations. Hence the ease with which the 
poorest ward, Viwandani, spent the least amount of money, while Harambee, 
which is a lot wealthier, spent the highest amount of money, as shown in 
Table 7.1 above. 
 
Table 7.2: Performance of the LASDAP in Viwandani, 2002-2005 
Financial Year Allocation (Kshs) Actual Expenditure (Kshs) 
2002 3,984,423.20 1,096,745.50 
2003 3,500,000.00 - 
2004 2,300,000.00 300,000.00 
2005 3,000,000.00 - 
TOTAL 12,784,423.20 1,396,745.50 
TOTAL (U.S.$) 170,458.98 18,623.27 
Source: Kenya Local Government Reform Programme (2007) 
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The Nairobi South Ward Manger’s perspective as quoted seemed typical of 
how the institutional framework was operationalised at the sub-city level. My 
experience when I visited the Ward managers’ offices in Viwandani and 
Nairobi South wards, support Ngori’s frustration; there were no records on the 
LASDAP at all. But at the City level it seemed as if there were no problems 
with the institutional framework. The head of the LASDAP secretariat noted: 
 
Of course there is a little bit of interference of the councillors; but 
remember if you are a technical person like me you have the 
responsibility. If you are a person who will sign the certificate and say 
this work has been properly done and on schedule then you take full 
responsibility and if you allow yourself to be manipulated by the 
councillors then it implies that really you don’t know your part. I would 
give you an example, if there were anybody who deals with the 
councillors on daily basis and who has a lot of interaction with 
councillors; I don’t think there is any council officer who deals with as 
many councillors as me. But I don’t allow myself to be bulldozed 
because one thing I tell them: they are not my employer. I am not on 
the councillors’ payroll. So I will do my work even if they decide that I 
will not get a promotion; because through a councillor, I will not be 
sacked by the council if I have not stolen or neglected anything and I 
don’t fear I will get a job in Kenya or outside the country because of my 
papers. You see this is what we are saying, that you should be able to 
stand your ground (J. Ganjo, personal communication, January 25, 
2007). 
 
From Ganjo’s account above, it was implied that even though he might have 
been able to resist pressure from powerful politicians and City officials, some 
of his colleagues were not always successful. But it is also possible that 
Ganjo’s colleagues never resisted but instead re-enacted power in the same 
way and with the same effects as the politicians and City officials to “confirm 
the legitimacy of the state (here read powerful politicians and City officials)” 
(Mbembe, 1992:4). Moreover, it would also appear that such courage and 
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principle, as Ganjo referred to, was the exception. For instance, one of the 
consultants who worked closely with the City to document the LASDAP in 
Embakasi constituency reflected on the institutional framework as follows. 
 
So one of the weaknesses at the beginning of the process was the 
monitoring and evaluation framework that enabled partners to oversee 
what was happening with the budget and the implementation. So 
having been through the process a lot of people would have lost 
interest because it became a City Council-headed process. Again the 
LASDAP was supposed to be joint partnership, a good idea, but it went 
back to the conventional service by City Hall and within there we lost a 
lot of time, a lot of trust because things also changed on the ground in 
spite of the consultation and within City Hall, people only did what they 
thought is beneficial to them (R. Dara, personal communication, 
January 4, 2007). 
 
The sentiments of central government on the other hand seemed to obliquely 
support sentiments of the councillors that the City was controlled. Explaining 
their role, the coordinator of the LASDAP in the MLG said: 
 
Although the councillors have to approve [the LASDAP] in a full council 
meeting; when that has happened, there is another major issue 
because the citizens have identified their priorities, they are processed 
in the council’s normal procedure, the councillors or the full council 
meeting can either take in or reject them. Because the approval has to 
come from the full council meeting, you will find out that some of the 
needs that have been identified by the citizens, were rejected when it 
comes to the full council meeting because again councillors or the 
officers have also other needs that they want to bring in; and therefore 
the mwananchi [ordinary citizen] now started to complain. We said this 
must stop last year, but this has not been implemented. Because these 
may have been rejected at the full council meeting and then when it is 
rejected at the full council meeting it is not provided for in the budget, 
and you can only implement these things when they have been 
 218 
provided for in the budget so now we had to revise the guidelines and 
the instructions that we were giving to the local authorities and that’s 
how we work (E. Wanga, personal communication, January 19, 2007). 
 
While the Ministry of Local Government official suggested strongly that their 
role was advisory, the issuance of guidelines with sanctions contradicted that 
position. The Provincial Administration in the President’s office was less 
circumspect but also tended to support the councillors’ view that the City was 
controlled. The District Officer for Makadara argued: 
 
You see the government and the City Council is just one and the same 
thing. So the government is the City Council, but the parent ministry is 
[the] Ministry of Local Government. This is the government, so the 
Ministry of Local Government is responsible for formulating the policies, 
which are the policies now, which are going to be given to the Local 
Authorities so that they […] to follow them up and then implement the 
government policy. So in the LASDAP, the Ministry of Local 
Government is doing all this (T. Norot, personal communication, 
January 11, 2007). 
 
There, were, however, intense and sometimes even overt rivalries between 
the Provincial Administration, the City of Nairobi and the MP on the “correct” 
interpretation of the communities’ needs, priorities and, sometimes, poverty 
reduction. In some cases, the Provincial Administration, that is headmen, 
chiefs and assistant chiefs, through systematic threats of violence, such as 
denying residents right to reside in the settlements, enforced a stringent 
regime of security and order. One of the residents related some of his 
experiences: 
 
Our youth are arrested without a good reason. You know the youth 
don’t have skills and don’t have jobs so they spend a lot time in the 
village. Sometimes they go to watch soccer and movies in the local 
movie houses. But a lot of time, the askaris [Administrative Police 
Officers] from the Chief’s camp go around harassing us claiming we 
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are disturbing the peace even when we have not done anything (N. 
Gagi, personal communication, December 23, 2006). 
 
Clashes between the councillor and the chiefs on the best way to provide for 
the needs of the residents were not unusual. Even during the fieldwork for this 
study, the Chief in Lunga Lunga was extremely careful when I sought her 
views on the LASDAP. When she finally agreed to be interviewed, she had 
several headmen in her office arguing: 
 
I don’t want any problems with the councillor. You know as the chief I 
am much closer to the people and I know what goes on here. The 
councillor is just a politician. If I say anything about the LASDAP 
projects, he [the councillor] will think I have fitina [jealousy] about his 
work. I have a young family and I really don’t want any problem with the 
councillor and these politicians.  I could lose my job…. But these 
LASDAP projects are not targeting the real needy people. It is just 
politics going on here. If something good has to happen, it must go on 
with the involvement of the chiefs and DO [District Officer] since we are 
the ones who really know what goes on in the vijiji [informal 
settlements] (D. Chiri, personal communication, December 29, 2006). 
 
From the different actors’ sentiments, nuances of the institutional framework 
are provided. Although it is difficult to give a broad-based assessment of the 
framework for implementing the LASDAP, from the perspective of the citizen, 
this framework was undermining the LASDAP. Most of the residents of 
Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga were generally cynical. But it is from the 
NGOs that the poor people’s experiences on the institutional framework for 
implementing the LASDAP were best captured. 
 
In this Nairobi City Council we have very colonial local governance 
structures. That is why people have been talking about reviewing the 
Local Government Act; that hasn’t happened so we have the same 
colonial local governance that was basically about enforcement of 
order and cleanliness. The Local Government doesn’t see the poor as 
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partners; they don’t see them as partners either in service provision or 
doesn’t see them as partners. So they are people to be bulldozed, 
people to be evicted, to be arrested. You see that image of the council: 
that the poor are basically illegal. Therefore, very colonial structure, 
very colonial attitudes: the city must be clean and so anybody dirty 
coming in is poor and they don’t deserve to be in the City so for me 
those are the issues. And then the calibre of councillors and this is 
Kenya-wide; the calibre of councillors is such that none of them 
practically believes in working with, listening to, and addressing poverty 
and basically therefore it is about their own interest (J. Jomo, personal 
communication, January 3, 2007). 
 
7.3 Seeking Answerability: Impunity in the LASDAP 
 
The typical view of most of the officials of the City of Nairobi I interacted with 
is that citizens, particularly the poor in Viwandani were not always informed of 
the decisions made with respect to projects in the LASDAP. Thus, from an 
institutional perspective, the actions of the poor were constrained by the 
institutional framework (North, 1990). In one of the interviews, Dangi Imani, a 
Ward Manager for Viwandani claimed: 
 
I have heard of them in the sense when we go for most meetings you 
hear a certain project was passed but it has not been implemented or it 
was not implemented, as it is being said that is the common 
mwananchi  [citizen] who comes. For example, may be it is a project 
that was proposed to cost so many millions it is said it has done and 
yet they don’t find the said project. These are common (D. Imani, 
personal communication, January 24, 2007). 
 
Daniel Imani’s was not an isolated sentiment. There were mixed views from 
the City officials. Some were empathetic about the citizens who they 
acknowledged were too powerless to reverse the state of affairs. Others, like 
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the Deputy City Engineer, strongly believed that the rational and objective 
system used to identify projects ensured reasonable accountability. 
 
We show them that this is what your need was. This is your priority but 
within the allocation this is what we are able to do. So if your priority 
was number one then we identify a project now for that priority based 
on […]. What your request was, and whether it was within the 
allocation. If we find that maybe for example again the example of the 
school the 3.5 million all be used for specific project then we advise 
that if it goes beyond the 3.5 million then again we would tell them that 
your project where as you want to do it in this first financial year it may 
require a longer period. So you must look at it and see that it’s going to 
roll into the second financial year.  If it’s a project for 6 million then we 
advice them that its going to take two year such that when we come to 
the next consensus meeting they are aware that yes we identified 6 
million, 3.5 million was funded in the first year so 2.5 million will be 
funded in the next year so once they agree they have to sign. We have 
forms that they sign, yes, that are what was agreed at the consultative 
meeting and has been agreed at the consensus meeting (C. Gut, 
personal communications, January 15, 2007). 
 
Different sentiments notwithstanding, for the residents in Viwandani, the 
frustration and feeling of powerlessness were evident. Not only did the 
residents feel helpless, but they also did not consider that the leaders or 
indeed any other person of and in power and influence could be held to 
account to them. Peninah Syawa, a resident in Lunga Lunga, captured the 
sentiments of most residents thus: 
 
We see our leaders only occasionally. There is no one we can ask. For 
instance the councillor, we only saw him when he was seeking our 
votes during the campaigns. Even for money that comes from the City 
[the LASDAP] we do not know how it is used and there is no one to 
ask. Having said that, there has been an attempt at fixing the road 
here; but we cannot tell how much it costs. We are aware it is to give 
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us an impression that they are working so that we can vote for them 
again in the elections next year (P. Syawa, personal communication, 
December 28, 2006). 
 
Not surprisingly, there were those residents who benefitted from the current 
system of patronage that argued that all was well. Even though these were a 
very small proportion in the purposive sample interviewed, they held a strong 
and persuasive view that the residents were largely to blame for their 
circumstances and for not being informed of the developments in the 
LASDAP. Maina Ariuk, a resident of Viwandani, closely aligned to the 
powerful in the community, said: 
 
The councillor’s work is very good. The way he conducts his business 
is good. He has done a lot of good but his detractors say he has done 
nothing. Yet he has built the road all the way from down to here. Of 
course the roads in the settlements are impassable. But the residents 
are to blame because there are drains and channels that have 
established this. The residents continue digging to set up drains in the 
knowledge that nothing will be done to them. With this kind of unruly 
behaviour, whose problem can it be? The councillor? The residents? 
Clearly, it must be the residents (M. Ariuki, personal communication, 
December 29, 2006). 
 
While it could have been true that the residents established drainage channels 
that aggravated the poor state of the ‘roads’ in the communities, their actions 
and behaviour did not justify the failure by the councillor to account for how 
decisions on the implementation of roads were made. Moreover, from the 
reference to the residents’ action in seeking alternative drainage solutions in 
their settlement, the councillor failed to acknowledge the widespread 
invisibilisation of the poor conditions that the residents of Viwandani were 
subjected to. 
 
My interactions with fieldwork participants, however, revealed that there were 
other considerations that were important in the failure by public officials to 
 223 
account to the residents. Participants variously alluded to ethnicity. Women 
drawn from tribes other than the Kikuyu felt that ethnicity affected 
accountability and worsened poverty in Viwandani. On this subject, one of the 
women said: 
 
I am a Mkamba, and the councillor is Kikuyu. The Kikuyus including the 
councillor, when they see a Mkamba or anyone from another tribe, they 
openly despise them. Why? When you would like to see him [the 
councillor] and consult over any matter, you are told to wait. You will 
never be seen and your concerns will never be addressed. Yet we 
know and we see that when a fellow tribesman [Kikuyu] seeks help or 
questions, the response is immediate! And it is always a positive 
response (M. Gina, personal communication, December 28, 2006). 
 
The accounts above show various relationships of power between the 
residents of Viwandani and the public officials who should account to them. 
Allen’s (2003) notion of power in things and mobilisation is useful in identifying 
the powerful and the powerless. The poor are clearly those endowed with 
significantly less resources and institutions, whilst the powerful such as the 
councillor, the City of Nairobi officials and supporters of politicians are the 
powerful. But more importantly, the ability of the powerful to avoid 
accountability to the powerless illustrates the usefulness of Galbriath’s (1983) 
perspective of power as condign, compensatory, and conditioned. It is 
reasonable to argue that even if the institutional framework is supportive of 
accountability; as long as the same power relations exist, impunity would still 
thrive. 
 
Failure to be answerable was not only restricted to public officials in relation to 
the residents, but also to politicians and professionals or technocrats; and 
among the technocrats at the City of Nairobi. The dominant view of the 
politicians I interacted with was that the professionals’ main role was to 
implement decisions of the Council. They argued that as elected leaders, they 
were responsible for deciding on behalf of the residents. The professionals’ 
attitude was characterised by contempt for the politicians. While it was taken 
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for granted by the politicians and residents of Viwandani that professionals at 
the City of Nairobi were obliged to account to politicians, the reverse was not 
the case. 
 
On accountability for public officials, power relations were vitally important in 
defining the absence of or even the need for politicians to account to public 
officials. Reflecting on how accountability was ensured in the LASDAP, a 
former Director of City Planning said: 
 
Like during those forums people were talking about priority areas and 
everybody worked on something from their own local levels from their 
estates, neighbourhoods and got them to the forum and priorities were 
worked [out] on the basis of what presentations people made. So it was 
a bit tricky although of course councillors sometimes tried to force 
things they think would give them political mileage. So the challenges 
were quite often between politicians and the residents. For us as 
officials the most difficult thing would be instances where having done 
transparent priority ranking in public instances where councillors try 
and overturn the publicly done priority rankings. That’s what I would 
say constitute the biggest challenge we faced because the law would 
forbid anyone of us changing the rankings as long as they are done 
publicly (P. Oluwa, personal communication, December 18, 2006). 
 
Because the law forbade changes, as Oluwa observed, did not necessarily 
mean that these changes never happened. The Deputy City Engineer 
guardedly observed: 
 
Yes, after them after that you see for the Council we have different 
committee meetings that take place every month. LASDAP committee 
being one of them, but you find after all these meeting then we have 
the full council meeting and the full council they just pass everything 
that was passed during the specific different committee meetings. (C. 
Gut, personal communication, January 15, 2007) 
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Although the politicians were clearly powerful, the officials at the City of 
Nairobi were not as powerless as the residents of Viwandani. The politicians 
were invariably more powerful because they owned and controlled access to 
resources and institutions in the City. The politicians failed to account to 
professionals because they were generally powerful and succeed in imposing 
their will on the professionals. But instances were also mentioned in which 
officials also failed to account to the politicians. An influential councillor at the 
City of Nairobi candidly admitted: 
 
Even when we have approved the projects and the money is received 
at the Council [City Council of Nairobi], it is not always easy to get 
things done. There are several things that must be done before any 
work can commence. You have to buy a goat and have nyama 
choma20. Without bribing these officers you cannot get work done. You 
bribe to get a tender approved; you bribe to have money received, and 
even to get small projects implemented. It is a big network here at City 
Hall. There is big corruption in the City Council. The contractors and 
businessmen are making a lot of money together with our officers. For 
instance, our staff together with the auditors collude with contractors, 
receive hefty bribes and approve ghost projects (O. Retep, personal 
communication, January 06, 2007). 
 
Councillor Retep’s sentiments only support a widely acknowledged fact of the 
corruption at the City of Nairobi that has been a concern of anti-corruption 
advocacy for decades. The reciprocal and mutual failure to account or answer 
to one another by City of Nairobi officials and the politicians and the 
widespread corruption showed the insidious effects of power relations. In 
these relationships, neither the officials nor the politicians were powerless. 
This illuminates Foucault’s (1991) and Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) notion of 
power as immanent. From the above, at the City of Nairobi, power was 
evidently organised through sophisticated webs of discourses, relationships 
and practices that produced some as powerful and others as less powerful. 
                                            
20
 Literally meaning roast beef, but in the context used by Retep simply means a bribe or the 
process of giving and/or accepting a hefty bribe. 
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This greatly shaped everyday life where professionals were not accountable 
to politicians and politicians not answerable to the professionals. Depending 
on the issue, the professional or politicians were relatively powerless. But 
because the power relations were always being reproduced, the effects of 
power were dynamic and not static or stable. 
 
As Cahill (2008:289) notes, from the shifting powerlessness and powerfulness 
between the politicians and professionals, reproduction is “…not only enacted 
by the powerful but is also dominated by subjects acting socially defined roles 
and identities.” In Nairobi, the community members including the poor are 
integral actors in the enactment and re-enactment of power and the continuity 
of corruption. Whilst the corruption that stymies the LASDAP in Viwandani 
vindicates Mbembe’s (1992; 2000) notion that Africans are thoroughly corrupt, 
it in one way makes this a uniquely African phenomenon. 
 
The power relations between the main actors in the LASDAP in Viwandani, as 
shown above, created conditions for impunity to thrive. Hence, within the 
institutional context that curtailed participation and accountability it was not 
surprising that seeking answerability in the LASDAP was virtually impossible. I 
now turn to how the citizens ensured redress for failures to account by 
politicians and professionals or how the latter addressed the glaring breach of 
public trust. 
 
7.4 Sanction? Protecting the Powerful While Ignoring the Powerless 
 
In addition to answerability, to assess accountability in the LASDAP, I also 
attempted to establish the consequences of failure to give account by public 
officials. Although sanctions relying on the moral considerations of public 
officials are arguably the weakest form of accountability, these for the most 
part were found to be scanty in the LASDAP in Viwandani. The relationships 
between the public officials and citizens show that by use of mainly condign 
power few sanctions were applied to against the powerful, hence 
underscoring the failure of sanction and privileging of the powerful. 
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The main types of sanctions provided were at the discretion of public officials. 
But even within such spaces the regulations provided for the Ministry of Local 
Government in preparing the LASDAP, the residents of Viwandani who I 
interacted with were generally sceptical about the possibilities of invoking 
these sanctions. When asked what challenges the LASDAP was faced with, 
Viwandani Lunga Lunga resident, Joseph Joro’s response, captured the 
overwhelming sentiments of virtually all the residents I interacted with: 
 
That is why I will reiterate the point I have made, and I guess many 
others have told you, or will tell you: we cannot ask any question or 
question anything because the person we have been obliged to work 
with is the councillor. When he receives funds from City Hall for 
projects, we just have to accept whatever he tells us. There is a 
committee that is charged with the LASDAP but it is not serious, it is a 
waste of time. If it were serious we would challenge a lot of things that 
are reported to us. But the councillor is really the beginning and the 
end. So we cannot challenge anything. We only see with our eyes. 
There is no inspection. We just see things done, then hear it is the 
LASDAP. How decisions are made, and how much was approved and 
finally how much it eventually cost, all remain a mystery (J. Joro, 
personal communication, December 22, 2006). 
 
In the context of the unfavourable and limited space, the scepticism of the 
residents about the usefulness of sanctions amidst spiralling impunity is best 
understood through Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power. The normalisation 
of impunity and attendant invisibilisation of the subjugation of the residents 
was possible through multiple strategies such as coercion, authority, and 
manipulation (Allen, 2003). While there was a widely acknowledged self-
censorship among the residents of Viwandani, the environment during the 
public meetings for the LASDAP was also too hostile to facilitate the 
enforcement of any form of sanctions. A chairman of the movement of 
residents of informal settlements in Nairobi related the experience at these 
public meetings as follows:  
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In most cases you find that it is the area councillor and his people 
whom he elected or appoints who would decide what project could be 
carried for those monies. So you find the community are not so much 
involved in those discussions because I have attended more than two 
meetings, but [of] all that we proposed there, nothing is considered, it is 
them [the councillors and their cronies] who decided what. (E. Mema, 
personal communication, January 6, 2007). 
 
He continued, 
 
They [the citizens] know, sometimes they don’t know, what to do 
because they fear, because you see all these councillors they have 
their youths who normally walk with them when they have those 
meetings so the moment you start arguing with him, you find that they 
can even beat you. So that way you find that the community 
themselves because they don’t want to risk their life, they just keep 
quite and leave it that way (ibid.). 
 
While in some cases the application of power was subtle, in the case Rema 
refers to above, it was simply sheer intimidation and the threat of use of brute 
force and violence. The councillors and their cronies enjoy power and are 
more powerful than the residents of Viwandani because of the “power in 
things” (Allen, 2003). The councillors are vastly wealthier than the residents, 
and in their stock of things or resources are the youths who execute their 
orders. Moreover, the power of the councillors was evident in the use of their 
resources. Here, the common use of their resources was unleashing terror 
and fear in the residents. 
 
In other instances, the residents of Viwandani were simply cynical. For 
instance one woman in the Lunga Lunga settlements expressed such 
cynicism as follows: 
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The councillor and the MP [Member of Parliament] have their 
committees. In the LASDAP we have heard that each village is 
supposed to be represented by a resident. In the whole of Lunga Lunga 
we do not have a representative. It is not surprising that we do not 
know what happens in the LASDAP. We hear some rumours that 90 
million [Kenya Shillings], sometimes 30 million [Kenya Shillings] and 
then 3 [Kenya Shillings] million will be released to the LASDAP. Some 
of this, the councillor is the one who tells people. But the councillor has 
never formally and openly told the residents how much money 
eventually gets released for work. Anyway, it is all up to him (P. Utho, 
personal communication, December 28, 2006). 
 
Although there are a variety of experiences to draw from, the pattern that 
emerged was one that clearly points to a subversion of sanctions by the 
powerful actors in Viwandani. Both the powerful and relatively powerless and 
how they interrelate and interact invariably determined the extent to which 
even the weakest sanctions were enforceable. Surprisingly, however, was the 
bold admission of the failure for accountability by the District Officer of 
Makadara Division with administrative oversight for Viwandani ward. He said: 
 
Also I would say that when the funds have been put into place, there is 
that lack of accountability and transparency. The money does not 
match the project, some of their projects are exaggerated so you go to 
a footbridge, and someone [the councillor or City of Nairobi officials] is 
saying it is costing two million when you can see that even two hundred 
thousand can do the said job; there is that lack of proper rules and 
guidelines as to how these funds should be managed. So there are so 
many loopholes that we need to address as the government. The rules 
and guidelines should be very stiff so that people do not mess around 
with these funds (T. Norot, personal communication, January 11, 
2007).  
 
It was probably much easier for the District Officer as staff of the Office of the 
President (OP) to admit to the absence of sanctions in the LASDAP because 
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it lay outside the direct control of his massive resources. However, it was also 
possible that such an assessment was based on an intimate understanding of 
the operations of the LASDAP as the Office of the President official who was 
directly charged with controlling and coordinating all development and security 
matters in the district. Moreover, there was merit in Nyoro’s argument that the 
rules and guidelines should be stiff, but the evidence on accountability so far 
suggests that the stiff rules of and on their own were not the panacea for 
accountability. Stiff rules and guidelines did not confront the unequal power 
relations or empower the citizens, especially the poor, to gain control, access 
and use of the resources and institutions of the more powerful. 
 
The collapse of sanctions evident in the protection of the powerful with the 
corresponding and continued disempowerment of the poor and powerless, on 
one level was the work of complex processes of domination. Yet, on the other 
hand, the sustained subjugation of the poor and powerless also is a product of 
‘reversed’ resistance or perpetual domination, where the powerful enact 
power in various ways to continue in the roles of privilege and impunity. But as 
the evidence also shows, to protect the powerful whilst muzzling the 
powerless in the LASDAP was also possible through multiple strategies 
employed to negotiate power.  
 
7.5 Responsiveness: Clutching Thin and Brittle Straws 
 
This study further attempts to establish the extent to which public officials 
exercise their moral obligations to consider preferences of the citizens, 
especially preferences of the poor in decision-making. The responsiveness is 
assessed both from the perspective of the citizens or residents of Viwandani 
and the public officials. Beginning with the citizens; surprisingly, in spite of the 
negative effects of the power relations such as denial of answerability and 
sanctions, the residents tend to be a lot more optimistic of possibilities for 
public officials being responsive and being morally persuaded to consider their 
preferences in decision-making. One of the women from the community I 
interacted with in this study noted: 
 231 
We do not have problems with them [public officials]. You know when 
official is posted here, we observe to know if the person is good or bad. 
If the official is bad we can always reject them. But some are posted 
and they are just like our youth, they are concerned about our welfare 
and we cannot reject them (S. Njira, personal communication, 
December 23, 2006). 
 
But even with such optimism, Njira continued, 
 
We are also stunned as well. For instance when you have a chance to 
meet with the chairman of the village, he casually informs that on 
Monday the road will be built. You see that even if you [the residents] 
did not need the road; the road will be built because they [public 
officials] have decided. We have no choice but to accept such arbitrary 
decisions. After all, the chairman and his colleagues have decided and 
that is what matters. Moreover, these chairmen claim when they 
decide, it is on behalf of the residents and anyway, they know where 
everyone lives so they argue they would inform all residents 
accordingly (ibid.). 
 
From the above, it is apparent, notwithstanding their optimism, that these 
residents remain keenly aware of the limitation of depending on the morality of 
public officials as a way to accountability. Implicit in the above was the 
powerfulness of the powerless. As in Allen’s (2003) notion of power as 
immanent, the residents of Viwandani show that power was not only found 
with or among the powerful, but also with the powerless. Being able to reject 
‘bad’ officials confirmed the unstable qualities of the effects of power where 
the powerless were not always oppressed. Similarly, the brazen and informal 
ways in which the chairmen made decisions demonstrates another aspect of 
the effects of power. 
 
While the residents were generally more optimistic, the public officials were 
less so. Their seniors at City Hall generally kept the public officers who should 
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be directing the LASDAP at the local level in Viwandani in the dark about their 
decisions. Simon Kingori, a ward manager in the area, cautiously lamented: 
 
I think before any project can start it is good that there are meetings, 
not only for the committees; but also that the residents are made 
completely aware and participate in the decisions relating to the 
implementation of projects. The residents should always know and 
participate; that way we shall have the full support and cooperation of 
the residents (S. Ngori, personal communication, January 24, 2007). 
 
From Ngori’s views, it is clear that whilst as a public official he was desirous to 
support and include the residents in decision-making, this did not happen in 
the LASDAP. But there was a capacity argument propounded by several in 
the City of Nairobi, the central government, and even in international 
organisations (cited below) such as the United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme (UN-HABITAT). It was widely believed that residents in 
settlements such as Viwandani did not have the ability to participate in 
‘complex’ decision-making processes such as the LASDAP. For instance, an 
UN-HABITAT official I interviewed for this study observed: 
 
Of course there are numerous challenges, as I said local people are 
not well prepared, they have not participated in this kind of process 
before. This is really related also to the Constituency Development 
Fund. We have seen in a number cases, a lot of resources going to the 
local level but people have not been well prepared for them to be able 
to absorb or participate in this process, so we see that as one problem. 
A second one is one of accountability and we do know and we were 
looking at some of these issues. […] There are lots of incomplete 
projects because of poor allocation of resources; because one of the 
things we have discovered is that each and every councillor wants to 
have a share and in some places they even have been doing equal 
share whereas we know there are some wards that have much more 
demands and others more needs… So breaking down of the cake 
towards them having small projects everywhere that are not complete 
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could be one of the other major problems that we have seen (C. 
Ngege, personal communication, January 05, 2007). 
 
While the need for preparing the residents as expressed by Ngege above was 
justifiable, the notion of preparation was stretched too far. The capacity to 
participate as earlier chapters show, can only be meaningful when such 
participation addresses the unequal power relations that exclude the residents 
from decision-making. On the contrary, the ‘capacity’ often referred to by 
public officials and their counterparts in international organisations and civil 
society was restricted to the ability to contribute to consultations, knowledge of 
processes, and ability to comply with established norms. 
 
A former Director of City Planning at the City of Nairobi aptly captures the 
other significant dilemma for public officials with respect to being responsive in 
urban planning for poverty reduction. 
 
I have serious problems with the whole notion of planning for poverty 
reduction, I have a very, very serious problem because I don’t know 
how that is done. In my own simple way I think that overall good 
planning should have an overall effect of eradicating poverty. Because 
a good plan depends on its own philosophy. A good plan depends on 
its own manifesto. A good plan sets out to do certain critical things to 
reduce incidences of poverty and national growth. […] The City Council 
is not designed to understand poverty. City Council is designed to 
provide services. So poverty is something that does not appear on its 
day-to-day agenda per se. But you want to go into a neighbourhood 
and probably rate its poverty. No, that is not something that I imagine 
even at its sharpest, the City Council would be thinking about. It is not 
in its mandate.  It may deal with aspects of poverty in the course of 
day-to-day discharge of responsibilities but it is not necessarily 
designed or in a position to deal with poverty reduction. It might work 
with agencies of governments on certain poverty programmes but 
those would be programmes coming in. May be under the guise of 
HIV/AIDS or slum upgrading or dealing with street families and so on 
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and so forth. Those are the instances in which we would be dealing 
with aspects of poverty but I do not think that many councils and City 
Council in particular has huge programmes designed as interventions 
into poverty. On the other hand, the department of social services has 
a bit of programmes, which would go a long way in dealing with 
aspects of poverty reduction (P. Oluwa, personal communication, 
December 18, 2006). 
 
Despite responsiveness being dependent on the morality of public officials, as 
shown above, it is affected by power and is mediated by social relations. 
Moreover, the discussion shows that the responsiveness of public officials in 
the LASDAP is so tenuous that it cannot be relied upon to ensure 
accountability. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
Since it was impossible to seek and secure answerability; sanctions and their 
enforcement was dependent on the morality and discretion of public officials; 
and power relations severely curtailed the responsiveness of public officials; 
then it is justifiable to conclude that in Viwandani, accountability was 
retrenched as the powerful were protected and the relatively powerless were 
further disempowered. 
The constricted participation and dearth of accountability; coupled with a puny 
provision of basic services portray a situation where the poor were threatened. 
Questions were rife of how the poor espouse such intractable hope and 
nurture resilience when the LASDAP that sought to reduce their poverty has 
instead nominally reduced poverty and disempowered the poor. This paradox 
is invariably the story of hope and productive power in Viwandani. The above 
and other questions are addressed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: SUBVERTING THE PROVISION OF SELECT BASIC 
SERVICES AND OPPRESSIVE POWER 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter argues that because power operates in all directions, and is 
immanent, even in situations of exclusion, oppression, dire provision of 
selected basic services, and lack of accountability, the poor invariably find 
ways of making a livelihood. While the poor in Viwandani were commonly 
presented and perceived as powerless, excluded, hopeless, and at the mercy 
of the powerful non-poor, when the essence of their life was threatened 
facipulation was not always tenable as the poor exhibited a rare power, hope, 
resilience, and ingenuity that sustained and adapted their lives under 
incredibly harsh conditions. 
 
This chapter is organised in five sections, including this introduction. The next 
section maps the important institutions for the poor. This is followed in the 
third section by a discussion of how the poor adapted institutions to serve their 
interests. Next the chapter discusses how the poor residents of Viwandani’s 
Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga countered power to reduce poverty in the 
fourth section; and then presents the concluding section thereafter. 
 
8.2 Important Institutions for the Poor 
 
The process of identifying institutions in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga 
involved listing and then ranking these institutions in focus group discussions. 
For virtually all the participants, importance was judged on the basis of how 
the institutions helped or undermined the poor in Viwandani. Even when the 
institutional framework for planning for poverty reduction was clearly 
oppressive and stifling, the resilience of the poor suggested that there was 
another institutional framework that was both relevant to and sustained the 
hope of the poor in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga. 
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8.2.1 Mukuru Kayaba 
 
Sixteen institutions were identified in Mukuru Kayaba. According to the 
research participants, these institutions performed diverse roles, including 
helping the poor and other residents of Mukuru Kayaba. The roles performed 
include: provision of emergency health care, relief (especially during fire), 
credit, and food and educational support such as bursaries awards. Table 8.1 
below summarises the roles and importance of these institutions in Mukuru 
Kayaba. The relationships between these institutions are strong by virtue of 
the fact that they are all working towards improving the living conditions and 
standards of the people of Mukuru. 
 
Table 8.1: Role of Important Institutions of the Poor in Mukuru Kayaba 
Institution Role/importance 
Mater Hospital 
St Catherine 
Railway Training Institute 
Provision of (emergency) health care 
Neighbours/community 
Red Cross 
Elders/Chairmen 
Fighting fire outbreaks in the 
neighbourhood 
Cosmoco Sacco 
Jami Bora 
Merry-go-round saving groups 
Open-joy women’s group 
Provision of friendly credit without 
collateral security 
The Church 
Chief 
Community 
Provision of food during times of food 
crises and hunger 
Pamoja Trust 
Nairobi People’s Settelment 
Advocacy 
Mukuru Promotion Centre Provision of affordable basic education 
 
Source: Data from listing by mixed focus group of 6 males and 8 females in 
Mukuru Kayaba 
 
From Table 8.1 above, the community and institutions for the poor were 
important in reducing the effects of fires, provision of low interest credit, and 
provision of food during times of crises and hunger. Institutions for the poor 
such as Open Joy Women’s Group, neighbours, and elders were mainly 
located in the community. Surprisingly, the government’s role through the 
chiefs in helping the poor was negligible – providing food during times of 
crisis. Table 8.1 shows institutions such as the Mater hospital, St Catherine, 
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and the Mukuru Promotional Centre that helps in providing emergency health 
care, food, and education, including bursaries, has played an important role in 
the lives of the poor. 
 
Another perspective of the importance of these institutions is evident in the 
institutional maps generated by participants. In focus groups, the participants 
showed the importance of the institutions by the sizes of the circles. Figure 8.1 
shows a typical institutional map of how the poor perceived the significance of 
the various institutions. 
Figure 8.1: Institutional Map of Important Institutions in Mukuru Kayaba 
 
 
The big circle in the map represented Mukuru Kayaba. The participants 
attempted to show the institutions inside Mukuru Kayaba and those outside 
Mukuru Kayaba. Because the Women’s Groups and Merry Go Round have 
the biggest circles, these are the most important institutions for the poor in 
Mukuru. Similarly, Oxfam (in the Figure 8.1 shown as Oxfarm) with the 
smallest circle is the least important to the poor. The Red Cross, Mater 
hospital, the chief, Goal Kenya, and the Mukuru Promotional Centre were 
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perceived of equal importance, thus the same size of the circles in the map. 
From Table 8.1, it is clear that the Women’s groups and the Merry go round 
provide low-interest credit to the poor, therefore, their significance to the poor. 
 
After the community organisations or institutions of the poor (the women’s 
groups and savings groups), the Church and church allied organisations were 
the second most important institutions for the poor in Mukuru Kayaba. In 
addition to having the highest number of roles as shown in Table 8.1, the 
church is the only institution not owned by the poor that was located in Mukuru 
Kayaba. The other institutions, although they were helpful to the poor, were 
located outside of Mukuru Kayaba. However, these institutions in Figure 8.1 
were classified into two broad categories: those institutions formed by the 
people of Mukuru Kayaba and working in Mukuru Kayaba, and external 
institutions working in and with the people of Mukuru Kayaba. 
 
Exploring ways in which the institutions in Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1 above 
undermined the poor (unhelpfulness), the residents complained that the 
village elders and the area chief greatly contributed to the poor people being 
oppressed. In a discussion with the youth it was obvious that the chief and the 
entire provincial administration machinery often harassed the poor of Mukuru 
Kayaba: 
 
The chief, the chairmen and administration police have youths 
commonly arrested for no reason. The chief especially targets the 
youth; we are imprisoned at any time. Sometimes when they know that 
we have seen them steal and sell food meant to assist the poor, they 
claim it is the youth. It is difficult to see the benefit of these people. 
They only serve the rich. They consider the poor thieves. Our 
businesses are destroyed and sometimes even the land where we stay 
can be re-allocated to other people who find or even buy the favour of 
these people [chief and the rest of the provincial administration] (F. 
Hola and A. Haba, personal communication, October 26, 2010). 
 
 239 
The gratuitous violence unleashed on the poor as Hola and Haba claim 
(personal communication, October 26, 2010), greatly undermined the capacity 
of the poor to participate in the LASDAP. Since the poor, especially the poor 
youth, were criminalised, justifications for their exclusion were normalised to 
the extent that this was increasingly one of the conventional truths or wisdoms 
for not including the poor in decision-making and meetings of the LASDAP. 
 
Instructively, the City of Nairobi institutions were never identified as important 
institutions in the interviews and focus groups I held in Mukuru Kayaba. 
Nevertheless from the discussions, it was apparent that there were two main 
types of institutions: internal and external. Of the institutions working in 
Mukuru Kayaba, Pamoja Trust in collaboration with Nairobi Peoples 
Settlement was the most important because of the advocacy role against 
unplanned and uncoordinated forced evictions in the settlement. In addition to 
the advocacy role, Pamoja Trust helped to mobilise the residents for the 
purpose of upgrading the settlement, through peoples credit saving 
organisations and construction of ablution blocks. 
 
The other important institution was the Catholic Church and the Mukuru 
Promotion Centre. The missionary work of these institutions was considered 
important for the hope and resilience of the poor. These two institutions 
provided support for the needs of these people ranging from medication, relief 
food, promoting education through construction of schools. The least 
important was the central government. According to the accounts of the 
people, assistance from the central government was too little to effectively 
address their needs; this assistance, such as relief food, never reached the 
very poor. This assistance had to pass through the chief’s office where bias; 
favouritism and even corruption were alleged to derail its use (A. Maraa, F. 
Fokin and M. Rubo, personal communication, October 25, 2010). 
 
Throughout the focus group discussions and interviews I held in Mukuru 
Kayaba, it was clear that the most important institutions responding to the 
needs of the people are those locally formed organisations in the villages. 
This was because each of the organisations was formed in order to respond 
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to a given need of people who were sharing the same problem or challenge. 
Generally, those institutions that were most viable and active in Mukuru 
Kayaba were those formed by women and the youth while those that 
comprised of men were minimal and inactive. However, it was institutions in 
which the residents had a lot of trust and respect that were also highly 
relevant to residents and their needs. Conversely, the residents of Mukuru 
Kayaba had limited trust and confidence in the provincial administration and 
central government which were also ranked the least important institutions for 
the poor. 
 
8.2.2 Lunga Lunga 
 
Seven institutions were identified in Lunga Lunga as important to the poor. 
Admittedly, the important institutions tended to be those that the poor trusted 
and addressed their needs. Invariably, these institutions were also, for the 
most part, those created by the poor or had the majority of the members as 
the poor. When asked to identify important organisations, the women easily 
pointed to the St Monica Catholic Church or mission, the Wajuu kuu youth 
group, Community Based Organisations (CBOs), and their neighbours or 
community in general. These important institutions were found in the 
community. From Figure 7.2 it was also clear that the relationships were 
based on the roles each organisation played and the how these were 
experienced by the community. 
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Figure 8.2: Institutional Map of Important Institutions in Lunga Lunga 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The big circle in the map represented Lunga Lunga. The participants 
attempted to show the institutions inside Lunga Lunga and those outside of 
Lunga Lunga. As in Figure 8.1, the size of the circle showed the importance. 
But unlike in Figure 8.1, the women in Lunga Lunga added the plus signs to 
distinguish the degree of importance they attached to each of these 
institutions that they considered important (by giving them circles that were 
almost of the same size). Therefore, the institutional map in Figure 8.2 above 
shows that for these women, the importance of the institutions was evident in 
the number of plus signs it was assigned. To these women, the plus signs 
also showed the extent to which an institution helped the poor, thus its 
importance. 
 
For these women, Together Youth Group was the most important institution, 
but it also enjoyed the most positive relationship. Although an institution 
outside the community, St Monica Catholic Church was very important. Wajuu 
 
 
 
 
Together Youth Group 
++++++++ 
Wajukuu       
+++ 
Chama              
+++++ 
St. Monica         
++++++ 
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kuu youth group helped to rehabilitate the youths affected by drug abuse and 
handled emergencies in the community. Furthermore, the women’s group in 
Lunga Lunga added the use of arrows to show the relationships between the 
institutions they identified. From the discussions, as shown in Figure 8.2 
Wajukuu had a closer relationship with St. Monica, while Together Youth 
Group was perceived to have a closer relationship with Chama. 
 
As in Mukuru Kayaba, the roles the institutions played provided insights on 
their importance to the poor in Lunga Lunga. Table 8.2 below summarises the 
roles and importance of the institutions to the poor I purposively sampled in 
Lunga Lunga. But unlike Mukuru Kayaba, the discussions in Lunga Lunga 
provide a more comprehensive view of the roles of important institutions for 
the poor I purposively sampled for this study.  
 
Table 8.2: Role of Important Institutions of the Poor in Lunga Lunga 
Institution Role/importance 
St Monica Sickness, disease, hunger, education 
Neighbours/community Funerals, provide food during hunger and food 
crises, protect assets during flooding, provision 
of security 
Wajuu kuu Youth group Fighting fire outbreaks in the community, 
ensuring peace and security, sanitation, 
controlling drug abuse and teenage 
pregnancies 
Lunga Lunga Youth group Garbage collection, cleaning the river and 
community, talent development, sanitation 
Waki Youth group Funerals  
The Red Cross Provision of disaster and emergency 
relief/assistance 
Chief Provision of relief assistance 
 
Overall, St.Monica and Wajuu kuu Youth group were considered to be the 
most important institutions for the poor in Lunga Lunga. Therefore, it may be 
fair to hypothesise that the marginalisation of the poor in Mukuru Kayaba and 
Lunga Lunga by the government instead turned into a motivating factor for 
them to work together to withstand poverty. But for these institutions to 
succeed, social trust, shared interest and personal interest plays a central role 
in ensuring that both residents and organisations relate and work together 
very well. Asked about what sustained good relations among the people and 
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their institutions, the respondents invariably noted that it was trust, 
cooperation, love, commitment, respect and honesty. Of these, trust was 
considered the most important. For example the youth in Lunga Lunga noted: 
 
Some of us are very determined to make life better by mobilising 
ourselves trying to do something. We cannot afford to sit around and 
lament that we are going to die. We are even trying to improve our own 
standards of living. Our experience has shown us that if it is not for our 
mothers in St Monica’s group, we would be completely finished. We 
now know that it is our mothers and ourselves as youth who will take 
care of our needs. The rest like the chief, the chairmen, and others 
never tell us anything. They are not interested in our welfare at all. We 
have few organisations compared to Kibera. Maybe it is our reputation 
as a deadly settlement, but you will all the same hear that the youth are 
doing a lot of good things and run successful organisations (S. Banda 
and P. Erupa, personal communication, December 23, 2006). 
 
From Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga, it was clear that the institutions that 
were important to the poor were those that addressed their immediate and 
strategic needs. But these institutions found in these settlements often were 
owned by the communities and were also, unsurprisingly, institutions in which 
the poor had a lot of trust and thus were highly relevant and held in high 
esteem. 
 
8.3 Adapting to Oppressive Institutions 
 
To show how the poor adapted to oppressive institutions and coped with 
poverty in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga, I begin with an overview of the 
key issues from discourses on poverty. I focused on discourses on poverty at 
both the City and sub-city level because “…a focus on place-specific 
discourses allows connections, nuances and contradictions between national 
narratives of poverty and grounded material to be explored” (Devine, 
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2006:964). I then discussed what actions the poor took to moderate the 
institutional framework so that the LASDAP could broaden its scope in poverty 
reduction. 
 
In discussing poverty in Viwandani, various perspectives emerged. But in 
some of these discourses, issues on poverty that should ordinarily have been 
expressed were absent. For instance, discussions on power relations that 
should have been self-evident were invariably implied and not explicitly 
referred to. The categories, themes and representation of poverty were also 
sometimes similar and intertwined. The helpless, hopeless or hungry people 
with disabilities, and people living with HIV/AIDS were good exemplars of this 
similarity. In some cases, there were also noticeable dissimilarities. An 
analysis of everything said about these categories revealed further nuances of 
poverty, i.e., the object(s) of the poverty and representations in the discourses 
of poverty, in the LASDAP. 
 
The interviews I held with various people showed that in the LASDAP, poverty 
was spoken of in fourteen diverse ways as shown in Table 8.3 below. 
 
 245 
Table 8.3: Themes, Categories and Representations in the Discourse of 
Poverty 
Themes, Categories, 
Representations 
Articulation 
Inability to generate wealth People manifesting with low capacities, or 
poor education, underprivileged, inadequate 
physical, mental, wisdom, education, no land, 
no tools to generate wealth. 
Lack of basic services No access to: toilets, water, electricity, 
housing and health care 
Unemployment A burden, lazy people, youth, hawkers,  
Homelessness Slum dwellers, the poor,  
Widowed / orphaned Women, children, youth, People Living With 
HIV and AIDS (PLWHA), poor, enterprising 
Marginal incomes People surviving, poor, hungry, Mama Mboga 
(women who sell vegetables) 
Reside in informal settlements The poor, homeless, slum dwellers, 
dangerous, filthy, exploited,  
Helpless The elderly, formerly employed, PLWHA, 
widows, women, orphans,  
Hopeless The youth, unemployed men, PLWHA, poor, 
terrorised 
Hungry The poor, orphans, youth,  
Disabled The poor, abandoned, neglected, wretched 
People Living with HIV/AIDS Poor, promiscuous, immoral, a burden, 
helpless, hopeless,  
Prostitution  Survivors, youth, widowed, enterprising, 
smart, fighting poverty 
Thieves/Gangsters Fighting poverty, survivors, youth, protectors 
of the settlement, dangerous, rich, 
enterprising 
Source:  Field Studies (2005 – 2007). 
 
To establish the ideas and ways in which these categories, themes and 
representations informed the discourses of poverty, I matched each to the 
other as shown in Table 8.4. From the analysis presented in Table 8.4, it was 
possible to determine the areas of convergence and the degree to which the 
themes, categories and representations of poverty identified in Table 8.3 
which were supported or contested in the discourses of poverty in the 
LASDAP process in Viwandani. 
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Table 8.4: Cross Matching Themes, Categories and Representations in the Poverty Discourse 
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Inability to generate 
wealth 
              - 
Lack of basic 
services 
      X        1 
Unemployment      X        X 2 
Homelessness  X     X        2 
Widowed/orphaned        X X X X    4 
Marginal incomes  X X    X        3 
Reside in informal 
settlements 
 X X   X         3 
Helpless    X   X  X X     4 
Hopeless    X   X X  X     4 
Hungry    X   X X X      4 
Disabled    X   X X X X     5 
PLWHA    X   X X X X     5 
Prostitution    X   X X X   X   5 
Thieves / Gangsters    X   X X X X     5 
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The ideas that were least matched also had the least convergence; therefore they 
were also the most contested. Conversely, those ideas with higher convergence 
were less contested. From the analysis in Table 8.4, the idea of poverty as “inability 
to generate wealth” was most contested. The themes of helplessness, 
hopelessness, hunger, and disability, People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), 
prostitution and theft/gangsterism were the most widespread in the discourses of 
poverty. However, the technocrats of the City mainly espoused the idea of poverty as 
inability to create wealth. This was at variance with how the poor in Mukuru Kayaba 
and Lunga Lunga articulated poverty. Whilst the ideas espoused by community 
members were clearly widespread, these were marginalised and seldom reflected in 
the official LASDAP discourses of poverty that the institutional framework supported. 
These phenomena were typical expression of governmentality and immanence 
(Foucault, 1991; 2001; Deleuze and Guattari, 1998; Cahill, 2008). 
 
The negative discourse was also evident in the identification of the poor as PLWHAs, 
prostitutes, and thieves/gangsters. Although hushed, the PLWHAs for the most part 
were understood as promiscuous, immoral, a burden and without hope. The 
prostitutes were also seen as ‘survivors’. In Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga 
however, the prostitutes and thieves were generally applauded as innovative and 
creative for they sought alternatives to responding to the acute poverty. For instance, 
like many of his contemporaries, a young man in a conversation argued: 
 
If we steal, it is because we are helping ourselves out of desperate situations. 
It is for taking care of the basic needs of life. You know like buying food, a 
bed, and others. And yet when you steal you may also be favoured with a 
mobile phone and that fetches a lot of money that is helpful in meeting the 
basic needs of life including paying rent for accommodation (H. Abdallah, 
personal communication, December 28, 2006). 
 
From the above, the effect of the discourse of the poor and poverty was evidently 
beyond the domain of urban planning. Abdallah’s response above was incisive on 
the constructions of morality and poverty. While some of the poor acknowledged that 
they were often desperate and pushed to steal, they categorically rejected a 
moralising discourse that nonetheless, the webs of discourses and relationships also 
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extended to public safety and security in Viwandani and morality in general where 
some of the poor in Viwandani were produced as immoral, security risks, moral, and 
safe, amongst others. 
 
By relegating the same ideas of poverty, the institutional framework through condign 
power (Galbriath, 1983) supported the LASDAP and seemed to only recognise and 
focus on a generally limited scope of poverty/reduction in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga 
Lunga. But from the discussions I held with various groups of the poor, it was clear 
that poverty was much broader than lack of services and that the poor I purposively 
sampled could lucidly articulate the nuances as shown in Table 7.3. Furthermore, 
even though the poor may not have been fully aware of the LASDAP they were 
constrained from participating in the LASDAP, and the powerful were seldom held 
accountable. Not all the poor I purposively sampled through immanence (Foucault, 
1991; 2002; Cahill, 2008) resigned themselves to an oppressive state of affairs. 
 
The first and most common response by the poor as shown in section 8.2 above, 
was forming institutions and organisations that were responsive to their needs. 
Speaking to one of the women on this subject, she noted: 
 
It is tough, but we have to do something because of our desperate conditions. 
When we see one of us who are so hard pressed that there is no help, we 
have to seek ways for support. We form organisations from which we can 
provide some help, especially financial help. With such assistance, they can 
buy maize meal for the children and the rest of the family, or even for other 
needs like bus fare for school children. If we do not do something, there will 
be a problem. Our men are mainly desperate and have given up. They drown 
their sorrows in alcohol. Most of the men just drink as a way to forget the 
problems and also to cope with the challenges at home (P. Syawa, personal 
communication, December 28, 2006). 
 
While the LASDAP did not provide support for the very poor such as food and 
financial grants, from the responses of groups, particularly women groups, it was 
clear what responsive interventions could be. The women, like Peninah Syawa 
above alluded to, were abandoned by men. However, even in the women groups 
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there were differences in power that tended to further disadvantage the younger 
women who were not always accepted in youth groups that had male members. 
Because of unemployment most women groups operated merry-go-round credit 
schemes that also functioned as welfare groups where they made contributions to 
one of the members at specified intervals. From the contributions, members received 
loans to pay for basic needs or even to start up small businesses such as selling 
vegetables. 
 
Other women groups were self-help groups that were meant to help their members 
in times of need. Some of the women’s groups included Jamaica sisters, Kenya 
Women, Tumainini Women Group, Kamba Dancers Group, Amaki Group, and Inuka 
Women Group Jamii Bora Women Group, amongst others. The women groups 
played a very important role in sustaining the social and economic well-being of the 
members. Many women in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga claimed that they had 
been able to purchase household assets and food using monies raised through 
group contributions. But other groups such as St Monica Wajane invested in 
business and development projects. 
 
The second way that the poor responded was by building on their social capital to 
work together. The youth, women, and men played specific roles in addressing 
poverty. Thus, even with high social capital and willingness to work together, there 
were always some differences in what each group sought to do to reduce poverty or 
to cope with it. As mentioned above, the formation of groups provided an important 
avenue for working together. For the youth, they formed groups such as the Jamaica 
Youth Group, Lunga Lunga Youth Group, Kayambe Youth Group, Bombasi Youth 
Group, Komoko Youth Group and Vijana Youth Group. For example, the Lunga 
Lunga Youth Group was critical in fighting against all the kinds of discrimination. 
These groups also engaged in development projects and in income generating 
activities in the settlement such as garbage collection and transportation using hand 
push carts popularly known as mkokoteni. These groups had leaders who 
represented their members and highlighted cases of discrimination. The youth also 
said that they mostly faced harassment from police officers and City officials. This 
harassment was typical of power as a zero-sum game. Harassment, like other forms 
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of violence, was the typical method of coercion to force one’s decision/will over 
others. Because the police and City officials were powerful in the condign sense 
(Galbriath, 1983), they invariably exercised their power through a variety of violent 
means. But the youth, because power operates in all directions (Allen, 2003; Cahill, 
2008) also managed to cope with such violence from the police and City officials. 
 
Since the youth were increasingly mobilising each other and controlling productive 
resources such as spaces for markets, roads, and transport terminuses, they were 
also emerging as a powerful force (Allen, 2003) especially in Mukuru Kayaba. 
Unfortunately, the provincial administration and others in the formal institutional 
framework for implementing the LASDAP conveniently considered the youth groups 
as criminal gangs. This had a negative impact on the development initiatives of the 
youth; they were reluctant to openly conduct their businesses, as they feared to be 
harassed by security agents and the chief. According to the youth, the office of the 
chief and the elders in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga were the reason why 
youths were not advancing (J. Mutta, personal communication, December 28, 2006). 
 
The struggle, typified by the relations between the youth and actors in the formal 
institutional framework, deteriorated to such extremes that even proposals from the 
youth were allegedly always blocked. The youth further claimed that the elders 
together with the chief actively worked against their progress. The communal 
collective responsibility was not as solid and coherent in the whole of Mukuru 
Kayaba and Lunga Lunga. Therefore, this gave a leeway for these powerful 
institutions and criminal gangs such as the Mungiki to operate freely and even devise 
new ways of survival and operation (Anonymous, personal communication, 
December 30, 2006). 
 
Therefore, the youth convincingly argued that they were inevitably forced to engage 
in criminal activities like mugging people, which they termed as kusamehea, so as to 
get some income. The youth also engaged in crime as an income generating activity. 
This, they claimed was because of joblessness among the youth and corruption in 
the local chief’s office where the little funding and initiatives available for the youth 
were given to the older non-deserving men, hence not benefiting them. But 
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sustaining livelihoods through crime was not restricted to the youth alone; it included 
men and women (ibid.). The main point, however, was that power (Foucault, 1991; 
2001; Galbriath, 1983; Allen 2003; Cahill, 2008) greatly shaped how everyone 
related to the other. Much of the power and influence was directly correlated to 
access, ownership, use and control of wealth and productive assets (Allen, 2003). 
Hence, the LASDAP did not significantly change the power relations in Mukuru 
Kayaba and Lunga Lunga. 
 
From the above, the poor were resourceful, innovative, and because power operates 
in all directions, power was reproduced in social capital to adapt to the oppressive 
institutions. By using power through social capital, the poor were also able to shape 
their actions and behaviour in response to constraining factors to ensure social 
justice, equality of opportunity and sustainability and to promote the identity and 
dignity of the poor people, and marginalised population groups of Mukuru Kayaba 
and Lunga Lunga. But for these responses to be effective, in addition to social 
capital, the poor also required shared interests, social trust, respect, honesty, 
accountability, and discipline – an institutional framework, here understood as 
informal institutions. 
 
8.4 Fighting Poverty and Enacting Local Power in Viwandani 
 
The most commonly accepted view of power in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga 
was that power was inherent in powerful subjects such as the District Officer, the 
City officials, professionals and local gangs. For instance, the Provincial 
Administration whose main role is enforcement of law and order often responded to 
poverty in Viwandani by removing the ‘immoral’, thieves and hooligans. Explaining 
how the Provincial Administration participated in poverty reduction in Viwandani, the 
District Officer related: 
 
Although the Ministry of Local Government is also saying each and every 
division or district has its own problems as I have said earlier, so if you have 
your own problems let us identify them. We have a lot of people who are 
unemployed; we have a lot of hawkers. So do we just disregard them and just 
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tell them to keep off our streets? Let us go there and see in Makadara now we 
have so many hawkers here, let us identify those areas whereby the 
government can, but if it doesn’t have enough lands or the government can be 
able to acquire or maybe to lease or even if the government land is set aside 
for these entrepreneurs or for these poor people, so that they can be able to 
come up with small business. 
 
That is basically what the government is doing now. So in each and every 
division countrywide, all divisions starting from location level to the manifesto 
provincial level, we have market, which is the problem that we are facing. We 
have so many hawkers, we have so many Jua kali [scorching sun, referring to 
informal market] people, we have so many poor people and we assist them. 
That is how now we are coming up to eradicate this type of poverty, but 
previously we just said we have so many hawkers, they are disturbing us in 
our streets, let us chase them away, but where do you chase them away to? 
(T. Norot, personal communication, January 11, 2007) 
 
Normative notions of morality and acceptable behaviour/conduct such as freeing the 
streets of the hawker menace and providing employment generally informed such 
responses to poverty by the Provincial Administration. Yet to the residents, these 
interventions by the Provincial Administration were not only excessive harassment 
but also further condemned the poor in Viwandani into even deeper poverty as one 
of the residents observed: 
 
The Chief constantly detains our children. Some are hunted down on grounds 
that they are hard-core criminals whilst others are said to engage in 
dangerous occupations like prostitution. Sometimes there are also threats 
from the Chief and chairmen about the legality of our housing yet they don’t 
necessarily provide anything to improve our lives. When the river floods, there 
is not much help from them. We feel that as residents of these places we are 
treated like garbage and the sewage that flows in the River Kongo (M. Ngari, 
personal communication, December 23, 2006). 
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From the above, in Viwandani, power was clearly vested in the powerful. As Ngari 
(ibid.) revealed, criminalisation was the strategy deployed to maintain domination. 
This strategy was evidently so successful that there was a notion of the poor feeling 
like they were treated as lesser human beings and disposable like sewage (M. Ngari, 
personal communication, December 23, 2006; N. Tugi and J. Weru, personal 
communication, December 23, 2006). However, the existence of locally owned 
organisations, other ways of provisioning critical services, and thriving enterprise 
strongly suggested that the duality of the powerful and powerless was a partial 
account of enactment of power in Viwandani. For instance, the youth, through the 
Lunga Lunga Youth Group with support from NGOs such as Umande Trust, 
successfully mobilised resources and established a community facility that provided 
hot showers, flush toilets, and a business centre. The facility is shown in Figure 8.3 
below. 
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Figure 8.3: The Lunga Lunga Youth Bio-Tower Project 
 
Source: Author’s photograph 
 
The Lunga Lunga Youth Group also suggested that while the LASDAP may not have 
addressed poverty, there were similarly other ways of alleviating poverty in 
Viwandani. By recognising the power of the poor, it was also obvious that in 
Viwandani power was distributed through an intricate web of relations, practices and 
institutions that made some more powerful than others at different times. As Foucault 
(1991) would argue, the effects of power are dynamic and require constant 
reproduction. To explore the continuous reproduction of unstable power relations 
among the powerful and powerless, I examined how the institutions of the poor were 
formed, key services were provided and economic empowerment was pursued. 
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8.4.1 Formation of Institutions of the Poor 
 
In section 8.2, I showed the important institutions of the poor. Here, using two cases, 
I highlighted the different ways in which local power was enacted to redistribute 
power in Viwandani. I sought the biographical account of the Founder of the St. 
Monica Wajane Lunga Lunga Women’s Group (SMW) and sentiments of the leaders 
of the Lunga Lunga Youth Self-Help Group. Specific perspectives of their oppression 
and everyday life that was often excluded from the official discourses of the LASDAP 
were prised open. 
 
St Monica Women’s Group – aka St. Monica Wajane21 
 
Started in 1989, the St Monica Wajane Women’s Group comprised of about twenty 
widows. Some had since died. The local Catholic Church with the aim of addressing 
their indigence brought these widows together. According to the chairperson, this 
group was started because of: 
 
The desperate conditions we find ourselves in, we are often left with helpless 
children (orphans) who require to go to school, hungry grandchildren, lack of 
toilets and without access to credit. We got together and started a savings 
group; have invested in a public pay-toilet. We meet twice a week on 
Tuesdays and Wednesdays to collect savings from members for the group to 
invest (M. Gathii, personal communication, December 22, 2006 and January 
5, 2007). 
 
By coming together to establish SMW, the widows were able to identify their 
strengths. Through SMW, the previously desperate and helpless widows 
successfully challenged the notion that relief and provision for such powerless 
people had to come from external sources. Since the City of Nairobi was unable to 
help, the SMW mobilised widows to practically provide for their needs. Having first 
been organised with the help of the local Catholic Church, the SMW’s credibility was 
further enhanced and was able to attract further donor support from a humanitarian 
                                            
21
 Wajane is Kiswahili for widows. 
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organisation known as African Focus. Gathoni narrated the historical development of 
the SMW and said: 
 
From our weekly meetings, we managed to get support from our donor 
partners, African Focus. They [African Focus] have never abandoned us.  We 
have been able to develop a savings fund that has provided loans to 
members. We meet twice every week to collect savings from members and to 
consider our concerns. African Focus also provided us a generous grant that 
enabled us (St Monica Women’s Group) to build a public pay-toilet. This toilet 
was also a source of regular income for the past five years. We have, 
however, now closed down the toilet for maintenance (ibid.). 
 
Although essentially created by widows, the SMW allowed the beneficiaries of their 
members to continue membership in the group and to perform roles as members in 
the event of death of such a member. I found that in the case of two deceased 
members, their children continued making payments and contributing to the savings 
fund whenever that was possible. I was also told that the SMW continued to provide 
support to these children in the same manner as the deceased members had 
received. 
 
Whilst the data from the interview with Mary Gathii did not yield a specific 
conceptualisation of poverty reduction, from the description of the group’s activities 
and the inspection of the toilets and water points during the field studies it was 
possible to infer a much more generalised notion of poverty reduction. It was also 
evident in the work of the SWM that poverty reduction was seen to include: provision 
of basic services such as toilets and water; supplementing family incomes through 
the loans to members for petty trading; provision of rental housing to residents; 
provision of employment to the youth who built the toilets and other facilities for the 
group and providing credit to women, particularly widows. 
 
Yet even with SMW’s provision of toilets, it was evident that these toilets were only 
accessible by way of payment of a user fee. Therefore, it was only those residents 
with a surplus income who could use these toilets. It was unsuprising, therefore, that 
in the Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga villages, the precincts of the public pay-
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toilets were frequently strewn with faeces. With a user-fee of five shillings per visit to 
the toilet, only a few were justifiably able to use these services. 
 
The continued failure to use toilets could have meant that power was not enacted at 
the local level. However, this also showed that through SMW, immanence and 
condign power was re-distributed in Viwandani at different times in specific locations 
as widows and others who previously could not own assets such as the user-fee 
toilets, were able to own and use such facilities. Moreover, consistent with post-
structuralist notions of power as immanent (Foucault, 1991), the reproduction of the 
effects of power was enacted by both the powerful (for example the Catholic Church 
and donors) and the powerless (the widows) as they acted out their respective 
socially defined roles. 
 
As indicated above, the efforts by the SMW to reduce poverty were not without 
challenges. In addition to the limited access for services they provided to the 
residents, as a group the SMW had been providing some kind of subsidy to 
members in the form of cash. However, from 2006 this support was terminated. 
Gathii sadly noted: 
 
We are unable to give any support this year to our members. Everyone has to 
support his or herself because what we had is finished. We would have had 
some income from our toilets but these are being repaired and maintained. So 
until our business revives – the toilets are operational and there is additional 
income from the sale of water we cannot help (M. Gathii, personal 
communication, December 22, 2006 and January 5, 2007). 
 
As if the above was not enough, the St Monica Women’s group were also grappling 
with a huge water bill from the City of Nairobi. SMW’s unpaid water bill was 
illustrative of the wider problem in Viwandani. For instance, the water to Lunga 
Lunga had been terminated. There was more that could be discussed as challenges 
that faced the poverty reduction efforts of the SMW, but I will return to this subject as 
I show the enactment of power at the local level through the Lunga Lunga Youth 
Group. 
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The Lunga Lunga Youth Group 
 
The Lunga Lunga Youth Group (LLYG) was formed in 2004 and comprised of sixty 
members – 40 men and 20 women. Their chairman said that their motivation to 
coalesce and address poverty was: 
 
What we know City Council consider slums as a dumping site. It doesn’t 
consider that people live here. So, they consider this as a dumping site where 
all the sewage block we never see anyone. Unless miraculously maybe 
‘niifungue’ [unless I should open]. We don’t have those types of services. 
That’s why we are trying to bring up these projects whereby we can be 
manning our own environment. Whereby we can be manning our own 
garbage around with the community, disregarding City Council (N. Tugi, 
personal communication, December 23, 2006). 
 
The other members of the group agreed with their chairman noting that 
 
Just imagine it is about five years since we elected our Councillor and MP and 
the only thing we can be proud of is the patching up of the road22 with 
murram. Yet this road has been only recently fixed. The Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF) that is disbursed to each constituency has not even 
provided a thing in this village. There is nothing that the MP and Councillor 
have done (S. Tandi, P. Inge, and C. Amo, personal communication, 
December 23, 2006). 
 
Like the SWM, the LLYG, on working together unveiled condign and conditioned 
power (Galbriath, 1983) that they did not have as individual youth in Viwandani. The 
powerful City of Nairobi, politicians, and central government, even though they 
continued to ignore and marginalise the youth, could no longer hold back their 
potential. Working together and through condign and conditioned power, they were 
able to build a rare confidence. The LLYG were able to overcome self-condemnation 
sustained by a relentless normalisation of constructions of powerlessness that 
                                            
22
 I inspected this road during the field studies and it was approximately 70 metres long and about two 
metres wide. 
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dominant discourses transmitted (Foucault, 1991). On assessing the quality and 
impact of the poverty reduction interventions in Viwandani, the youth were less 
circumspect than the women and men I interviewed. They claimed that: 
 
The Catholic Church assists the poor and we say so because we have seen 
what we are talking about. For instance, our parents are utterly helpless. The 
sick ones in our community have been built for houses by the Church and not 
by the government. They (the Catholic Church) have done a lot in providing 
housing. The government has not helped anyone. I have been told severally 
by Mama Beth to compile a list of the poor and submit to the Chief but nothing 
has been done about that list. The Chief retorts often ‘you don’t want to return 
to your homes in the upcountry because you stay and enjoy in Nairobi’ (J. 
Weru, personal communication, December 23, 2006). 
 
Obviously, even when some in Viwandani such as the LLYG were able to fight 
poverty, the others as Weru’s (ibid.) account shows, were still helpless. That 
difference did not mean that resistance to power and reproduction of power within 
and across different social groups was not happening, but rather confirmed that 
enactment of power at the local level happens at different times and with varying 
impacts on the overall relations of power in Viwandani. 
 
Furthermore, these youth in the Lunga Lunga Youth Group considered several ideas 
to address poverty, but it was the bio-tower project and provision of security and 
cleaning of the settlement of garbage that was particularly successful in showing a 
reversal in relations of power. With the subsequent empowerment, the youth group 
who were previously powerless, without any income, and even not recognised, were 
so confident that they ‘acquired’ a parcel of land of approximately 84 square metres 
to establish a business centre. From such a hapless group of youth in one of 
Viwandani’s poorest communities, there now were a group that owned various 
businesses and a business centre that was also used as a social hall for meetings of 
the community. 
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Provisioning Services and Economic Empowerment 
The City and central government notionally provided services in Mukuru Kayaba and 
Lunga Lunga. However, the citizens, mainly through their own institutions sought to 
fill this vaccum. These institutions invariably owned business enterprises that availed 
critical services such as security, sanitation, water, lighting, housing, and solid waste 
management. Therefore, in fighting poverty and oppressive power, the institutions of 
the poor, economic empowerment and provision of services were evidently closely 
intertwined. To analyse how power was enacted at the local level to fight poverty, it 
was important to consider the access to, use and control of community assets. 
Seven economic and other productive activities were identified as critical in this 
respect. These included: water vending, small scale businesses, toilet and bath 
facilities, housing, lighting/electricity, solid waste management, and coordination of 
development interventions. 
 
Water Vending 
At the beginning of 2002, the Nairobi Water Company (NWC), NGOs such as 
Umande Trust, and some business people were the ones who sold water to the 
residents of Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga. This structure of provision of water 
clearly showed the residents as less powerful in a traditional patron-client 
relationship. At the time of my field studies, there was a marked change in the 
structure for provisioning water. The Lunga Lunga youth group, the Nyakweringeria 
group in Mukuru Kayaba, the Presbyterian and Catholic churches now sold potable 
water. By organising themselves to be able to sell water in Lunga Lunga, the youth 
not only participated in a monopolistic market, but also acquired a confidence, 
acceptance in the society and were recognised as important members of their 
community. The chairman of the group said: 
 
These days even the District Officer (DO) can meet with us [youth]. Because 
we have our hall, the DO comes here. There is no more need for the youth to 
sit in the scorching sun while the DO sits in a special tent! The other day, the 
Mayor, Mr. Dick Wathika, was also here to see us. We tried talking to him 
about the need to attend to the poor in Lunga Lunga. But it was all promises, 
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empty promises! Well, the councillor and headmen also regularly come to 
meet with us (N. Tugi, personal communication, December 23, 2006). 
 
The visits by obviously powerful persons to previously helpless poor youth of Lunga 
Lunga showed the extent to which the resistance by the poor had shifted the 
relations of power. Through their efforts at mobilising their resources, re-discovering 
their confidence and ultimately their power, the youth were not only recognised, but 
were also reluctantly included in discussions on their communities. 
 
By providing water pipes and water meters, the Nairobi Water Company also 
contributed towards water provision in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga. But what 
was significant was that in fighting poverty and the oppressive power, resistance was 
not always privileged. As groups such as the Lunga Lunga youth and 
Nyakweringeria group in Mukuru Kayaba continued to make decisions on their 
businesses, there was a clear and growing sense of confidence and shift in their 
relations with the City, the NWC, NGOs, and the central government. For the groups 
involved in water vending in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga, there was growing 
recognition and also ability to question some of the injustices in these settlements. 
For instance, Mary Gathoni noted: 
 
We [St Monica Wajane] are now known and recognised far and wide. For 
example, our Priest talks about the work of our group and others in the slums 
of Lunga Lunga and Mukuru Kayaba. We can now even go out to talk to 
donors and other people who may be interested in the work of our groups. Of 
course we still have challenges. Our members are old and widowed and 
several times this discourages us and affects our confidence. But we are 
working. Men have always exploited us. They would, in the past, have wished 
to join our group and act as chairman or treasurer. But we have encouraged 
them to leave us alone; they can form their own groups. I have told them if 
they are stuck and need help, to call me I can always assist them [the men] to 
form and strengthen their own groups. They have failed to form their own 
groups. We do not wish to be in the same groups with them. Sometimes they 
are simply drunk, lazy and unhelpful. It is not good to be in the same group 
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with such people who will pull us down (M. Gathii, personal communication, 
December 22, 2006). 
 
While the poor in some instances worked within the existing structures of power, 
there was also resistance from the powerful. Many in the City and central 
government felt that the poor were not capable of performing roles such as water 
vending or even managing such complex businesses. As some City officials stated: 
“They [the poor] do not have the capacity to implement these projects, they lack the 
skills and expertise” (R. Amina, personal communications, November 7, 2005). Even 
if this were true, it detracted from the changing power relations and from the notion 
that the poor in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga were not entirely helpless and 
hopeless. 
 
Small-Scale Businesses 
The diversity of small businesses owned by the residents in Mukuru Kayaba and 
Lunga Lunga was an indisputable confirmation of belief in their own power. These 
businesses included shops, spaces for selling airtime, vegetables sold in the front of 
their homes, clinics, child-care centres, bars, restaurants, carpentry workshops, 
laundry, second hand clothes and used electronics among many others. 
Surprisingly, the City licensed several of these businesses. In some cases traders 
paid as much as twenty-five shillings each day. However, there were times when the 
residents refused to pay these fees. One of the residents said 
 
If I have not sold I will not pay. But even when I have sold and would like to 
pay, the City officials always harass us asking for bribes of between five 
hundred and two thousand shillings. That is a lot of money. I cannot afford it. 
My colleagues can also not afford it. You have to find a solution. If you are 
taken to court, the fines are much higher. You may be imprisoned and end up 
losing a lot of time and business. So we have to struggle. Sometimes we are 
able to sell and in other cases we are not (M. Anyima, personal 
communication, October 25, 2010). 
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The City’s presence was noticeable in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga for 
harassment in the collection of levies and licensing fees. The aggression of the City 
officials notwithstanding, business remained vibrant. Any available space was useful 
for one trade or another. For instance, it occupied the railway lines and adjoining 
space. This space was personalised by constructing sheds to shelter their 
businesses and in some cases these spaces were used as homes. Because of 
inadequate space and an ever-increasing number of traders, many traders could 
only display their commodities on the railway line. The photo in Figure 8.4 shows a 
typical small businesses scene. 
 
Figure 8.4: Small businesses in Lunga Lunga 
 
Source: Author’s photograph (2006). 
 
Business was clearly not without further challenges. It was very difficult to secure 
spaces within the settlement to locate individual businesses, thus the poor were 
invariably vulnerable to abuse and exploitation by chairmen and chiefs who 
controlled land in these settlements. In these cases, the poor were subject to the 
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rent-seeking actions of the administration and City officials. The other challenges 
faced by the business community of Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga included: lack 
of capital to expand their businesses, lack of access to loans, high insecurity 
(including robbery) and frequent fire outbreaks that destroyed assets of the poor and 
their businesses. 
 
Garbage collection 
Solid waste was mainly disposed in open areas, especially along the narrow roads 
and in common garbage heaps. In some cases the residents paid forty shillings each 
week for their household garbage to be collected. But this garbage from the 
households was mainly strewn in the open sewage in the area. The most common 
solid waste produced in these households was polythene bags and household 
waste. Because of the indiscriminate mode of waste disposal in the sewage, the 
derelict conditions, and absence of repairs, these sewage lines were constantly 
blocked. However, through garbage collection where community paid for the service, 
and recycling, the youth were able to obtain some employment and additional 
income. 
 
Furthermore, the ‘dumping’ sites were also useful resources for the youth. Most 
collected plastic bottles, scrap metals and other valuable things that they sold to get 
more income. Some of the groups that engaged in garbage collection included: the 
Lunga Lunga youth group, global youth for action and South B transport self-help 
association. 
 
Supply of electricity 
The access to and use of electricity in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga was 
another way in which the poor challenged power relations by working within the 
existing power structures. Although Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga were the 
poorest in Viwandani ward, the majority of the households had access to and indeed 
used electricity for lighting, ironing and for television. Figure 7.5 shows a section of 
Mukuru Kayaba and the proliferation of television aerials and televisions that 
residents had connected to electricity procuring from both legal and illegal sources. 
Figure 8.5: Access to and Use of Electricity in Mukuru Kayaba 
 
Source: Author’s photograph (2007). 
 
The residents confirmed that there was a “cartel” that controlled the supply of 
electricity in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga Lunga. They further claimed that this 
cartel consist of individuals who were duly authorised by the Kenya Power 
and Lighting Company (KPLC) to connect to electricity lines. But it was 
through the legal connections that an avenue for tapping for additional and 
unauthorised connections was possible. Furthermore, it was also claimed that 
the “cartel” enjoyed “protection” from senior staff in KPLC who also benefited 
from this business (Anonymous, personal communication, January 15 2007). 
 
By working with bona fide clients/customers of the KPLC, spaces were 
created for the poor to enact power in different ways. It was no longer the 
KPLC and her customers that were powerful and could enjoy lighting, but the 
poor were also able to enjoy lighting from different sources. This electricity 
was supplied at three hundred and fifty shillings for each room per month paid 
to the “cartel”. Admittedly, from the widely known perpetual complaints of the 
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KPLC, this company suffered heavy losses, but in a rather strange way, the 
poor were also able to buy televisions and view television like their 
counterparts. Moreover, because of the easy access to electricity, the poor in 
Mukuru Kayaba were able to closely follow the English Premier League 
soccer and kept up to date with the current movies in the local theatres, which 
operated on a 24-hour basis in these settlements. The youth confidently 
discussed international politics and soccer in detail so that they felt they were 
not excluded from the globalisation phenomenon that was gripping Nairobi. 
 
Unsurprisingly, challenging the formal structures of power through the supply 
of electricity greatly endangered the poor in Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga 
Lunga. Figures 8.4 and 8.5 show the people encroaching in restricted and 
dangerous areas such as the electricity way leaves and railway lines. It was 
therefore difficult for KPLC and the railway Company to carry out any 
maintenance. The poor, particularly their children, were also exposed to 
numerous health risks. The women and youth further claimed that whenever 
there was an outbreak of fire in these settlements, it was attributed to the 
dangerous ways in which electricity was provided to Mukuru Kayaba and 
Lunga Lunga. 
 
Because of the heavy losses incurred by the KPLC, there were attempts to 
control illegal connections and also to indirectly restore the power relations 
between the powerful, powerless and poor to the status quo where the poor 
did not have access to electricity. The residents claimed that in some cases 
extreme measures such as removal of transformers or even the hiring thugs 
to burn down the homes of the poor were employed. Staff of the KPLC were 
often threatened (Anonymous, personal communication, 29 December, 2006). 
Indeed, in one case, following such fire in Mukuru Kayaba, the Member of 
Parliament, the Hon. Reuben Ndolo, publicly on television incited the 
residents, urging them to burn such staff using used tires. Conflicts and even 
violence between the KPLC and the people of Mukuru Kayaba and Lunga 
Lunga is a regular occurrence. 
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8.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown the ways in which the poor in Mukuru Kayaba and 
Lunga Lunga overcame facipulation, resisted oppressive power and ensured 
they had more than a puny provision of select basic services. The important 
institutions for the poor addressed their immediate and strategic needs; and 
also tended to be located within these settlements, and were often owned by 
the communities. These institutions were also the ones in which the poor had 
a lot of trust, thus, were highly relevant to the poor and they held these 
institutions in high esteem. To successfully resist oppressive power and fight 
poverty, the poor were clearly resourceful, innovative, and deployed social 
capital. This was also useful in adapting to the oppressive institutions. By 
using a complex combination of immanence, condign and conditioned power 
in social capital the poor were able to shape their own actions and behaviour 
to respond to numerous constraining factors. The poor also required 
facipulation, shared interests, social trust, respect, honesty, accountability, 
and discipline for their responses to be effective.  
 
The poor in my study are not always powerless, hopeless, and hapless. In a 
way, this goes beyond the typical blame that is often attributed to the Africans 
(Mbembe, 2000). In the final chapter of this thesis I will draw together 
contributions from the history of the development of institutions for urban 
planning in Kenya and the case study of implementing the LASDAP in 
Nairobi’s Viwandani ward, to enable a more appropriate way of understanding 
and furthering the question of urban planning for poverty reduction and the 
impact of policy and institutional contexts on urban planning to reduce 
poverty. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CHALLENGES OF URBAN PLANNING FOR POVERTY 
REDUCTION: INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters presented a wide-ranging account of the challenges of 
urban planning for poverty reduction in urban Kenya and more so in the 
Viwandani ward in the City of Nairobi. This chapter presents insights from the 
main study findings and their implications for urban planning for poverty 
reduction by public institutions. The research question that this study sought 
to address was: What are the challenges of planning for poverty reduction by 
public institutions in urban Kenya? To address this research question, the 
experience of a planning approach widely believed to be progressive, the 
LASDAP, in Nairobi’s poorest ward, Viwandani, was used. To analyse the 
relationship between the institutional and policy frameworks and urban 
planning for poverty reduction, this research was guided by seven specific 
questions; namely: 
 
a) What was the institutional framework for urban planning in Kenya in 
2005-2007? 
b) How did the institutional framework link/affect poverty reduction 
processes? 
c) How did the institutional framework affect citizen participation in urban 
planning? 
d) What mechanisms existed in the institutional framework for citizens to 
express their priorities and preferences in urban planning? 
e) What were the various state attempts made to deal with poverty 
reduction in urban areas? 
f) To what extent did (planning) interventions respond to urban poverty? 
g) What was the power dynamics within the institutional and policy 
framework of urban planning for poverty reduction? 
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The extensive review of literature for this study showed that very little was 
known about the challenges faced by public institutions in planning for poverty 
reduction, particularly in urban Kenya. Hence, the topic, public institutions and 
urban planning for poverty reduction, needed to be explored in significant 
depth. For such exploratory research, Lincoln and Guba (1985) advise that 
the social phenomena are investigated with minimal a priori expectations if 
explanations for such phenomena are to be availed. In this study, the 
research question dictated a qualitative research methodology, which was 
also deemed appropriate for answering the research questions above. 
 
Ideas of “power”, “poverty”, and “institutions”, were explored to build an 
overarching conceptual framework for the study. The literature, which 
spanned from politics, institutionalism, power, planning, urban, and 
development studies suggested five key concepts to analyse urban planning 
for poverty reduction by public institutions. These concepts included: 
appropriateness of power, institutional frameworks, participation, 
accountability, and responsiveness. 
 
The historical background to the development of key public institutions in 
Kenya is presented in Chapter Three. The main finding in Chapter Three is 
that the growth and development of political institutions in Kenya was inimical 
to urban planning for poverty reduction. In analysing the institutional 
framework for urban planning in Nairobi, this study finds, as presented in 
Chapter Four, that the institutional framework does not support citizen 
participation and accountability in urban planning. In Chapters Three and Four 
the context for urban planning at a national level and in the City of Nairobi is 
unravelled.  
 
The empirical argumentation that addresses the research questions is 
presented in Chapters Five to Chapter Eight. In Chapters Five, Six, Seven, 
and Eight, evidence from implementation of the LASDAP in the Viwandani 
case further highlights the challenges public institutions face in planning for 
poverty reduction. The Viwandani case reveals several important findings. 
The first, as presented, is that in a context of an established dictatorship and 
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manipulation the LASDAP in the study period (2005-2007) barely supported 
participation. Attempts at participation were unconvincing and in Arnstein’s 
(1969) view of participation were mere therapy and varying shades of 
tokenism. Secondly, the study also detemines that accountability was 
carefully undermined by the LASDAP. Chapter Six also shows that the 
powerful, who were also often the non-poor, were silenced or muzzled 
through the use of condign and conditioned power. But even when the poor 
and seemingly powerless were subjected to oppressive power and puny 
provision of token select services, this study finds that they were not always 
powerless and helpless. The third main finding from the Viwandani case as 
Chapter Seven shows, is that, when the essence of lives of the poor and 
powerless was threatened, they not only overcame facipulation, but also 
exhibited power, hope, resilience, and ingenuity; and adapted their lives to 
survive the hostile and demeaning conditions of poverty in Viwandani. 
 
9.2 Public Institutions, Urban Planning and Poverty Reduction: 
Empirical Insights 
 
This study seeks to understand the challenges public institutions face in urban 
planning for poverty reduction in urban Kenya. A specific case, the LASDAP 
in Nairobi’s Viwandani ward, is used to investigate these phenomena; but an 
institutional context at a national scale is provided in Chapters Three and 
Four. Epistemologically, the point of departure is that for an exploratory 
qualitative case study such as this one, analysis of the national context is 
critical both to situate and broaden the contextual analysis since national-local 
level relations matter in the growth, development and operationalisation of 
institutional frameworks. The remaining parts of this section provide the 
empirical insights availed in addressing the research questions that guide this 
study. 
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9.2.1 Institutional Framework for Urban Planning 
 
While there is information, particularly in Government of Kenya publications, 
on the functions of different institutions, this study is the first to analyse these 
institutions in relation to poverty reduction, and the extent to which these 
institutions enhance or constrain citizen participation and accountability of 
public officers. This study finds that the processes of constitutional 
development affect the form and types of political institutions for urban 
planning. Before independence, during the first republic, and the period 
leading to the birth of Second Republic, the constitution invariably shaped the 
type and role of public institutions. This study then draws on existing literature 
(North, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Lane, 2005) and also found that institutions 
constrain behaviour and shape behaviour of actors. 
 
Even though there are numerous institutions that have been established, 
including more recently a progressive Constitution (Republic of Kenya, 2010) 
that recognises and seeks to protect the poor, subversion by the Office of the 
President and resistance to reform continue to undermine the effectiveness of 
these institutions. The latter seems to vindicate Mbembe’s (2000) argument 
that state power in Africa is “obscene and vulgar.” To achieve an urban 
planning framework for poverty reduction, therefore, institutional reform 
processes should be cognisant of and address the insidious power 
represented by the reluctance to shift the current institutional framework from 
the status quo and align it to the aspirations of the recently promulgated 
constitution. Further, even though condign and conditioned power (Galbriath, 
1983) is necessary in such institutional reforms, if the progressive aspirations 
in the constitution are to be realised, Foucault’s (1991) notion of immanence 
power is indispensable. 
 
In the same vein, at the city level, a crowding-out (see Table 5.3) of the City 
Council of Nairobi by national level institutions, particularly the Office of the 
President, is ubiquitous. The effect is undoubtedly the fragmentation of efforts 
for poverty reduction while at the same time invisiblising urban poverty in the 
City by focusing on rural poverty on one hand, and on the other hand 
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emphasising service provision in the city. Further, at the City of Nairobi, the 
Town Clerk and his senior managers such as the Director of City Planning, 
and the Councillors dominate the decision-making processes of the City. 
Compared to the role of central government, the dominance of technocrats at 
the City level is considered insignificant. 
 
While respondents from central government perceived their role as advisory, 
their interventions, mainly in the form of sanctions, contradicted their view. 
Just as the central government frustrates the City, the City also frustrates its 
operations at the sub-city level. At the Viwandani ward, there were no records 
about the implementation of the LASDAP at all. From the perspective of the 
citizens, the institutional framework was clearly undermining the LASDAP. 
 
The ease with which the constitution was amended from 1964 through to 
1991 proved a double-edged sword for creating institutions in terms of 
participation and accountability. Through a system of amendments Kenya slid 
into a dictatorship that eschewed participation and accountability. But it is also 
through the 1991 constitutional amendments that the rebirth of political 
institutions was possible. It is justifiable to argue that with a new progressive 
constitution citizen participation and accountability of public officials is 
secured. But given the way public policy is developed in Kenya – proposals 
for elaborate systems of stakeholder forums under the aegis of the Office of 
the President to mean citizen participation - it is not unlikely that realisation of 
participation guaranteed in the Constitution of Kenya (2010) is impossible if 
future policy development does not ensure that those excluded by poverty 
and discrimination are empowered to take up opportunities presented by the 
constitution, can influence and control decision-making, and are able to 
exercise agency through institutions they shape for themselves. Moreover, 
because of facipulation and the façade of participation it portrays, it is highly 
likely that participation, even though guaranteed, can remain a perpetual 
illusion. 
 
This study also finds that the legal framework for urban planning in Kenya 
does not generally support citizen participation and accountability. For 
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instance, the Physical Planning Act does not recognise informal or irregular 
settlements. Together with virtually obsolete land laws that do not provide any 
tenure rights to the poor, squatters and other groups of the urban poor, 
responding to urban poverty is extremely difficult. The study further finds that 
participation within the Physical Planning Act is at the discretion of a powerful 
Director of Physical Planning. Not unexpectedly, there are no sanctions and 
mechanisms provided by this Act to ensure the answerability of public officers 
to the citizens. The Environmental Management and Coordination Act, 1999 
and the Water Act of 2003 on the other hand are the exception in the planning 
framework. This difference lies in the provision of locus standi rules that 
allows citizens to initiate public interest legal proceedings whether or not 
directly affected by any incidences of environmental degradation. But like the 
other laws, the EMCA and the Water Act are also anchored on a 
stakeholder’s involvement (model) that only pays lip service to participation. 
 
At the city level, there is an overlap of frameworks and institutions but with a 
clear dominance of the national level institutions, especially the Office of the 
President. The Local Government Act, which is the main statute governing the 
City of Nairobi, does not create an entitlement to participation by citizens. For 
instance, while citizens are allowed to attend full council meetings, they do so 
only as observers. Moreover, this Act does not provide for the council to 
consult the opinion of citizens. While citizen-initiated contact is not outlawed, 
according to the Local Government Act, any such citizen-initiated interaction 
can only proceed with the sanction of the chairman or if the residents manage 
to convince at least one-third of the council members to sign a request for a 
special meeting of the council. 
 
The legal framework that is intended to operationalise the Constitution (2010) 
that guarantees participation of citizens and accountability of public officers in 
their discharge of public roles such as urban planning is generally incongruent 
to the latter. Because of the above, it follows that if the space of participation 
and accountability is to be significantly increased and secured, then these 
roles should be clearly specified according to Arnstein’s ideas of partnership, 
delegated power, and citizen control (Arnstein, 1969:217). Ideas of 
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consultations built on stakeholder models or approaches, where the 
government – central or local - determine who participates, how they 
participate, as currently suggested by the government, should be completely 
eschewed if the institutional framework, especially the planning laws, are to 
enhance participation of citizens and the accountability of public officers. 
Because power is dynamic and is lived in institutions, these institutions must 
of necessity be dynamic, thus reform is inevitable. When those charged with 
ensuring that these institutions remain dynamic or relevant fail, the others 
affected by the increasing anachronism and irrelevancy invariably act to 
restore relevance. 
 
9.2.2 Citizen Participation in Urban Planning 
 
The study finds that from the onset of the Republic of Kenya participation and 
accountability were not recognised as important values. The foundations for 
the exclusion of the poor, and later in independent Kenya the citizens, were 
laid before independence. The 1964 constitutional amendment that made 
Kenya a republic also created an imperial President with unfettered power. 
The study finds that from 1964 through to the time of this research, voting was 
the main mechanism for participation. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that 
in this line of thought multi-party political democracy is analogous to citizen 
participation. 
 
From a constitutional perspective, the overall framework for urban planning for 
poverty reduction stymied considerable space for accountability and citizen 
participation. There was no recourse as key political institutions such as the 
judiciary, the public service, police, and the military had been emasculated by 
the presidency. Since the constitution was not supportive of participation and 
accountability, the planning law rubric predictably restricted space for citizen 
participation and did not provide for significant accountability by public 
officers. 
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Participation in the LASDAP was by invitation even when public notices were 
posted in discrete places in Viwandani. This practice is neither new nor limited 
to the LASDAP, but as literature (Chambers, 2005; Brock, Cornwall and 
Gaventa, 2001; Cook and Sverrison, 2001) shows, these are typical 
challenges of participation and are consistent with Arnstein’s (1969) view of 
the difficulty of participation in the first ranks of the ladder of participation. This 
study thus shows the usefulness of Arnstein’s (1969) notion of participation in 
unveiling the challenges of participation in a nascent democracy as the re-
birth of public institutions indicates. With only ten of a possible 100 thousand 
people for the LASDAP to rely on a single notice and unconfirmed invitations 
to civil society organisations, it is not surprising that the majority of my 
respondents among the residents of Viwandani were not aware of the 
LASDAP. 
 
Compared to participatory processes such as the participatory budgeting 
processes in Brazil (Coehlo, 2004; Acharya, Lavalle and Houtzager, 2004), 
participation referred to in the LASDAP in Viwandani is simply a sophisticated 
form of manipulation of citizens that is appropriately conceptualised as 
facipulation. The suggestion that if participation was assured in the LASDAP 
then the citizens would accurately identify their needs and priorities, which 
would in turn be addressed through the LASDAP, thereby addressing poverty, 
cannot be supported because the LASDAP was not participatory. My analysis 
of the views of officials of the City of Nairobi and politicians revealed that the 
Council tightly controlled the invitations and discussions during the 
consultations and even what was finally approved at the full council meetings. 
This research built on Chambers’s (2005) position that power is extremely 
important in participatory processes, including participatory process in urban 
planning for poverty reduction. Therefore the study concludes that 
participation that ignores power is unlikely to be effective in its objectives. The 
methodology used also makes sure that this research goes beyond the issues 
of representation, information flows and the capacity of representatives “to act 
as intermediaries between constituents and participatory forums” (Mitullah, 
2004:101). By exploring how power affects participation in a framework for 
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urban planning for poverty reduction, this research seeks to deepen the 
empirical understanding of effectiveness of participation. 
 
9.2.3 Government Responsiveness to Urban Poverty 
 
Poverty reduction has not always been an important priority of the 
government. There was an initial interest shortly after independence as 
articulated in the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, but this petered out and 
only re-surfaced in the late 1980s. The findings of this research show that 
poverty at the national level was scarcely addressed beyond the rhetoric. The 
1999 National Poverty Eradication Plan and the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers in the early 2000s show a remarkable shift towards an undertaking to 
address poverty. However, absent in this plan and earlier responses to 
poverty are significant measures to address urban poverty. 
 
The current Constitution (2010) in Articles 39 and 43 provides a progressive 
framework for addressing urban poverty. This study highlights the challenges 
urban poverty in Viwandani and similar contexts present in operationalising a 
progressive constitution through older order oppressive public institutions. 
Although at the time of my fieldwork the progressive Constitution was not yet 
in place, this particular finding in terms of clarity of expression and good 
intentions generally agrees with Watson’s (2002) conclusion from the 
investigation of the role of power in metropolitan planning in Cape Town: 
 
However well-designed and however well-intentioned a metropolitan 
planning process may be, it will present an opportunity for the exercise of 
power which could be simultaneously (but unpredictably) positive, or 
negative and dominatory. This is one important conclusion which can be 
drawn from the Forum years of the MSDF [the Metropolitan Spatial 
Development Framework] (Watson, 2002:133). 
 
This research, thus, like Flyvbjerg (1998) and Watson (2002) has sought not 
only shows the ubiquitous quality of power relations but also how power 
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relations shape, and even alter planning outcomes. The conclusion is that 
good and clearly stated intentions that include poverty, the poor and poverty 
reduction in plans are not sufficient in and of themselves in ensuring that 
poverty, poverty reduction and the poor are explicitly addressed in plans. 
Even though the intentions to address poverty are clearly stated in the 
Constitution (before the 2010 Constitution), these are not in the plans for the 
city. Moreover, in operationalising these intentions, the interests of the status 
quo and powerful tend to dominate. 
 
From the case of Viwandani, this research shows that poverty was not 
significantly addressed through the LASDAP. This research agrees with 
others like Charlton and Kihato (2006) that show that promoting and delivering 
services do not necessarily reduce poverty. In Viwandani the renovation of the 
dispensary, repair of the road and construction of the footbridge did not 
significantly affect the poverty of the residents. 
 
Since the LASDAP allocations were invariably equally allocated amongst the 
55 wards irrespective of the prevalence of poverty and other needs, the poor 
were correspondingly marginalised in the LASDAP. Obviously, with an 
average of 5 million shillings (equivalent of U.S. $ 50,000) allocated each year 
to Viwandani ward as a result of equal as opposed to equitable allocation of 
the LASDAP, in Viwandani it was safer to prioritise and implement “safe” 
community infrastructure projects like providing murram for a few metres of 
seasonal roads. Of the U.S.$ 170 thousand allocated to Viwandani ward 
during the study period, only U.S.$ 18.6 thousand was eventually spent on a 
range of small auxiliary projects such as construction of the footbridge across 
River Kongo, renovation of the Lunga Lunga dispensary, maintenance of 
some community roads, and provision of primary school bursaries. 
 
Although the discourses of poverty in the LASDAP yielded diverse views of 
what poverty is and who the poor were, these diverse views seldom informed 
the LASDAP planning processes in Nairobi’s Viwandani ward. Furthermore, 
since the other views of poverty were edged out and even the dominant 
notions of poverty did not necessarily inform the LASDAP processes in 
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Viwandani, the targeting of LASDAP projects such as the public toilets and 
the foot bridge was often too broad to be effective in addressing poverty and 
the poor. Thus, it is justifiable for this study to agree with the residents of 
Viwandani who conclude that the City of Nairobi was not addressing poverty. 
 
This research also finds that by constituting and normalising a specific notion 
of poverty reduction, as the puny provision of select basic community 
services, the LASDAP did not significantly address poverty. Four discursive 
strategies were identified as critical techniques in constituting and normalising 
a truncated view of poverty reduction. These are: conflating service delivery 
with poverty reduction; configuring the LASDAP as a participatory process in 
which citizens identified their priorities; showing the City of Nairobi as 
benevolent and helping ungrateful poor despite the City’s obvious financial 
dificulties; and finally constructing the citizens of Viwandani as indeed well-
served by the City of Nairobi. 
 
Because the City has not had a clear view of poverty or an explicit poverty 
reduction plan, in the LASDAP in Viwandani the City maintained a restricted 
notion of poverty. It was not surprising that as at the national level where the 
State did not significantly impact poverty, in Viwandani the City of Nairobi did 
not significantly reduce poverty. It follows, therefore, that for urban planning to 
address poverty in Viwandani and similar contexts, it is imperative that clarity 
of the phenomenon or problem is gained and deliberate strategies to address 
it are proposed. 
 
9.2.4 Power in the Institutional Framework 
 
By using condign, conditioned and compensatory power as well as through 
immanence, this study finds that from independence, the assault on political 
institutions was facilitated in three main ways, namely: amendments to the 
constitution, assassination of influential dissenting political leaders, and 
intolerance and intimidation of dissenting voices. The imperial presidency that 
coerces citizens and other public servants to some extent exhibits Galbriath’s 
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(1983) notion of condign power. Through constitutional amendments a 
president is able to control all the nation’s resources and decide on their use 
and access. 
 
Foucault’s (1991) notion of power as immanent is useful in understanding that 
while the government was clearly dominant and powerful, the dominated are 
also able to ‘reproduce’ practices and discourses that sometimes maintain or 
change the power relations between the oppressor and oppressed. The 
rebellion that ruptured in 1982 that climaxed in the failed coup d etat clearly 
shows how the dominated and oppressed reproduce power relations. 
 
This study builds on Foucault’s (1991) and Cahill’s (2008) notions of power 
being held by both the powerful and seemingly powerless. Similarly, even 
when the institutional framework for planning for poverty reduction was clearly 
oppressive and stifling, the resilience of the poor suggests there is another 
institutional framework that that is relevant to the poor, which sustained their 
hope and made resistance to the oppressive power possible. The important 
institutions in the “alternative” framework were organisations formed by the 
poor and the Catholic Church. These organisations mainly addressed health, 
safety, environmental health, disaster management, funerals, crime, and 
violence in their communities. Here this study builds on the notion in 
development that power rests in finite resources and institutions (Kilby, 2002; 
Mayoux, 2002). 
 
Whilst Allen (2003) considers the above notion as disempowering to the 
powerless, this study, on the contrary, views or shows that the poor, through 
their institutions are able to mobilise power, thereby transforming being 
powerless to being powerful and able to challenge oppressive power that 
restricts their accumulation of “things.” Through these institutions the poor I 
purposively sampled in Viwandani effectively confronted oppressive power 
that marginalised them and were able to provide electricity, water, operate 
businesses, provide toilets, housing and collect garbage through alternative 
but severely constrained and compromised means. 
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Each law and policy in the legal framework for urban planning defines and 
sets out the relations between the citizens, the state and others. But these 
legally defined positions and relations also create authority and provide 
legitimacy in the distribution of power in planning. This study finds that power 
impacts on participation and accountability in the institutional framework for 
urban planning for poverty reduction in Nairobi’s Viwandani ward. 
 
On the political front, the Councillor, Member of Parliament, politicians, City of 
Nairobi officials, planners and other professionals, and the private business 
owners are more powerful whilst the poor are relatively powerless but at times 
are just as powerful if not more powerful than the non-poor. The powerful are 
through the use of their power, able to contain the poor in squalid, over-
crowded spaces while living in relatively well-planned neighbourhoods. But 
even when the LASDAP processes produced priorities, the Councillors at the 
full council meetings invariably amend these priorities. As in the case of Sager 
and Ravlum’s (2005) study that shows why Norwegian parliamentarians on 
the transport committees ignore expert opinion, the institutional analysis 
approach adopted in this study also analyses the effect of power, and 
provides a useful way to understand why politicians may not implement 
planning proposals for poverty reduction prepared by technocrats from the 
City of Nairobi. 
 
There is also a way in which the decision-making in the LASDAPS builds on 
Forester’s (1999) notion of power as agenda setting. To the extent that there 
is a struggle to influence and dominate interests in the struggle between the 
City’s technocrats and politicians the latter carefully use the agenda of Council 
meetings to exclude the poor. It is reasonable, therefore, to argue that the 
LASDAP is justifiably best understood as agenda setting. However, the 
overall context in which the LASDAP is implemented is far from the 
participatory planning envisaged by Forester (1999). Thus far, this study has 
shown, as Forester (1999:175) would say, “…power shapes practice.” 
Although Forester (ibid.) is critical of analyses that end with the above 
conclusion, the nature of the problem that this study sought to address meant 
that it would not be possible to establish what good urban planning for poverty 
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reduction would be. Instead, having established how the poor and non-poor 
interpret poverty and urban planning in Viwandani, then the progressive 
planning that follows from this analysis should be more sensitive to the needs 
of the poor. 
 
9.3 On Public Institutions Planning for Urban Poverty Reduction 
 
This study also builds on Moser’s (1995) work that assesses the relationship 
between urban social policy and poverty reduction by exploring the 
relationship between urban planning by public institutions and poverty 
reduction. Unlike Moser (1995), this study specifically explores the challenges 
public institutions face. The epistemological and ontological approach that this 
study adopted shows that power greatly influences not only the relationship 
between planning and poverty reduction; but also adds layers of complexity to 
the challenges of institutionalising and operationalising urban planning for 
poverty reduction. By identifying what constricts the institutionalisation and 
operationalisation of urban planning for poverty reduction, rather than what 
normative urban planning for poverty reduction is, the study shows the 
significance of governance, power, and institutions in urban planning for 
poverty reduction. Thus, this study contributes to the growing body of 
knowledge on urban planning and institutionalism. 
 
It is imperative that urban planning for poverty reduction should in addition to 
focusing on the poor, ensure that institutional change management is 
germane to practice and always seek to understand how the excluded 
respond to exclusion, deprivation, oppression, and how they participate in 
their everyday lives. This should be for the purpose of ensuring that urban 
planning for poverty reduction is always relevant and effective. The corollary 
is that if the reverse is the case, the poor, excluded and oppressed will 
invariably use governmental attributes, reproduce other power relations that 
will change the form and practice of urban planning for poverty reduction. 
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This study was an explorative qualitative case study of urban planning for 
poverty reduction by public institutions in Nairobi’s Viwandani ward. Previous 
studies did not directly address the dynamics of urban planning by public 
institutions that might affect poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan African cities. 
Therefore, this study makes a useful contribution to the literature on urban 
planning by public institutions and poverty reduction. 
 
By bringing together Checkoway’s (1994) notion of citizen participation in 
planning processes, Arnstein’s (1969) ideas of participation as manipulation, 
and Forester’s (1999) deliberative practice, this study shows how power 
aggravates the institutional challenges of urban planning for poverty 
reduction. Additionally, by concentrating on the poorest ward in Nairobi the 
study also contributes further information on the LASDAP and public 
institutions’ planning for urban poverty reduction in Nairobi, an area that is yet 
to be investigated in significant depth. 
 
This study has sought to make an important addition to the literature on 
poverty and planning in Nairobi. By examining how institutional frameworks 
for planning for poverty reduction constrain or enhance the responsiveness of 
urban planning in poverty reduction, the study shows the significance of 
institutions in planning. Since this study was aimed at describing and 
explaining an emerging phenomenon of urban planning for poverty reduction, 
and illuminate the impact of institutional frameworks on urban planning, it 
adds to a base of largely little known information on urban planning and 
poverty reduction in Kenya. As a result, therefore, it is hoped that this study 
on the whole will be an important resource for obtaining knowledge on urban 
planning for poverty reduction that will invariably be useful in advancing 
knowledge and theory in this field. 
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9.4 Implications for Theory 
 
Since very little is known about the challenges faced by public institutions in 
planning for poverty reduction in Kenya, there is correspondingly very little 
theory to build upon, or even test. Moreover, the cross-disciplinary nature of 
the research problem avails a diverse range of ontological and 
epistemological perspectives. Therefore, for this study, ideas of “poverty”, 
“institutions”, and “power” from politics, institutionalism, urban studies and 
development studies were together applied to build a conceptual framework to 
investigate the research problem. 
 
The exploratory nature of this study notwithstanding, by adopting theoretical 
ideas from diverse disciplines, the research systematically analyses a specific 
case of urban planning for poverty reduction by public institutions. As a result, 
the study contributes to ways of having a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics of urban planning poverty reduction in Nairobi’s Viwandani ward. 
This research demonstrates what may hopefully become a productive way of 
evaluating the challenges faced by public institutions planning for poverty 
reduction in Nairobi and other African cities. 
9.5 Implications for Further Research 
 
It is worth noting that the scope for further research at a general level is both 
captivating and unlimited, at least for now. Extending similar studies to the 
other fifty-five wards of the City of Nairobi would be useful in enhancing 
understanding of power in planning for poverty reduction through the 
LASDAP. Such studies would also provide further scope for theory building in 
this field. Thus, further studies within the other wards of the City of Nairobi 
should provide invaluable information on the robustness of the theoretical, 
methodological, even analytical approach developed in this research. 
 
Even though it is somewhat related to the above, since this research 
employed a qualitative case study methodology, the need for quantitative 
research to generalise the findings cannot be over emphasised. The literature 
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suggests that urban planning for poverty reduction is a relatively new 
phenomenon. Even scarcely known in this literature are the challenges faced 
by planners and the poor in urban planning for poverty reduction. Some of 
these challenges, as this study has shown, include: how to ensure citizen 
participation, accountability and empowerment of the poor and excluded while 
ensuring a dynamic and relevant institutional framework. This explorative 
qualitative case study research shows the complexity of both urban planning 
for poverty reduction and the challenges public institutions in Nairobi’s 
Viwandani face in this endeavour; and sets a foundation for further research 
that seeks to build theory and methodology in this field. 
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91. Waithera, Lydia, St. Monica Wajane Group, 22 December 2006. 
92. Wako, Rukiya, Donholm Maendeleo Self Help Group, 23 December 
2006. 
93. Wambui, Lydia, Donholm Self Help Group, 23 December 2006. 
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95. Wangari, Margaret, St Monica Wajane Group, 23 December 2006. 
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Statement on the Research 
 
This research is all about the power of planning in the context of poverty.  It 
will be carefully analysing the planning and implementation of the LASDAP 
projects in the Viwandani ward of Makadara constituency in the City of 
Nairobi.  This research is titled:  Planning, Poverty and Power:  The Role of 
Power in Poverty Eradication Plans of the City of Nairobi, Kenya (see 
attached summary of the research and list of questionnaires for details). 
 
This research involves gathering information from a range of respondents.  
These include:  Central Government (officials from the Ministry of Lands and 
Ministry of Local Government, Local Government Reform Programme), City of 
Nairobi officials, members of organised civil society organisations involved in 
poverty related activities in the ward, business community, the Area MP and 
Councillors, selected professionals, community members where the LASDAP 
project(s) is located, community based organisations and the DFID Kenya 
Urban Poverty Programme. This research aims at improving planning for 
poverty reduction in City of Nairobi. 
 
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, 
discontinue participation, or skip any questions you don’t wish to answer at 
any time without penalty. Although you may not personally receive any direct 
benefits from participating in this research, the research will hopefully have a 
wider benefit to planning in Kenya, or at least to academic knowledge and 
understanding. As an academic research, confidentiality of information 
provided will be maintained and names of individuals will not be published 
whilst presenting the results of the study without the necessary authority.  It is 
only the researcher, Grace Lubaale, who will have access to research results 
associated with your identity.  To ensure your participation is confidential, 
please do not provide any personally identifying information on the 
questionnaires.  
 
Should you have any questions about this research study, do not hesitate to 
contact the researcher or his supervisor, Professor Philip Harrison of the 
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School Architecture and Planning, at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, Private Bag 3, Wits 2050 Republic of South Africa. Email: 
philiph@joburg.org.za or telephone: +27 11 717 7702 
 
I would be most grateful if you assisted me by kindly answering related to 
planning for Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plans and poverty 
reduction in Nairobi and the wards in the Makadara Constituency.  In the 
event that some of the questions asked appear irrelevant to you or your 
organisation, please answer only those you deem relevant. Finally your 
comments on this study will be much appreciated. 
 
 
 
PART A:  TOWN CLERK 
 
DATE: 
 
LOCATION/PLACE 
 
TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF INTERVIEW: 
 
 
PART ONE:   INTRODUCTION. 
 
My names are  Grace Lubaale, at present a PhD Candidate at the School 
of Architecture and Planning, at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. 
 
The purpose of my visit is mainly to talk to you about my research and 
get your views on the study.  I trust your views and your thoughts will 
greatly enrich my study.  I will begin with getting to know more about 
your role in this organisation. 
 
1) How long have you been in this position? 
 
 
2) What position did you hold before moving here? 
 
 
Let me move on to asking specific question about the city’s views on 
issues related to poverty 
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PART:  TWO 
 
 
1). How has the City responded to poverty? 
 
2) How does the City relate with other local and central government 
departments in addressing poverty? 
 
3) What does the Poverty Reduction strategy mean to the City of Nairobi? 
 
4) How do you see your programmes tackling poverty in the City? 
 
5) Could you please narrate for me how the LASDAP has worked in Nairobi? 
 Actors/players and their roles and expectations from the process 
 How they interacted 
 How did each of them understand the purpose of the LASDAP 
process 
 Challenges faced and how they have been addressed 
 Outcomes, successes and what did not turn out well 
 What could have been done differently 
 
6) What lessons or insights have you gained from the City’s response to 
poverty? 
 
 
Finally, I would like to get you personal views on some issues related to 
poverty in the City of Nairobi. 
 Notions of poverty 
 City’s response to poverty 
 Planning for poverty 
 
THANK YOU. 
 
 
TIME INTERVIEW ENDED 
PERSONAL COMMENTS: 
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PART 2 
KEY STAFF IN THE MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT REFORM PROGRAMME AND MINISTRY OF LANDS, 
DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICAL PLANNING 
 
DATE: 
 
LOCATION/PLACE: 
 
TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF INTERVIEW: 
 
 
PART ONE:   INTRODUCTION. 
 
My names are Grace Lubaale, at present a PhD Candidate at the School 
of Architecture and Planning, at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. 
 
The purpose of my visit is mainly to talk to you about my research and 
get your views on the study.  I trust your views and your thoughts will 
greatly enrich my study.  I will begin with getting to know more about 
your role in this organisation. 
 
1) How long have you been in this position? 
 
 
2) What position did you hold before moving here? 
 
 
Let me move on to asking specific question about the city’s views on 
issues related to poverty 
 
 
PART:  TWO 
 
1) How has your department responded to poverty in the country and in 
Nairobi in particular? 
 
2) Could you please describe the planning process for poverty reduction in the 
country? 
 
3) How does your department relate with the City and with other central 
government departments in addressing poverty? 
 
4) What has the Poverty Reduction strategy meant to your work and 
relationship with the City of Nairobi? 
 
5) Could you please explain to me how the LASDAP has worked in Nairobi? 
 Actors/players and their roles and expectations from the process 
 How they interacted 
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 How did each of them understand the purpose of the LASDAP 
process 
 Challenges faced and how they have been addressed 
 Outcomes, successes and what did not turn out well 
 What could have been done differently 
 
6) What lessons or insights have you gained from the department and City’s 
response to poverty? 
 
 
 
Finally, I would like to get you personal views on some issues related to 
poverty in the City of Nairobi. 
 Notions of poverty 
 City’s response to poverty 
 Planning for poverty 
 
 
 
THANK YOU. 
 
 
TIME INTERVIEW ENDED 
 
PERSONAL COMMENTS: 
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PART 3 
 
CITY OF NAIROBI PLANNING DEPARTMENT AND OTHER STAFF WHO 
ARE INVOLVED IN THE LASDAP 
 
DATE: 
 
LOCATION/PLACE: 
 
TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF INTERVIEW: 
 
 
PART ONE:   INTRODUCTION. 
 
My names are Grace Lubaale, at present a PhD Candidate at the School 
of Architecture and Planning, at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. 
 
The purpose of my visit is mainly to talk to you about my research and 
get your views on the study.  I trust your views and your thoughts will 
greatly enrich my study.  I will begin with getting to know more about 
your role in this organisation. 
 
1) How long have you been in this position? 
 
 
2) What position did you hold before moving here? 
 
 
Let me move on to asking specific question about the city’s views on 
issues related to poverty 
 
 
PART:  TWO 
 
1) How has the City Council responded to poverty in Nairobi? 
 
2) Could you please describe the planning process for poverty reduction in the 
city? 
 
3) How does your department relate with the other departments of the Council 
and government ministries in addressing poverty? 
 
4) What has the Poverty Reduction strategy meant to your work and 
relationship with the City of Nairobi? 
 
5) Could you please narrate for me how the LASDAP has worked in Nairobi? 
 Actors/players and their roles and expectations from the process 
 How they interacted 
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 How did each of them understand the purpose of the LASDAP 
process 
 Challenges faced and how they have been addressed 
 Outcomes, successes and what did not turn out well 
 What could have been done differently 
 
6) In which parts of the city has the LASDAP been successful/not successful 
in reducing poverty? Why? 
 
7) What lessons or insights have you gained from the department and City’s 
response to poverty? 
 
 
Finally, I would like to get you personal views on some issues related to 
poverty in the City of Nairobi. 
 Notions of poverty 
 City’s response to poverty 
 Planning for poverty 
 
 
THANK YOU. 
 
 
TIME INTERVIEW ENDED 
 
PERSONAL COMMENTS: 
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PART 4 
 
ORGANISED CIVIL SOCIETY AND BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN 
VIWANDANDI WARD, MAKADARA CONSTITUENCY 
 
NAME 
DATE 
 
LOCATION/PLACE: 
 
TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF INTERVIEW: 
 
 
PART ONE:   INTRODUCTION. 
 
My names are  Grace Lubaale, at present a PhD Candidate at the School 
of Architecture and Planning, at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. 
 
The purpose of my visit is mainly to talk to you about my research and 
get your views on the study.  I trust your views and your thoughts will 
greatly enrich my study.  I will begin with getting to know more about 
your role in this organisation. 
 
1) How long have you been in this position? 
 
 
2) What position did you hold before moving here? 
 
 
Let me move on to asking specific question about the city’s views on 
issues related to poverty 
 
 
PART:  TWO 
 
1) How long have been resident/worked in Viwandani (the study area)? 
 
2) How have you been involved in poverty reduction in Viwandani? 
 
3) How has the City Council responded to poverty in this Ward and in Nairobi 
in general? 
 
4) What has the Poverty Reduction strategy meant to your work and 
relationship with the City of Nairobi? 
 
5) Could you please narrate for me how the LASDAP has worked in Nairobi? 
 Actors/players and their roles and expectations from the process 
 How they interacted 
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 How did each of them understand the purpose of the LASDAP 
process 
 Challenges faced and how they have been addressed 
 Outcomes, successes and what did not turn out well 
 What could have been done differently 
 
6) In which parts of the ward has the LASDAP been successful/not successful 
in reducing poverty? Why? 
 
7) What lessons or insights have you gained from the department and City’s 
response to poverty? 
 
Finally, I would like to get you personal views on some issues related to 
poverty in the City of Nairobi. 
 Notions of poverty 
 City’s response to poverty 
 Planning for poverty 
 
 
THANK YOU. 
 
 
TIME INTERVIEW ENDED 
 
PERSONAL COMMENTS: 
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PART 5 
 
POLITICIANS (MPS AND COUNCILLORS) 
 
NAME 
 
DATE: 
 
LOCATION/PLACE: 
 
TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF INTERVIEW: 
 
 
PART ONE:   INTRODUCTION. 
 
My names are  Grace Lubaale, at present a PhD Candidate at the School 
of Architecture and Planning, at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. 
 
The purpose of my visit is mainly to talk to you about my research and 
get your views on the study.  I trust your views and your thoughts will 
greatly enrich my study.  I will begin with getting to know more about 
your role in this organisation. 
 
1) How long have you been in this position? 
 
 
2) What position did you hold before moving here? 
 
 
Let me move on to asking specific question about the city’s views on 
issues related to poverty 
 
 
PART:  TWO 
 
 
 
1) How have you been involved in poverty reduction in Viwandani/Makadara? 
 
2) How has the City Council responded to poverty in this Ward and in Nairobi 
in general? 
 
3) What has the Poverty Reduction strategy meant to your work and 
relationship with the City of Nairobi? 
 
4) Could you please narrate for me how the LASDAP has worked in Nairobi? 
 Actors/players and their roles and expectations from the process 
 How they interacted 
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 How did each of them understand the purpose of the LASDAP 
process 
 Challenges faced and how they have been addressed 
 Outcomes, successes and what did not turn out well 
 What could have been done differently 
 
5) In which parts of the Constituency/ward has the LASDAP been 
successful/not successful in reducing poverty? Why? 
 
6) What lessons or insights have you gained from the department and City’s 
response to poverty? 
 
 
Finally, I would like to get you personal views on some issues related to 
poverty in the City of Nairobi. 
 Notions of poverty 
 City’s response to poverty 
 Planning for poverty 
 
THANK YOU. 
 
 
TIME INTERVIEW ENDED 
 
PERSONAL COMMENTS: 
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Part 6 
 
PROFESSIONALS AND OTHER KEY INFORMANTS WHO PARTICIPATED 
IN THE PROCESS: 
 
NAME 
 
DATE 
 
LOCATION/PLACE: 
 
TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF INTERVIEW: 
 
 
PART ONE:   INTRODUCTION. 
 
My names are Grace Lubaale, at present a PhD Candidate at the School 
of Architecture and Planning, at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. 
 
The purpose of my visit is mainly to talk to you about my research and 
get your views on the study.  I trust your views and your thoughts will 
greatly enrich my study.  I will begin with getting to know more about 
your role in this organisation. 
 
1) How long have you been in the LASDAP processes? 
 
 
2) What were you doing before you got involved in the LASDAP 
processes? 
 
 
Let me move on to asking specific question about the city’s views on 
issues related to poverty 
 
 
PART:  TWO 
 
1) How have you been involved in poverty reduction in Viwandani? 
 
2) How has the City Council responded to poverty in this Ward and in Nairobi 
in general? 
 
3) What has the Poverty Reduction strategy meant to your work and 
relationship with the City of Nairobi? 
 
4) Could you please narrate for me how the LASDAP has worked in Nairobi? 
 Actors/players and their roles and expectations from the process 
 How they interacted 
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 How did each of them understand the purpose of the LASDAP 
process 
 Challenges faced and how they have been addressed 
 Outcomes, successes and what did not turn out well 
 What could have been done differently 
 
5) In which parts of the ward has the LASDAP been successful/not successful 
in reducing poverty? Why? 
 
6) What lessons or insights have you gained from the department and City’s 
response to poverty? 
 
 
Finally, I would like to get you personal views on some issues related to 
poverty in the City of Nairobi. 
 Notions of poverty 
 City’s response to poverty 
 Planning for poverty 
 
 
THANK YOU. 
 
 
TIME INTERVIEW ENDED 
 
PERSONAL COMMENTS: 
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Part 7 
 
 
ORGANISED COMMUNITIES, RESIDENTS OF COMMUNITIES WHERE 
LASDAP PROJECT (S) ARE LOCATED 
 
Name 
Date 
 
LOCATION/PLACE: 
 
TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF INTERVIEW: 
 
 
PART ONE:   INTRODUCTION. 
 
My names are  Grace Lubaale, at present a PhD Candidate at the School 
of Architecture and Planning, at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. 
 
The purpose of my visit is mainly to talk to you about my research and 
get your views on the study.  I trust your views and your thoughts will 
greatly enrich my study.  I will begin with getting to know more about 
your role in this organisation. 
 
1) How long have you been living in this village? 
 
 
2) What position did you hold before moving here? 
 
 
Let me move on to asking specific question about the city’s views on 
issues related to poverty 
 
 
PART:  TWO 
 
1) Talking about poverty in Nairobi, what does poverty mean?  Who are the 
poor? 
2) What are your experiences regarding the LASDAP and poverty reduction? 
 
3) Could you please narrate for me how the LASDAP has worked in 
Viwandani? 
 Actors/players and their roles and expectations from the process 
 How they interacted 
 How did each of them understand the purpose of the LASDAP 
process 
 Challenges faced and how they have been addressed 
 Outcomes, successes and what did not turn out well 
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 What could have been done differently 
 
4) In which parts of the ward has the LASDAP been successful/not successful 
in reducing poverty? Why? 
 
5) What lessons or insights have you gained from the department and City’s 
response to poverty? 
 
 
THANK YOU. 
 
 
TIME INTERVIEW ENDED 
 
PERSONAL COMMENTS: 
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Outline Procedures for the case study 
 
o Identify key informants, who will advise on the identification of 
suitable projects and triangulation of evidence gathered during the 
field study. 
o Carefully study relevant documents and reports prior to any 
interviews as well as review materials from earlier interviews. 
o Using questions listed, conduct open-ended interviews with 
purposefully sampled respondents. 
o Tape and transcribe all interviews on an on-going basis. 
o Prepare feed back reports to share at forums with the different 
interviews to further triangulate evidence and analysis. 
o Whilst collecting data/evidence for this study, use multiple sources; 
build a database and maintain a chain of evidence. 
o Finally, overlapping analysis with data collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
